Assessing The Impact Of University Technology Incubator Practices On Client Performance by O\u27Neal, Thomas
University of Central Florida 
STARS 
Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 2004-2019 
2005 
Assessing The Impact Of University Technology Incubator 
Practices On Client Performance 
Thomas O'Neal 
University of Central Florida 
 Part of the Engineering Commons 
Find similar works at: https://stars.library.ucf.edu/etd 
University of Central Florida Libraries http://library.ucf.edu 
This Doctoral Dissertation (Open Access) is brought to you for free and open access by STARS. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 2004-2019 by an authorized administrator of STARS. For more 
information, please contact STARS@ucf.edu. 
STARS Citation 
O'Neal, Thomas, "Assessing The Impact Of University Technology Incubator Practices On Client 




ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF UNIVERSITY TECHNOLOGY INCUBATOR 










B.S.E.E. University of South Florida, 1986 
M.S. University of Central Florida, 1995 




A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements  
for the degree of /Doctor of Philosophy  
in the Department of Industrial Engineering  
in the College of Engineering  























































This research is designed to distinguish and describe or explain incubator practices that affect the 
performance of incubator clients of university technology incubator programs. The research 
focuses on understanding which practices significantly contribute to increasing job creation for 
the firms located in university based technology incubators. 
 
An increasing number of communities are embracing economic development strategies that 
target the high tech sector with high wage, high value jobs as a way to diversify their economies 
and boost local and regional economies.  New economic development strategies include the 
notion of a creation strategy or “growing your own” instead of relying on recruiting of existing 
companies from other regions.  In 1999-2000 (according to the most recent data), small 
businesses created three-quarters of U.S. net new jobs (2.5 million of the 3.4 million total). The 
small business percentage varies from year to year and reflects economic trends. Over the decade 
of the 1990s, small business net job creation fluctuated between 60 and 80 percent.  Moreover, 
according to a Bureau of the Census working paper1, start-ups in the first two years of operation 
accounted for virtually all of the net new jobs in the economy. 
 
                                                 
1 Sources: U.S. Bureau of the Census; Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts; Endogenous 
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CHAPTER ONE:  INTRODUCTION 
 
Economic development targeted to the high tech sector is becoming increasingly more appealing 
to areas interested in boosting local and regional economies. With the higher than average wage 
and rapid growth potential typically associated with technology-based companies, it is easy to 
see why.  New economic development strategies include the notion of a creation strategy or 
“growing your own” instead of relying on what is commonly referred to as “smokestack 
chasing” (Fredrikson, 2001). Smokestack chasing, the recruitment of companies from other 
regions, can be a very costly strategy.  
 
According to the National Business Incubation Association (NBIA) Survey of Business 
Incubators (Linder, 2002), there are approximately 950 business incubators operating in the US 
today, up from 550 in 1997. New incubators have been opening at the rate of about one per week 
since 1986. In 2001 alone, North American incubators assisted more than 35,000 start-up 
companies that provided full-time employment for nearly 82,000 workers and generated annual 
earnings of more than $7 billion (Linder, 2002). That figure is up from 8,000 start-up firms in 
1997. One of the most astounding statistics (Molnar et al., 1997) reported by the NBIA is that 
nearly 90 percent of firms started through an incubator are still in operation. This compares to an 
overall national average survival rate of less than 50 percent for the first four years of a company 
(SBA). If the goal is reduction of infant mortality among new ventures, then many incubators are 




This research is designed to distinguish and understand incubator quality and the performance of 
technology incubator programs. The answers to this question will better inform economic 
development officials on how to invest scarce resources. It also seeks to understand and 
overcome problems with previous evaluative research on business incubation: small sample 
sizes, selection bias, combining the results from different types of incubators, and the failure to 
control for the environmental context (Allen and Bazan, 1990; Mian, 1996; Bearse, 1998; Lewis, 
2001).  
 
Some of these shortcomings can be addressed by focusing on a specific type of incubator and 
surveying the entire technology segment of the business incubator industry. A recent survey 
conducted by the Department of Commerce did just that, focusing on technology business 
incubators in the United States. Data from this survey will be analyzed to help understand the 
differences between technology incubator programs with respect to both the size and age of the 
program, as well as to ensure sufficient distribution across regions. 
 
In the case of technology incubator research, other obstacles exist, including their nascent nature 
and their limited number (Mian, 1996). The growth of this segment of the industry in the 1990’s 
has increased their numbers, and as we entered the twenty-first century, they have begun to 
mature.  
Communities have three basic economic development strategies:  
• Attract existing or expanding companies 
• Retain companies  
• Grow new companies 
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To better understand the differences between these economic development stategies, consider the 
following examples.   
 
In the first case, local communities compete for a new plant, where extravagant baskets of 
incentives are not unusual in what is often referred to as “smokestack chasing.” In the 1993 
Mercedes sports utility vehicle plant bidding war, Alabama out-dueled 34 other states with an 
incentive package that totaled $300 million, of which infrastructure development, job training, 
tax concessions, and other perks were included. Similar deals had been struck in Tennessee, 
where, in 1982, the state offered an incentive package for a Nissan automobile manufacturing 
plant that totaled approximately $11,000 per created job; in 1987 Tennessee offered Saturn a 
package more than double Nissan’s package in terms of dollars per created job: $26,000 per job. 
Both Nissan and Saturn gladly accepted the offers and chose the Volunteer State as their new 
homes.1 
 
Retention can also be very expensive.  Consider the example involving Lucent Technology Inc.’s 
Orlando semiconductor fabrication facility.  Lucent employed over 1,500 high tech workers in 
this facility and was looking to expand.  The King of Spain became aware of this and offered 
Lucent $300 Million to move its entire operation to Spain.  Even with the locally rooted 
manager’s resistance to move, the money on the table was too much to ignore.  A counter offer 
had to be made to keep the company here, even if the offer fell short of the $300M offer.   
The State of Florida, local government, and two universities (USF and UCF) pulled together to 
make Lucent a long term offer that included tax relief on all major equipment, matching funds 
for equipment purchases if bought through a state university, millions in research at the 
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universities with liberal intellectual property terms, and the creation of and access to specialized 
laboratories at UCF and USF such as UCF’s Material Characterization Facility.2   
 
The offer was good enough to keep Lucent in the Orlando area.  Subsequently, the telecom 
bubble burst and they laid off over 800 employees but are now on the rebound.  The interesting 
part is that they do not have any plans to expand or upgrade the facilities.  They are running three 
shifts now but will most likely close the plant once this product line completes its life cycle.3  
 
On the other hand, the cost of creating jobs via a creation strategy that incorporates an incubation 
program averages $1,100 per job created (Molnar et al., 1997). These companies also establish 
local roots and are less likely to be recruited out of the area by the next incentive package. The 
rationale for this practice is that homegrown companies develop the roots and loyalties to 
communities lacking in transplanted companies. The same study (Molnar et al., 1997) reported 
that 84% of incubator graduates remain in the area they were incubated in. As these companies 
go through their ups and downs, it is hoped that they will keep their corporate headquarters in 
these communities intact during down periods and that other regions will be first in line for 
cutbacks, layoffs, and other negative actions. 
 
Different tools, strategies, and practices have been developed across the U.S. and the modern 
world to stimulate or catalyze new company creation. Efforts concentrate on increasing the 
number of new companies formed as well as increasing the success rate of these ventures. The 
technology oncubator has gained popularity in recent times as a major tool for increasing the 
number of successful “homegrown” companies (DeGiovanna and Lewis, 1998).  
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Technology incubators are found in many places, provide differing levels of services, and 
achieve varying levels of effectiveness. The number of technology incubators has doubled to 
nearly 300 since 1997 (Lewis, 2003). However, there has been limited work conducted on how 
to assess the quality of incubation programs relative to regional development goals. The goal of 
this dissertation is to develop a framework to assess incubator quality. As will soon become 
apparent, the quest for a universal set of indicators has not been successful. The variety of 
incubator goals has thwarted such efforts. To understand the issue, this dissertation will review 
the developmental history of incubators.  
 
Brief History of Incubation 
Webster’s Dictionary defines the term incubator as:  
“an apparatus by which eggs are hatched artificially b: an apparatus with a 
chamber used to provide controlled environmental conditions especially for the 
cultivation of microorganisms or the care and protection of premature or sick 
babies.”  
 
The dictionary dates this entry as 1857. Starting in the mid-1980’s, editors of the journal, 
Frontiers of Entrepreneurship Research, dedicated a session to business incubation each year at 
their conference. It is from these sessions that the definition of business incubator used by much 
of the industry began to emerge. In 1985, three papers presented at the conference asserted that 
that an incubator must have a physical plant with below market rents, shared services, logistical 
support, and business consulting services (Gatewood et al., 1985; Allen, 1985; Peterson, 1985).  
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Building on knowledge from the practice of incubation, Allen and Weinberg (1988) incorporated 
empirical evidence to show that the industry had shifted its focus to value added business 
services, away from site development and subsidized rents. In the case of technology 
entrepreneurs, entrepreneurial training programs and networking opportunities are valued higher 
than a reduced cost of services or rent (Lichtentein, 1992). 
 
Hackett and Delts (2004), based on insights they acquired from reviewing the literature as well 
as from conducting fieldwork in Asia and North America, offer the following definition: A 
business incubator is a shared office space facility that seeks to provide its clients (i.e. 
‘‘portfolio’’ or ‘‘client’’ or ‘‘tenant companies’’) with a strategic, value-adding intervention 
system (i.e. business incubation) of monitoring and business assistance. The incubator can 
control and link resources that assist in the development of its clients’ new ventures.  It 
simultaneously helps contain the cost of their potential failure. Additionally, they offer the 
following corollary: When discussing the incubator, it is important to keep in mind the totality of 
the incubator. Specifically, as a firm is not just an office building, infrastructure and articles of 
incorporation, the incubator is not simply a shared-space office facility, infrastructure and 
mission statement. Rather, the incubator is also a network of individuals and organizations 
including the incubator manager and staff, incubator advisory board, client companies and 
employees, local universities and university community members, industry contacts, and 
professional services providers such as lawyers, accountants, consultants, marketing specialists, 
venture capitalists, angel investors, and volunteers.  This suggests that an incubation system 
better describes how an effective incubator fits into this context.  
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The National Business Incubator Association website (www.nbia.org) currently defines a 
Business Incubator as:  
“A dynamic process of business enterprise development. Incubators nurture 
young firms, helping them to survive and grow during the start-up period when 
they are most vulnerable. Incubators provide hands-on management assistance, 
access to financing and orchestrated exposure to critical business or technical 
support services. Most also offer entrepreneurial firms shared office services, 
access to equipment, flexible leases and expandable space — all under one 
roof.” 
 
This definition focuses on the “process” of incubation rather than on the incubation facility.  It 
captures the notion of providing a supportive environment for new companies, much in the same 
context as the original biology based incubator has done in the life sciences. The difference being 
that the nurturing environment necessary to hatch new companies depends more on a process and 
services that on the physical environment.  
 
 Thus metrics like floor space and space utilization miss the point. The act of mentoring or 
helping a new company get started has likely been going on for as long as companies have been 
in existence. The most commonly accepted birth date for formal Business Incubation in the U.S. 
is 1959, when Joseph L. Mancuso of Batavia, New York opened an 850,000 square feet 
incubator in a Massey-Furguson facility that had been closed a year earlier (Allen and Bazen, 
1990). More incubators followed on a limited scale until 1984 when the U.S. Small Business 
Administration (SBA) released a study that concluded that the majority of new jobs were being 
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creating by small business. This created a boom for incubator development. At that time there 
were 20 incubators in operation. In the 1960’s and 1970’s incubation programs diffused slowly, 
and typically as government sponsored responses to the need for urban/Midwestern economic 
revitalization. Notably, in the 1960’s interest in incubators-incubation was piqued by the 
development of University City Science Center (UCSC), a collaborative effort at rationalizing 
the process of commercializing basic research outputs (Adkins, 2001). 
 
Incubator Trends 
The rapid growth of the incubator industry was accompanied by a shift in the relative size of its 
different segments, with technology incubators rapidly ascending to become the dominant 
segment of the industry, growing to 40 percent of the population, while mixed-use incubators 
have declined to 30 percent (Loftus, 2000).  Public support for technology business incubators, 
in terms of funding, is widespread.  Over 65 percent of technology incubators receive public 
funding for operating expenses from the federal, state, and/or local government. If one includes 
assistance from public universities, the figure rises to 71.2 percent (Quittner, 1999).  
 
Business incubators have a wide variety of structures and supportive mechanisms. Some of the 
most common are classifications of business incubators defined by sponsors include:  
 
Sponsor Arrangement % 
Nonprofit, public or private 51
Academic related 27
Hybrid: joint effort among government, nonprofit agencies and/or 
private developers 16
Private, for profit 8 
Other sources such as art organizations, private industry councils, 
church group, chambers of commerce, etc. 5 
Source: National Business Incubator Association (Molnar, 1997)
 8
The most common types of firms using business incubators are light manufacturing, technology 
and service firms, and those developing new products or engaged in research and development. 
There are a limited number of construction-related, sales and marketing, or wholesale and 
distribution firms using incubators. A retail operation is considered a poor fit for incubation 
(Molnar, 1997).  
 
There are a wide variety of reasons for operating an incubator. There may be a need for job 
creation in the community, promotion of economic self-sufficiency for a selected population 
group, diversification of the local economy, transfer of technology from universities and 
corporations, or sharing venture experiences with new companies by successful entrepreneurs 
and investors. There is no question that whatever the motivation behind the incubator, it is an 
economic boon for the community, providing jobs and an expanded business base (Molnar, 
1997). 
 
Another key ingredient for home grown economic development is entrepreneurship. A pool of 
entrepreneurial venture starters with the ability to take an idea and turn it into a company is vital. 
The question many communities face is: is there an entrepreneurial talent-base in their specific 
region?  The effective integration of entrepreneurship, technology transfer, and incubation 
programs is the goal of many university and community economic development efforts (O’Neal 
and D’Cruz, 2003).   
 
Business incubation is also increasing on a global scale. The United Nations Industrial 
Development Organization (UNIDO) actively monitors and promotes the development of 
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business incubators worldwide. They estimate that there are at 500 incubators in developing and 
transition countries. 
 
The key point is that, given the varied motivations and interest, support structures, and objectives 
of individual incubation programs, the question of how you measure the quality or success of an 
incubation program becomes complex. From a purely economic development perspective, the 
number of new jobs created and the amount of revenue generated by client companies are 
excellent metrics. If the stated goals of an incubator differ from pure economic development 
however, these measures may only capture one dimension that may or may not meet the strategic 
purpose of the program.  
 
The Role of Universities in Incubators 
As noted in previous sections, many incubators are sponsored by academic institutions. Others 
have established close relationships with universities and colleges. Technology incubators, in 
particular, use universities as a technology source and as a means to provide opportunities for 
their tenant firms to leverage university research in their commercialization efforts. 
 
In a recent study on the relationship of firm performance and its link to academic institutions, 
researchers found that growth companies with university ties have productivity rates almost two-
thirds higher than their peers (Coopers and Lybrand, 1995a). This result was based on interviews 
of some 424 product and service companies. Companies that used university resources also 
project higher annual revenues (21 percent higher), more recent bank loans (32 percent more), 
and more major capital investments (23 percent more). Of the companies interviewed, 59 percent 
indicated no relationship with the university. 
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Growth companies used students as resources.  Some 70 percent hired student interns, while 40 
percent recruited their employees directly from the student population. Additionally, 44 percent 
of the firms indicated that they employed faculty as technical resources. In addition to these 
resources, the growth companies utilized university laboratories and facilities. While the growth 
companies were satisfied with their relationships, certain barriers existed, including faculty 
culture, lack of active support for coordinating programs, inappropriate technology or research 
for business, and lack of expertise in working with growing companies. Overall, approximately 
29% of the growth companies indicated that their relationship with a university had been 
extremely helpful to their company's growth. 
 
Gibson (1988) focused on the role of universities with respect to the commercialization of 
technology. In this context, he suggested four categories of activities: (1) evaluation of 
innovations and patent policies; (2) commercialization, innovation and technology transfer; (3) 
entrepreneurship; and (4) incubator activities and research parks. With respect to incubator 
activities, Gibson suggests that incubators offer not only general business services, but also 
direct assistance such as business advisory services, seed money, and assistance in securing 
venture capital. 
 
Mian (1996) examined six university technology business incubators (UTBI) with respect to 
their role in the development of new technology based firms and their value-added dimensions of 
services along with university-related inputs. The study concludes that several UTBI services, 
specifically some of the university-related inputs such as university images (credibility), 
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laboratories and equipment, and student employees, added major value to the client firms, 
making the UTBI a viable strategy for nurturing new, high-technology firms. 
 
Mian (1994) examined some 30 university-sponsored technology incubators to assess their 
performance along organizational, design, tenant performance review, funding sources, targeted 
technologies, strategic operational policies, services and their value-added components, and 
growth of the client firms. This study was a comparative assessment of private versus state 
university-sponsored incubators. The results found that there were no significant differences 
based on the type of sponsorship, state or private. It concludes that the UTBI’s appear to provide 
an environment conducive to the development of new firms. 
 
Summary 
Nearly all researchers emphasize that incubators serve multiple purposes.  The question of what 
factors or conditions are necessary for success is difficult to answer.  The real question then is 
“What is meant by incubator success” and “What is it that the incubator sponsors are trying to 
achieve?”  
 
Incubator success should be measured against what is trying to be achieved. For example, 
investment opportunities of tenant firms will not be the same for all types of incubators. 
Similarly, job creation will not occur at even rates; perhaps the focus of an incubator on new 
firms in manufacturing versus services may be the main determinant of job creation. To evaluate 
incubator quality or success, especially in their early stages, one must look more at what 
milestones have been achieved rather than only at quantitative indicators. Many people, 
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especially in the media, have a tendency to "count jobs," that is, how much employment is 
created at the incubator. This simplistic approach ignores the fact that employment gains 
primarily occur if and when the firm graduates from the facility and assumes a more mature 
market stance. The existence of a graduate is, in fact, an important incubator performance 
milestone, possibly the most important success measure.  Other milestones that Campbell and 
Allen (1987) proposed examining are: creation of a responsive business consulting network, 
participation of financial intermediaries in tenant capitalization, the point at which the majority 
of tenants are start-up firms as opposed to previously existing small businesses, and the 
synergism that occurs when tenants develop trade relations with one another such as 
subcontracting and joint purchasing. These types of conditions must exist before success can 




CHAPTER TWO:  LITERATURE REVIEW 
During the progression through the introspection and preliminary study of incubators, three 
distinct issues emerged.  First, much of this research will be exploratory in nature.  Second, this 
research will focus on technology incubators and third, the research will focus on ascertaining 
the impact that external relationships have on the success of an incubation program.  Thus the 
literature review consisted of (1) a general review of research concerning incubators, (2) a 
review targeted at technology incubators, and (3) a review of literature pertaining to networking 
research.  The latter is required because it has become evident that meaningful studies of 
incubation must be performed in a systemic context.  
  
General Incubator Literature Review 
The literature for incubation is new and often ambiguous.  To help with this review, the 
following terms will be used for convenience but no assertion will be made as to their 
correctness. 
 
Incubator: The term incubator, incubation, and the process of incubation will be used 
interchangeably. Much of the literature will use the hyphenated term, incubator-
incubation but will only be done so here if there is a distinction to be made. 
Client: This term will refer to the company being incubated. The term “incubatee” is often 
used in the literature but client better reflects the relationship.  Incubator client will 
also be used. 
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Overview of Exploratory Research 
This exploratory research of the literature revealed a substantive work in the area of interest but 
not a lot of depth.   Many of the reviews, including this one, sound very similar in many respects, 
with very little deviation from some of the original work.  While progress has been made, 
especially in the last ten to fifteen years, the problems associated with research in this area 
remain formidable.   
 
The Council for Urban Economic Development conducted one of the earliest quantitative based 
evaluations by surveying fifty (50) successful incubators and conducting a stratified analysis of 
the results (Peterson, 1985) by external affiliation (i.e., public nonprofit, university related, or 
private) and analyzed the types of firms and their needs relative to the services provided. It 
concluded that the range of services provided by an incubator program was determined, in part, 
by the location of the lead organization and targeted clients. This certainly alludes to the 
difficulty in measuring success or quality given the different activities or service offerings. 
More recently, analyzing Dun & Bradstreet data on corporate history, Birch (1987) concluded 
that small entrepreneurial companies created approximately eighty (80) percent of the new jobs 
in the United States between 1969 and 1976. While many of Birch’s conclusions have been 
challenged, his work has clearly had an effect on public policy (Harrison, 1987; Shahhadi, 1997). 
This resulted in public policies designed to help small business and help drive the explosion of 
incubation programs in the U.S. (Osborne, 1990; Harrison, 1997; Eisinger, 1988).  
 
The apparently high new job payoff and its applicability on a regional basis made it important to 
understand how incubators work and what key factors make it successful.  Social scientists and 
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economic development officials have attempted to understand the factors that contribute to 
successful business incubation, so they can replicate these practices, and have focused their 
research on successful incubators (Peterson et al., 1985; Campbell et al., 1988; Smilor and Gill, 
1986). These published best practices have had demonstrable positive impacts on incubated 
firms (Kang, 1991; Rice, 1992; Campbell et al., 1988; Lichtenstien, 1992).   This section traces 
the implications of their findings. 
 
Campbell points out that while company survival rates and new job creation rates are important, 
these measures fail to capture the long-term effect of business incubators (Campbell et al., 1988). 
Graduation rates and job creation do not take into account what happens to firms once they 
graduate and leave the incubator. These numbers certainly are important to defining long-term 
success. Allen and Culp concluded that there are no significant differences in the growth rate of 
incubator graduate firms and their control groups (Allen et al., 1990; Culp, 1996). The survival 
rate however, for incubated firms is approximately twice the national average, approaching 90 
percent (Molar et. al., 1997). Even given that it has been found that there is no significant 
difference between incubator graduate firm growth and regional firm growth, the fact remains 
that twice as many of these firms survive. How much of this is attributable to the incubator 
program and how much is a function of selection bias is not addressed in this research.   
 
In the 1970’s the National Science Foundation’s (NSF) Innovation Centers Program began 
generating interest in the incubator concept through its program designed to stimulate and 
institutionalize best practices in the processes of evaluating and commercializing selected 
technological inventions (Bowman-Upton et al., 1989; Scheirer, 1985)4. In the 1980’s and 1990’s 
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the rate of incubator diffusion increased significantly when (a) the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act 
in the U.S. Congress in 1980 decreased the uncertainty associated with commercializing the 
fruits of federally funded basic research, (b) the U.S. legal system increasingly recognized the 
importance of innovation and intellectual property rights protection, and (c) profit opportunities 
derived from the commercialization of biomedical research expanded. In this environment, 
several incubator development guides as well as non-academic reports and articles with a 
geographic and normative focus on current or potential business incubation efforts were 
generated. This surge in incubator report-generating activity in the early 1980’s and the 
formation of the NBIA in 1985 underscore the growth in popular interest in business incubation 
in the 1980’s. Concurrent to these and other local efforts at studying and unleashing the potential 
of business incubation to foster economic development, academic incubation studies began in 
earnest.  
 
Much of this early research addresses the questions ‘‘What is an Incubator?’’ and ‘‘What do we 
need in order to develop an effective incubator?’’ Business Incubator Profiles: A National 
Survey (Temali and Campbell, 1984), a ground-breaking survey of 55 business incubators, is the 
first academic attempt to address these questions by describing in detail the incubators operating 
in the United States. It is comprehensive in scope, taking the incubator, the incubator manager, 
the clients, and the services provided by the incubator as various units of analysis. Although this 
survey does not test hypotheses or attempt to build theory, its rich descriptive data and insightful 
perspective established a platform upon which much subsequent incubator development research 
is based.    
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According to the study, most incubators at the time were established in existing, and frequently 
vacant buildings.  Many had been purchased and renovated with the assistance of funding from a 
variety of government loans and grants.  Others had been purchased with state or local issued 
revenue bonds.  A few buildings had been donated or sold inexpensively by private corporations.  
Most of the incubators in the study acted as brokers between new businesses and potential 
investors by making introductions to key people or by assisting in the development of proposals 
and loan packages.  Publicly sponsored incubators sought primarily to create jobs, and university 
affiliated incubators sought to transfer research and development activities and to spin off 
university research efforts. 
 
The Temali-Campbell study identified a number of elements in incubator operations: flexibility 
in leasing and management of space, centralized services to help reduce overhead costs of tenant 
companies, and various types of business assistance.  It is interesting that the research also 
discovered a unique social atmosphere that encouraged trading relations. 
 
In the late 1990’s, fueled by irrationally exuberant stock valuations of several for-profit 
incubators and/or their clients, the media popularized a perception of business incubators as 
innovation hatcheries capable of incubating and taking public ‘‘infinitely scaleable, dot-com e-
business start-ups’’ less than a year after entering the incubator. This concept of an incubator was 
pervasive causing leaders such as Florida’s Governor in 1999, to veto state funding for 
incubators in the belief that the for-profit incubator was a better model5.  This perception and the 
incubator concept were largely abandoned by the popular press after the collapse of the United 
States’ stock market bubble.  
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However, rumors of the demise of the incubator were ‘‘greatly exaggerated’’. The media reached 
its negative conclusions regarding incubators while focused on for profit incubators, a relatively 
small segment of the total incubator population.6 The vast majority of incubators are non-profit 
entities that continue to incubate below the ‘‘radar screens’’ of most journalists. Since the 
establishment of the first business incubator, most incubators have been established as publicly 
funded vehicles for job creation, urban economic revitalization, and the commercialization of 
university innovations, or as privately funded organizations for the incubation of high potential 
new ventures (Campbell and Allen, 1987).  
 
The fact that most incubators are publicly funded is not trivial. Despite the National Business 
Incubator Association’s position asserting the importance of operating incubators as enterprises 
that should become self-sufficient, profit-oriented organizations, it has not been translated into 
profitability for the majority of publicly funded incubators (Bearse, 1998). Financial dependency 
forces incubators to operate in a politically charged environment where they must constantly 
demonstrate the ‘‘success’’ of the incubator and its clients in order to justify continued 
subsidization of incubator operations with public funds. Such a politically charged environment 
can tempt incubator industry stakeholders to under report incubator failures and over-report 
successes.7  
 
For the researcher interested in understanding, explaining and building models of incubator 
phenomena, the politically charged environment and the state of subsidy-dependency in which 
many non-profit incubators operate cannot be ignored. The review of the literature shows the 
progression of the research through five primary research topic areas over various, but 
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overlapping, time periods. Hackett and Dilts’ (2004) summary of these categories is reproduced 
in Table 1 below. 
 
Table 1:  Overview of Incubator Literature Review  Source: Hacket & Dilts, 2004 
 
Research Streams                    A Systematic Review of Business Incubation Research                                                   
Overview of incubator-incubation literature  
 
Characteristics  




           B 
Incubator configuration 
studies  
             C 
Incubatee development 
studies  
           D 
Incubator-incubation 
impact studies  
             E 












What is an 
incubator? How 
do we develop an 
incubator? What 
life cycle model 
can be extracted 





Incubatee selection What are 
the critical success factors 
for incubators-incubation? 
How does the incubator-
incubation concept work in 
practice? How do incubators 
select incubatees?  
New venture 
development Impact of 
planning on development 
What is the process of 
new venture 
development in an 
incubator context? What 
is the role of planning 
and the business 
incubator manager?  
Levels and units of 
analysis Outcomes and 
measures of success Do 
incubators achieve what 
their stakeholders assert 
they do? How can 
business incubation 
program outcomes be 
evaluated? Have 
business incubators 
impacted new venture 
survival rates, job 
creation rates, industrial 
innovation rates? What 
are the economic and 
fiscal impacts of an 
incubator?  
Explicit and implicit 







is the significance of 
relationships and how 
do they 
entrepreneurship? What 
are the critical 
connection factors to 




production value, and 
creation process?’’ 
What constitutes a 
model for a virtual 
incubator? Is the 
network the location of 
the incubation process?  
 
A review of each area is provided in following five sections  
 
Incubator Development Studies 
The goal of early incubator related researchers was to accurately and / or normatively describe 
incubators. Themes in incubator development studies include efforts aimed at defining 
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It appears that most research assumes that incubators are economic development tools for job 
creation whose basic value proposition is embodied in the shared belief that operating incubators 
will result in more startups with fewer business failures (Fry, 1987; Kuratko and LaFollette, 
1987; Lumpkin and Ireland, 1988; Markley and McNamara, 1995; Rice, 1992; Udell, 1990). 
Despite the existence of this shared baseline assumption, definitional ambiguity in the terms 
‘‘business incubator’’ and ‘‘business incubation’’ plagues the literature.  
 
Such ambiguity is problematic because, without precise definitions, it is difficult to ascertain the 
actual size of the incubator population to which a systemic research effort could seek to 
generalize findings. Who to include and who not to include in a survey becomes a very difficult 
and subjective decision. The NBIA maintains a listing of member organizations.  A quick glance 
at the list reveals that a significant number of members are not functioning incubators, but are 
instead virtual incubators and other economic development organizations. The NBIA recently 
established four separate member categories to help with this issue8. 
 
Business incubators and incubation in general suffers from several sources of definitional 
ambiguity. First is the diffusion and repeated adaptation of the original business incubator 
concept in order to fit varying local needs and conditions (Kuratko and LaFollette, 1987). Second 
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is the interchangeable manner in which the terms “Research Park,” , “Technology Innovation 
Center,”, and “Business Incubator” are used in the literature (Swierczek, 1992).9 “Business 
Accelerator”, “Venture Lab”, and “Innovation and Commercialization Center” are also terms 
used in practice.10 Third is the emergence of virtual incubators (also referred to as ‘‘incubators 
without walls’’) which endeavor to deliver business assistance services to clients who are not 
collocated within an incubator facility.11 Fourth is a persistent tendency to not define the 
incubation process, or—when defined—to disagree on where and with whom the incubation 
process occurs.12  
 
Cumulatively, the above mentioned sources of ambiguity in the terms and concepts of discourse 
hinder efforts at generalizing incubator or incubation research results to the overall incubator 
population. Early attempts at defining incubators are careful to draw out a distinction between 
incubators as real estate development efforts, and incubators as systematic business development 
and business assistance efforts (Brooks, 1986; Smilor, 1987b; Smilor and Gill, 1986).  
 
Highlighting this distinction in a normative description of incubators, Brooks (1986) describes a 
two type incubator continuum where start-ups enter an ‘‘economic growth incubator’’ in order to 
gain access to the incubator’s external support network, shared support services, and the 
resources of a local university affiliated with the incubator. In this view, once the start-ups have 
attained a more advanced state of business development they can move into a ‘‘real estate 
incubator’’ which provides office space and shared services.  
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Brooks’ continuum is adapted and elaborated by Allen and McCluskey (1990). They discard the 
notion however, that clients would move into a real estate property development incubator after 
achieving a critical mass, and instead focus on the primary and secondary objectives of four 
types of incubators that are distributed along a value adding continuum. From least value-adding 
to most value-adding, these incubator types include For-Profit Property Development Incubators, 
Non-Profit Development Corporation Incubators, Academic Incubators, and For-Profit Seed 
Capital Incubators. The Allen and McCluskey continuum is reproduced in Figure 1.  
 
While the goals and objectives of different incubator types may be indicative of the amount and 
type of resources that a certain type of incubator maintains, the varying goals and objectives 
among types of incubators depicted in the figure below may not reflect the objectives of the 
incubator’s clients. Moreover, regardless of the stated goals and objectives of the incubator, ‘‘the 
universal purpose of an incubator is to increase the chances of a client firm surviving its 







Similarly, regardless of the incubator stakeholders’ desire (and political need) to demonstrate the 
ancillary effects of job creation and economic development, the universal goal of clients is (or 
should be) to survive and develop as a corporate financial entity that delivers value to the 
owner(s)/shareholders. This point is often lost in practitioner debates and in politically charged 
discussions related to the initiation of incubator feasibility studies.  With the average incubator 
 $1,000,000 (Bearse, 1998), incubator proponents tend to 
itial 
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Figure 1:  Allen and McCluskey Continuum (Allen and McCluskey, 1990). 
start-up costs approaching
overemphasize the ability of the incubator to ‘‘create jobs’’ as a justification for the large in
capital expense.   
 
As the understanding of the incubator concept advanced, the notion that the incubator itself is a
enterprise with its own developmental life cycle was developed.  The incubator start-up stage 
begins at the time a local community begins to consider establishing an incubator and ends on
the incubator has reached full occupancy (Allen, 1988). The incubator business development 
stage is indicated by an increase in the frequency of interaction among incubator managers and 
clients, stable demand for space within the incubator, and greater support for the incubator in t
local community (Allen, 1988). The incubator maturity stage reflects the point when the 




as become a center of 
ntrepreneurial gravity in the community (Allen, 1988).  
 
The recognition of the incubator life-cycle is an important advancement.   Specifically, it 
highlights the importance of would-be-clients performing due diligence on the incubator in order 
to determine whether th r has the core s assistance and the 
resources t alue demand ent team.  
 
Incubato
One of the great challenges of conducting incubator research is the difficulty of creating a 
control group of non-incubated companies whose developmental outcomes could then be 
compared to incuba herman and Chappell, 1998). Ways to overcome this 
problem include ado tched pairs or comparing the performance of clients to 
the performance of a virtual incubator’s clients (Bearse, 1998). In the literature, taxonomies of 
convenienc ar to create comparison groups. These taxonomies classify 
incubators on the basis of (a) the incubator’s primary financial sponsorship (Kuratko and 
e
e incubato  competencies in busines
o provide the kind of v ed by the venture’s managem
r Taxonomies 
ted companies (S
pting the use of ma
e e typically employed 
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LaFollette, 87b; Temali and C mpbell, 1984), (b) whether clients are spin-offs 
or start-ups (Plosila and Allen, 1985), (c) the business focus of the clients (Plosila and Allen, 
1985; Sher  and (d) the business focus of the incubator (i.e. property development or 




Incubator level: primary (Kuratko and LaFollette, 
financial sponsorship  1987; Smilor, 1987b;  
ored  Temali and Campbell, 1984)  
• Nonprofit-sponsored   
• Privately-sponsored   
1. Single tenant   
• Business assistance   
1. Shared space   
3. Business support  
• Product development  Sherman, 1999)  
• Spin-off   
 1987; Smilor, 19 a
man, 1999),




• University-sponsored   
Incubator level: business focus  (Brooks, 1986)  
• Property development   
2. Multi-tenant   
2. Low rent   
services  
Incubator level: business focus  (Plosila and Allen, 1985;  
• Manufacturing   
• Mixed-use   
Type of incubatee  (Plosila and Allen, 1985)  
• Start-up   
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A key finding is that despite the widespread use of these taxonomies, none of the stud
reviewed provided a means to predict or explain variation in incubation outcomes—presumably 
the facet of the incubator concept of greatest interest to researchers—on the basis of these 
taxonomic classifications.  
ies 
A.3 Policy Prescriptions 
 
m 
e following sources: (Allen and Weinberg, 1988; Brooks, 1986; Bruton, 1998; Campbell and 
cubator 
 
ator space are somewhat mediated by the level of 
evelopment and competencies attained by the incubator and the current state of the 
entrepreneurial activities in the local community. With this in mind, pre-screened clients should 
be waiting in the admissions pipeline prior to the departure of current clients in order to optimize 
incubator rental revenue streams.14 
 
A number of incubator policy prescriptions (best practices) offered in the literature are analyzed
below.  These prescriptions appear multiple times in the literature but are drawn primarily fro
th
Allen, 1987; Culp, 1996; Plosila and Allen, 1985).  
 
First is the need for an advisory board to serve as an incubator ombudsperson. Because the 
incubator must make difficult client selection decisions that require a sophisticated 
understanding of the market and the process of new venture formation, and because the in
must rely upon political support from its advisory board in order to secure annual operating 
subsidies, the importance of a strategically constructed advisory board should not be understated. 
 
Second, the rental income risk associated with the temporary tenancy of clients must be 




Third, a comprehensive menu of support services must be developed in order to be able to 
properly incubate the clients. Developing and offering a set of services—even if they are 
nderutilized— may be significant, as the availability of the services may induce self-reflexive 
didates must drive the client selection process. Specifically, because the incubator 
presents an attempt to help entrepreneurial firms overcome some resource gap(s)16 that prevent 
owing ways: (a) those that cannot be helped through business incubation, (b) 
ose that should be incubated due to the existence of some resource gap(s) and (c) those that do 
ns, 
u
consideration on the part of clients as to what is required for their new venture to develop.15  
 
Fourth, the qualitative difference between applicants for admission to the incubator and 
incubation can
re
them from succeeding in their early stages of development, it is important from an economic 
rationality perspective to differentiate the types of applicants for admission to a business 
incubator in the foll
th
not need incubation. Ideally, only those firms that are ‘‘weak-but-promising’’ (weak due to a 
lack of resources, but promising in the sense that they have built a compelling business case) 
should be considered incubation candidates.17  
 
Fifth, the degree to which incubators should / can assist clients with financial matters must be 
considered. Typically, most incubators do not maintain their own investment fund, serving 
instead as a broker that introduces clients to sources of capital when the need arises.  
 
Sixth, while incubators are not an economic quick fix and while they have numerous limitatio
they are an important component of a local economic development strategy and can serve a 
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Finally, flexible oversight with dynamic readjustment of incubation programs as dictated by 
local needs is important for maintaining the vitality and effectiveness of the incubator in a cost-
 the 
s for 
at were previously 
iscussed, it is important to note that incubator development studies are a beginning and not an 
d a 
ed descriptions 
at are useful for understanding the scope and nature of incubators. Over the next few years that 
eaders launched the National Business Incubation 
ssociation (NBIA), a private membership organization of incubator developers and managers, 
 
effective manner.  
 
In summation, incubator development studies represent the earliest research conducted on
incubator concept. These studies are characterized by efforts to define the incubator, to create 
taxonomic categories for comparison, and to provide policy guidelines or best practice
operating an incubator. While these efforts have several weaknesses th
d
end.  They are novel exploratory, conceptual, empirical and normative attempts to understan
very young research topic.  Early research conducted on incubators has provid
th
number  of studies rose rapidly. Industry l
A




Studies often describe the configurations of business incubators, examining the ‘‘design of the 
incubator’s support arrangement, and describing facilities, budgets, organizational charts, 
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geographical location, and institutional links’’ (Autio and Kloftsen, 1998) with a view to 
ascertaining the critical success factors of business incubation.18 The emergence of these studies 
dicates the evolution of incubator “science” from an initial exploratory, fragmented 
ponent of the incubator system.  
Incubator Configuration Frameworks 
 
Several attempts have been made to conceptualize incubator configurations and, to a limited
xtent, the process of incubation. Building on the survey data collected in Temali and Campbell 
plicitly, with this framework, Campbell et al. have normatively defined the incubation 
tion of 
in
understanding of the concept to an increasingly holistic perspective.  
 
The following subsets of configuration research are considered: (1) incubator configuration 




(1984), Campbell et al. (1985) develop a framework offering the first explicit linkage of the 
incubator concept to the business development process of clients (Campbell et al., 1985). This 
framework, reproduced in Figure 2, suggests four areas where incubators add value: the 
diagnosis of business needs, the selection and monitored application of business services, the 
provision of financing, and the provision of access to the incubator’s network.  
 
Im
process. This is useful because it suggests in detail, and for the first time, how different 
components of, and activities within, the incubator are applied to facilitate the transforma






Weaknesses in the framework center on the failure to account for failed ventures (the framework 
assumes that all incubator tenants succeed) and the application of the framework to private or for  
profit incubators only. In Figure 3, Smilor extends the Campbell et al. framework by elaborating 
various components (incubator affiliation, support systems, impact of tenant companies) of the 
incubator concept. Unlike Campbell et al., however, the Smilor framework takes an external 
perspective and fails to account for the incubation processes occurring internally.  
 
Utilizing data gathered from a national survey as well as from interviews, analysis of case 
studies, and observation, Smilor and Gill (1986) casts the incubator as a mechanism for 
reshaping the way that industry, government and academia interrelate. They categorize the 
benefits that incubators extend to their clients along four dimensions: (1) development of 
credibility, (2) shortening of the entrepreneurial learning curve, (3) quicker solution of problems, 
Figure 2:  Campbell, Kendrick, and Samuelson Framework   
(Campbell et al., 1985). 
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and (4) access to an entrepreneurial network (Smilor, 1987a). Smilor also conceptualizes the 
a set 
s components of the incubation system and most closely 
pproaches our concept of a systemic context for evaluation of incubators.  
incubator as a system that confers ‘‘structure and credibility’’ on clients while controlling 
of assistive resources: ‘‘secretarial support, administrative support, facilities support, and 
business assistance’’ (Smilor, 1987b). Smilor’s effort is perhaps the most comprehensive effort 






Hisrich (1988) advances understanding of the incubator concept by locating the incubator within 
a complete continuum of innovation: The Enterprise Development Center (EDC) approach to 
incubation aggregates venture capi
Figure 3:  Smilor framework (Smilor, 1987). 
talists, student entrepreneurs, corporate intrapreneurs, the 
nter, the local Small Business Development Center (SBDC) 
and two local incubators. Hisrich (1988) asserts that localizing the design of an EDC based on 
community (Tulsa) Innovation Ce
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cultural demands, having a highly placed champion to promote the EDC, establishing th
a step-wise fashion with validation at each step, and educating private and public sector leaders 
about the EDC are criti
e EDC in 
cal success factors.  This assertion is especially interesting as it parallels 
mu d later.  Like Brooks 
(19 , servicing 
the work, the Hisrich framework ignores 
ternal incubation processes.  
ng 
Client Selection 
Having specified the basic configuration of the incubator and conceptualized the incubator as a 
system or process, more intensive studies of the individual components of the incubator system 
were the next logical step in building the body of incubator research. Surprisingly, beyond 
Campbell et al.’s (1985) implicit definition of the incubation process and specification of the 
general configurations of incubators, little effort has been devoted to unpacking the variables 
associated with the incubation process. What work has been done in this area is generally limited 
to examining the process of selecting clients. Culp’s (1996) position focused on the need to 
select what are essentially ‘‘weak-but-promising’’ companies. Lumpkin and Ireland (1988) use 
cluster analysis to categorize incubators on the basis of the selection criteria they employed when 
ch of what created the Silicon Valley phenomenon that is presente
86)  Hisrich emphasizes the importance of incubating the community as much as 
needs of the clients. However, as with the Smilor frame
in
 
Incubator configuration studies are important efforts at drilling down into the incubator’s 
infrastructure and operations in order to extend broad understanding of the incubator concept. 
Although most of these studies are atheoretical, they help advance knowledge of a very you




choosing incubation applicants for admission to the incubator.  This research provides useful 
insights into the variability of selection criteria configurations across incubators and offers a new 
xonomy, but the study does not suggest which configuration(s) are better or worse than others, 
the approach in three questions, the first two of which are directed at the 
cubation applicant:  
1. Is this a good business in which anyone should be involved? 
2. Is this a business in which the organization has the competence to compete? 
 
st method for entry and / or growth?’’ In 
 
n lead to incubator and 
ta
nor does it attempt to link the analysis of selection criteria used with incubation outcomes or 
performance.  
 
Merrifield (1987) introduces a constraint analysis approach for selecting candidates for 
incubation. He grounds 
in
3. What is the best method for entry and / or growth? 
 
These questions form the basis for constructs that are operationalized on a number of items 
relating to business attractiveness and fit.19  If a business is deemed attractive and a good fit, the
incubator addresses the final question: ‘‘What is the be
general, Merrifield’s approach is sound. However, his emphasis on a firm’s manufacturing
capability being an integral factor in determining its fitness precludes the possibility of 
outsourcing.  The approach also assumes client success to a degree that seems somewhat 
unrealistic.   
 
Kuratko and LaFollette (1987) point out one of the biases intrinsic to incubator research by 
postulating that variability in the client screening and selection process ca
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/ or client failure through the selection of ventures that do not merit incubation for either being
too strong or too weak. This concept is elaborated upon by Bearse (1998) who draws a 
comparison between selecting clients and selecting students for admission to Harvard University. 
Specifically, Bearse asks whether Harvard students (the clients) succeed because of what 
Harvard (the incubator) does to them, or because Harvard selects only students who will 
regardless of what Harvard does to them (Bearse, 1998). In the absence of a ready answer, 
scholars stress the importance of having a good ‘‘fit’’ between client needs and the business 
assistance services that the incubator is capable of providing (Autio and Kloftsen, 1998).  
 
The research attempts to identify critical success factors, explain how incubators work, and d




ring an era of much growth and 




Much of this work failed to relate their research to measurable outcomes but a lot of insightfu
foundations were built. 
 
 
e toward understanding how clients develop within the 
cubator. This is not surprising, however, because a stream of literature on new venture 
n 
generate six flowchart diagrams depicting the evolution of a new venture and conclude that 
Little progress appears to have been mad
in
development that centers on all new ventures (as contrasted with new ventures operating withi
incubators) exists within the domain of entrepreneurship research. Reviewed below are articles 
that focus explicitly on incubator client development.  
Observing five clients of the St. Louis Technology Center, Scherer and McDonald (1988) 
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clients benefit most when instructed to balance a ‘‘flexible capability for short-term adjustm
to market feedback’’ with a long-term perspective. They caution against the new venture 
tendency toward unrealistic growth projections and ignorance of the need for operating funds. 
These findings are not novel, but they are useful in highlighting the fact that incubator clie
suffer the same shortcomings as their non-incubator client counterparts.  
 
More importantly they highlight the potential for incubator environments to generate passiv






 within their activity sets) amongst clients. Stuart and Abetti 
987) focus on the determinants of ‘‘initial success’’20 of a convenience sample of new and 
n 
d 
nd negative relationships between market dynamism, R&D intensity, organic nature of 
the firm and success. They interpret their findings as indicative of a need for entrepreneurs to 
maintain tight, centralized control over their ventures.  Given the small sample size and bias 
however, it is difficult to defend the validity of these findings. 
 
Fry (1987) conducted a census of the members of the NBIA to examine the variance among 
clients’ intensity of planning activities. A comparison group of companies affiliated with a 
SBDC is used in an effort to parse out differences between incubator tenants and non-tenants. 
However, because incubator managers were the respondents to questions on the perceived use of 
(1
young ventures located in the Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute’s Incubator Program and 
Technology Park. Measuring the impact of market, company and entrepreneur characteristics o
initial success, the authors find a positive relationship between entrepreneurial characteristics an
success, a
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planning amongst c ses of SBDC-
nies is not 
Fry however, ignoring this point, concludes that clients are ‘‘more active planners’’ than non-
clients and argues that resu cubator managers should actively encourage planning 
activities among clients. Al
comparison group for expe l, it seems likely that Fry is comparing the 
’’ engine of economic development whose clients are selected in 
ely, 
not 
tegrated into the local innovation development continuum in the manner described in the 
Hisrich Framework) are purely government-operated programs that provide general advice to 
any individual(s) seeking to establish a new venture. The typical SBDC customer seeks to 
establish a lifestyle venture (i.e. a venture that is built slowly over time in order to replace 
come from a currently held job).  
lients, a statistical comparison with the self-reported respon
affiliated compa meaningful.  
 
lts imply that in
though his attempt at overcoming the difficulty in creating a 
rimental research is nove
proverbial apples and oranges regarding the t
established as a ‘‘public-private
ypes of ventures.  The non-profit incubator is 
the expectation that fostering their success will help fuel local economic growth. Alternativ




Lyons asserts that there are several levels of client needs that enterprises require depending on 
the level of development the individual enterprise is in.  He asserts that technology incubators 
provide a higher level of service than do mixed-use incubators.  These levels are reproduced in 
Table 3. 
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Table 3 Enterprise development levels, Source Lyons, 2004 





small specialized venture funds, high technology incubation programs, etc. 
s 
Hackett and Dilt’s perceived relationship among the types of entrepreneurial ventures and 




Majors Venture capitalists, professional consulting practices, investment b
AAA Angel investors, emerging business consulting practices, university 
AA Manufacturing extension programs, small business development centers, 
A Micro-enterprise programs, small business development centers, busines
incubation programs, etc. 






Figure 4:  Types of entrepreneurial ventures and corresponding 
support agent market space, Source: Hackett & Dilts 2004. 
Client development studies are rather underdeveloped and probably will remain so due to the 
difficulty of obtaining data from early stage ventures regardless of whether the venture is locat
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within an incubator. Nonetheless, key findings from this area of research include the impor
of providing dynamic, proactive feedback to clients, assisting clients with business planning, and 








ver time (i.e. organizational learning) may be the most important 
ariable for incubating new ventures.  
The use of age as a proxy for development however, is contradicted by Lewis’ (2003) work that 
showed that age was not a factor in performance of the top technology incubators.  In fact two of 
the top ten were less than 3 years old.   
 
Additional incubator impacts of interest include the number / rate of new start-ups created, the 
number / rate of corporate start-ups created, and the number / rate of new jobs created (Udell, 
1990). Most impact studies that measure these items do so by tabulating simple running counts 
for each metric.22   
When considering incubator impacts, the fundamental research question is ‘‘Does the incub
make any difference in the survival rates of clients?’’ In the literature review, one study 
addresses this question squarely: “An exploration of the relationships between incubator 
structure, services and policies and client survival”, found that more than half the variation in
outcomes was explained by the age of the incubator (a proxy for level of development of the 
incubator) and the number of clients (Allen and McCluskey, 1990). This suggests that reaching a
certain critical mass of incubator experience, client interactions, and flow of new venture 




Measures of Incubator Success 
As mentioned in the introduction, Campbell and Allen (1987) offer the following ‘‘milestones’’ 
as measures of incubator success (Note: ‘‘tenant’’ means client in this context): Creation of a 
responsive business consulting network, participation of financial intermediaries in tenant 
capitalization, the point at which a majority of tenants are start-up firms as opposed to previously 
existing small businesses, and the synergism that occurs when tenants develop trade relations 
with one another such as subcontracting and joint purchasing. (Ibid, p. 189).  Measures of the 
above aspects are also indicators of the incubator’s level of development, as are the sustainability 
and growth of the incubator, the scope and effectiveness of incubator management policies, and 
the ability to provide comprehensive services (Mian, 1997). The degree of fit between the 
business incubation services offered by the incubator and the needs of the local market is another 
measure of incubator success (Autio and Kloftsen, 1998). Drawing from the performance 
benchmarking literature, Bearse (1998) suggests that if data is regularly collected and made 
available, an incubator could also measure its success in comparison to other incubators on a 
variety of operational and outcome measures and against a business incubator industry baseline 
(Bearse, 1998). Despite efforts by the NBIA such data has proven difficult to gather and 
maintain on an ongoing basis.  
 
The simplest measure of client success is ‘‘graduating’’ from the incubator upon overcoming 
gaps and developing sustaining business structures.  Indeed, in the literature incubator success 
has been defined as a ratio expressed in the following terms: Number of Firms Exiting the 
Incubator, Number of Firms Discontinuing Operations While Still a Tenant (Allen and 
Measures of Client Success  
23
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Weinberg, 1988). Beyond this simple measure, firm growth and development measures have also
been applied to the clie
 
nts. Growth measures include examining increases in number of jobs or 
les over time, while development measures are reflected in ‘‘product innovation, quality of the 
ummated’’ over time (Bearse, 1998; Udell, 1990).  
 
Incubator variables that have been put forth to be associated with client success include client 
selection processes (Kuratko and LaFollette, 1987; Merrifield, 1987), internal incubator network 
formation (Lichtenstein, 1992), incubator-industry network and incubator support services 
network density (Hansen et al., 2000; Nowak and Grantham, 2000), incubator manager–client 
relationships (Autio and Kloftsen, 1998; Fry, 1987; Rice, 2002; Sherman, 1999; Udell, 1990), 
incubator effectiveness (Sherman and Chappell, 1998), level of incubator development (Allen, 
happell, 1998), and procedural standardization and policy formalization 
ay not be meaningful as the use of selection criteria in admitting clients to the incubator results 
an and Chappell, 1998).  
 
ubators 
and their clients are not very good job creators (Campbell and Allen, 1987). However, business 
sa
management team, and strategic alliances cons
1988; Sherman and C
(Bearse, 1998). However, few of these relationships have been empirically tested. While most 
practitioner studies find a high rate (usually over 80 percent) of client survival (Bearse, 1998), 
other studies report less optimistic (55 percent) survival rates (Roper, 1999). When examining 
client survival rates, however, direct comparisons with non-incubated ventures’ survival rates 
m
in a selection bias (Sherm
Community Economic Impacts 
Despite the prevalent practitioner based and politically correct belief of incubator managers and 
government officials that incubators create jobs, early empirical research suggests that inc
 41
incubators have been found to be more cost effective economic development tools than programs
to attract firms to local regions (Markley and McNamara, 1995; Sherman, 1998, 1999; Sherman 
 
nd Chappell, 1998).  
There are three key findings in the incubator impact studies. First, the level of incubator 
development and the number of clients are positively related with client survival. Second, 
incubators represent a lower cost means to job creation than cost-sharing corporate relocation 
programs. Third, the area of incubator impact research is surprisingly understudied and 




Summary of the Incubator Impact Studies 
Incubator Theory  
This section reviews theoretical approaches to explaining the incubator concept that appears in 
the literature. Given the newness of the field, it is not surprising that much of the literature is 
exploratory and descriptive with little attention devoted to theory-building.  Some, but not many, 
implicit and explicit efforts at theorizing about incubators can be found in the literature.  
 
Early Theorizing  
The incubator development studies that address the question of ‘‘What is an incubator?’’ are 
implicitly engaged in descriptive and normative theorizing about the incubator concept. The first 
formal hypothesis ventured regarding incubators is as follows: Once extraneous factors that lead 
to early stage failure of small businesses (poor management, inability to find early stage 
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financing, high overhead, etc.) are controlled or eliminated, the projected increased survival ra
of new ventures should lead to increased employment and an expanded tax base (Brooks, 198
 
This hypothesis is grounded in the ‘‘theory of economic development through entrepreneurship’’ 
which posits that the entrepreneurial process of conceiving new busines
te 
6).  
s concepts and then 
reating new firms based on these new concepts is the basis of economic growth (Brooks, 1986). 
ap that occurs between conceiving the new business concept 
and actually instantiating the firm.24 Brooks contends that the incubator and the incubation 
process are used to narrow this gap.  
 
Another perspective on bridging the gap can be found in transaction cost economics (TCE). In 
the TCE view a firm gains competitive advantage by relentlessly reducing the costs of doing 
business (Williamson, 1978). From this perspective the primary function of the incubator is to 
bridge the gap by reducing the start-up and other operating costs of incubatees (clients) by 
providing shared office space and services at low cost. This frees the client management team to 
focus on building the business. A related hypothesis suggests that incubators are designed to help 




This theory is used to address the g
incubator, most of the entrepreneurs would either not be in business or struggle to remain in 
business. (Plosila and Allen, 1985, p. 732).  
 
This hypothesis is essentially a market failure argument and is complemented by research that 
views incubators as mechanisms for enabling a firm ‘‘to master the competitive factor
with effectiveness within particular industry settings’’ (Lumpkin and Ireland, 1988). While su
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assumptions are both intuitively compelling and difficult to disprove, many incubator clients 
report that they would have established their firms even if the incubator did not exist (Culp, 
1996). This should not necessarily be taken as evidence against the incubator concept, how
as the confidence required to start a new venture may also be associated with unreasonable level
of confidence regarding personal capabilities and success (Nye, 1991). 
 
Structural Contingency Theory 
ever, 
s 
Although the incubator configuration studies were atheoretical, inductive collections of variables 
of the incubator concept, implicitly this approach rests on structural contingency theory. The 
primary assumption of structural contingency theory is that the configuration of an organization 
and the external environment must achieve ‘‘fit’’ in order to obtain ‘‘success’’ (Ketchen et al., 
 theory 
ed to 
Rice (2002) explicitly grounds the collaborative incubator manager–incubator client relationship 
in the interdependent co-production equation.  This equation models the co-creation aspects of 
the value-adding incubation process. It suggests that the time intensity of business assistance 
interventions must be strategically allocated by the incubator manager to the clients, and that   
clients must be properly prepared to utilize the advice and insights resulting from the 
intervention. This perspective is important because it calls attention away from the incubator 
facility and toward the incubation process. It does not however address the willingness of a client 
1993). Although most configuration studies do not test for success, structural contingency
provides a theoretical underpinning for the often asserted need for the incubator to be tailor
meet local needs and norms. 
 
Interdependent Co-production Modeling 
25
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to utilize the support structure on any given day.  It also reminds us of the importance of properly 
assessing the core competencies of the incubator before entering the incubator and determining 
hether the incubator and incubator client are a good fit from client-manager relationship 
e interdependent co-production may result in the co-creation of 
inappropriate, value subtracting incubation processes.  Fit in this context refers to a co-
production model where the business incubator — in collaboration with the community in which 
it operates — is a ‘‘producer’’ of business assistance programs. The entrepreneurial ventures 
located in an incubator, as ‘‘consumers’’ of those outputs, operate in an interdependent co-
production relationship with the incubator.  
 
Network Theory 
cubator network in order to create conditions that facilitate the development of incubator 
rs 
at 
 of the 
 
bation process either inside the incubator or in the local community, network theory 
w
perspective.  If there is no fit, th
 Commercialization usually occurs within an innovation community rather than a single 
organization (Lynn et al., 1996). Hansen et al. (2000) employ network theory (Nohria and 
Eccles, 1992) to argue that the primary value-added feature of networked incubators is the set of 
institutionalized processes that carefully structure and transfer knowledge throughout the 
in
clients and the commercialization of their innovations. They find that the degree of 
entrepreneurial intensity, economies of scale and scope, and network design are important facto
for incubation success. The importance of the network design factor is supported by research th
concludes that network relationship building is the most important value-added component
entrepreneurial support systems (Lichtenstein, 1992). Network theory is also useful because it
handily addresses the debate regarding the location of the incubation process: Rather than locate 
the incu
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asserts that the incubation process includes and transcends the incubator.  A more comprehensive 
review of networking is included in Section 2.  
 
Virtual Incubation Theories  
Lastly, several theories related to the virtual incubator or “incubator without walls” are found in 
the lite escribes a condition in 
whi a





three theories. They assert that a virtual incubator drives the entrepreneurial processes among a 
roup of ethnically distinct minority immigrants who consciously position themselves as brokers 
in a discrete location and work to improve and expand the business achievements of one another.   
 
wing 
ace for ideas (Gans and Stern, 
2003). 
rature.  Middleman theory finds its roots in Weber (1993)26 and d
ch  resourceful minority group systematically develops a brokering position in a specific 
y or industries. Enclave theory locates the spatial positioning of m
eci ic cluster. Collective theory describes a form of group-based economic endeavors in 
t to ‘‘lone-wolf ’’ entrepreneurs.  
ene and Butler (1996) explore the phenomenon of virtual incubators by drawing on these 
g
Also theorizing about virtual incubation, Nowak and Grantham (2000) focus on flows of 
knowledge in the software industry. They contend that because leading edge software industry 
knowledge is geographically distributed and embedded within practices, a virtual incubator is 
needed to foster the development of information intensive new software ventures through 
information dissemination (Nowak and Grantham, 2000). This argument suggests a gro
importance in the roles of knowledge brokering and the market sp
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 incubator client.  
5. Network relationships and institutionalized knowledge transfer enhances the likelihood of 
 
This section reviews the challenges identified within existing research and suggests new areas 
for future research. Specifically the need for future research to address the lack of convergence in 
the terms and concepts related to incubators or incubation, the lack of theoretically meaningful 
incubator classifications, the lack of a business incubation process model, the longstanding 
challenges in the definition and measurement of incubator-incubation-incubator client 
‘‘success,’’ and the need for deeper theorizing about incubators.  
There are several key findings related to studies theorizing about the incubator concept.  
1. From a Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) and market failure perspective, incubators are
a systematic approach to controlling resources and reducing costs during the ear
of a venture’s development.  
2. The incubator configuration must meet local needs and norms.  
3. The process by which the incubation system is managed and created is a collaborative 
effort between the incubator manager and the incubator clients.  
4. The time duration and intensity of incubator manager intervention, coupled wi
breadth, readiness and goodness of fit of the incubator manager–client does impact the 
success of the
incubation success.   
Challenges within Existing Research  
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Defining Terms and Concepts  
Most researchers agree that incubators represent a systematic method of providing business 
assistance to firms in the early-stages of their development. Assistance is provided with the aim 
of increasing firm survival rates. Beyond this common baseline assumption, however, 
definitional and conceptual heterogeneity have made defining the scope and boundaries of the 
incubator phenomenon as well as the development of a set of obvious statements related to the 
phenomenon rather difficult.  In the absence of strong incubator theory, research has produced 
catalogs of incubator configurations listing the factors associated with various conceptualizations 
of incubator ‘‘success.’’  If incubator research is to advance in a scientific manner, a 
convergence upon a single definition that accounts for the scope and boundaries of the incubator 
concept is required.  
 
Incubator Classifications: Taxonomies vs. Typologies  
The taxonomies of convenience that have been employed in the literature thus far have not been 
useful with regard to explaining variation in incubation outcomes. Prior research (Allen and 
McCluskey, 1990; Rice, 2002) suggests that more meaningful classifications may be created by 
focusing on items such as the competencies of the incubator, the incubator’s level of 
development, and the incubator client’s level of potential.  
 
Theoretically grounded and tested typologies that use these metrics have the potential to be much 
more useful for future research than existing taxonomies.  It bears noting that over time a number 
Q bubble-
about 
of the early entrants into the for-profit incubator space, as well as many of the NASDA
era for-profit incubators have exited the incubation industry. This not only raises questions 
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the utility of using “incubator primary financial sponsorship” and “profit-orientations” as 
meaningful comparison categories, it also raises questions regarding the long-term sustainability 
of for-profit incubator models. Perhaps the non-profit incubator— with its relatively lowe
costs and expectations—might represent a better, more politically rational model for allocating
community resources and demonstrating the community’s long-term commitment to facilitating 
economic development through entrepreneurship. In this view the politically mediated infus
of public resources into the incubator on an annual budget review basis, and at levels roughly
analogous to current economic cyclical demands, seem logical. 
 






Despite the fact that the NBIA has noted on many occasions that the incubation process is much 
more important than the incubator facility, the majority of what is known about the incubation 
process is focused on the incubator facility (Adkins, 2001). As interest in entrepreneurship 
f the incubation process represents an opportunity to conduct incubator research that 
is li der spectrum of researchers than studies on incubator 
faci rocess studies, a moratorium on incubator facility 
con  be considered. 
 
Me
continues to grow, interest in methods for increasing the likelihood of entrepreneurial success 
and preventing entrepreneurial failure will also continue to grow. Accordingly, the development 
of models o
kely to be of interest to a much broa
lities. To facilitate a focus on incubation p
figuration studies should probably
asures of ‘‘Success’’ 
The attempt to measure the impacts of incubators is as important as it is challenging. 
Measurement is important because most incubators operate with public funds and are held 
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accountable for the outcomes associated with the use of those funds. Measurement is challenging
because the full range of data required to implement experimental research designs that sq
address the question ‘‘If the incubator client had not been incubated, would there be any 
difference in the survival rate of new ventures?’’ is not readily available. Spec
 
uarely 
ifically, data on 
ccessful incubator clients is relatively easy to obtain because incubators tend to promote their 
d 
 
Specifying the level of analysis employed helps to limit the scope of an investigation by focusing 
the research efforts.  Hackett and Dilts propose the following levels of analysis for incubator 
research.   
1. Entrepreneur (individual) level 
2. Incubator manager (individual) level 
3. Incubatee (group/firm) level  
4. Incubator (firm) level 
5. Community (local) level  
6. Incubation industry (industry) level  
 
su
own incubation success stories.  Data related to failed clients is somewhat more difficult to 
access as incubation failures may carry political implications that can result in a decrease or 
elimination of operating subsidies. Data on the success and failure of comparable non-incubate
companies is rarely kept and has proven quite difficult, if not impossible, to obtain (Bearse, 
1998). Identified below are the levels and units of analysis available to incubator researchers in 
order to better understand what kind of variables can be measured in future research efforts.
 
Levels and Units of Analysis 
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Spe  design. The range of potential 
units of
ope s, (e) 
incubat eams, and (f ) the innovations being incubated. 
 
The lack of peer-reviewed incubator impact studies that measure success demonstrate the need 
for r
renewal of funding arrangements for an incubator, most incubator managers and stakeholders 
repare annual incubation performance reports. In these reports, the incubator is often the unit of 
t 
 
litically sensitive incubation failures will continue to remain 
roblematic. Accordingly, in addition to measures reviewed in the body of this work, 
chers should seek to measure the incubator’s performance on the basis of 
incubator client performance to capture incubation outcomes that are relatively politically safe 
but also meaningful.  
 
Operationally, Hackett and Dilts (2004) propose five different mutually exclusive incubator 
outcome states at the completion of the incubation process worthy of consideration:  
cifying the unit of analysis is critical for creating any research
 analysis in incubator research includes (a) the community in which the incubator 
rates, (b) the incubator as enterprise, (c) the incubator manager, (d) incubator client firm
or client management t
mo e, and the difficulties associated with research in this area. Interestingly, to justify a 
p
analysis while a running count of incubation outcomes—measured in terms of incubator clien
job growth, client financial performance, and client developmental advances at the time of 
incubator exit—provides measures of the incubator’s performance.  
Cooperation among researchers and practitioners may result in an increase in studies that report 
incubator impacts accurately and meaningfully for both groups. This is not trivial: the level, 
scope, and quality of incubation-related data management varies widely among incubators and




1. The incubator client is surviving and growing profitably. 
2. The incubator client is surviving and growing and is on a path toward profitability
3. The incubator client is surviving but is not growing and is not profitable or is only 
marginally profitable. 
4. The incubator client operations wer
.  
e terminated while still in the incubator, but losses 
were minimized. 
5. The incubator bator, and the losses 
were large.  
 
Current approaches to conceptualizing incubators and the practice of incubator management 
suggest that the first three outcome states are indicative of incubation success while the last two 
outcome states indicate incubation failure or possibly non-success. It must also be noted that the 
first three outcome states represent only a snapshot of the client’s performance on ‘‘graduation 
day’’ and does not address future success or failure. It also should be noted that these are all 
measures of the client’s success and market forces often play a bigger role in the success of a 
company than does the incubator. 
 
Theory Development
 client operations were terminated while still in the incu
 




exists an accumulated number of empirical and normative descriptions of the factors that shou
be included in attempts at explaining the concept. However, most of this research is atheore
(Mian, 1994; Mian, 1996), and theory is the lifeblood of any research area. If the area of 
incubator research is to advance in a theoretically meaningful manner beyond simple lists of 
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critical success factors, then we must turn our attention from “what” are the important factors 
“how” and “why” and “in what context” (“who” “where
to 
” and “when”) these factors are 
terrelated. Finally, the long term viability of incubator research depends not only on grounding 
This review attempts to summarize the current state of incubator research through existing 
academic literature.  Concepts, empirical findings, and problems related to existing incubator 
research using the five primary research orientations along which the literature has evolved is 
discussed. Although a significant body of research has developed in the years since, Temali and 
Campbell (1984) set the standard for describing incubators and their configurations.  Hacket and 
Dilts, Lewis, Culp, and Lyons also made significant contributions to the understanding of the 
research body.  It is also clear that research has is just beginning to understand the incubator 
concept and the many problematic issues associated with research in this area.  While 
considerable attention has been devoted to the description of incubator facilities, less attention 
has been focused on the incubator clients, the innovations they seek to diffuse, and the 
incubation outcomes that have been achieved.  
 
As interest in the incubator concept continues to grow, new research efforts should focus not 
only on these under-researched units of analysis, but also on the incubation process itself.  
Hackett and Dilts (2004) assert a key point that for the understanding of the incubator concept to 
advance, we will need to unpack the variables associated with the incubation process and then 
in
future research in theory and developing new theory, but also on demonstrating why incubators 
are intrinsically, theoretically compelling. 
 
Summary of General Incubator Literature Review 
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use these variables to build, validate and test incubation process models that help predict an
explain clearly defined business incubation outcomes.  
 
Focusing on the process of incubation rather than on the incubator facility and its configuration 
will draw attention to the underlyi
d 
ng causes of new venture development in an incubator 
nvironment. This should lead toward theories of business incubation. The path to such theory 
 
Methods such as case study research, although not always embraced in the scientific community 
offers much insight into incubation.  Incubator case studies suffer however from the practice of 
only celebrating success and not exploring any causal relationship.  In particular, future research 
may benefit by drawing from the rich set of theories that are used to explain phenomena 
associated with new venture formation and development, new product conceptualization and 
development, and business assistance.  This research is vitally important to communities 
interested in developing programs based on best practices for their individual circumstance.  
 
Lastly, it is important to realize that incubator managers and stakeholders rarely take advantage 
of the existing literature when making decisions as to how to operate an incubator.  Efforts 
should be made to disseminate this information, in an acceptable manner, to the broader 
community.  As with much of the research dedicated to business development, practitioners 
rarely take advantage of the research, opting mainly for popular press or word of mouth27. 
e
development undoubtedly will entail multiple research methods, and will require researchers to
draw from theories that are used in other research domains.  Understanding the process in terms 
of how it fits into an overall regional “incubation” process is also needed. 
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There are shortcomings in the previo dressed before meaningful 
ent 
n 
similar to measuring the success of a university.  While you can measure 
ow well an individual program is performing or point to successful outcomes, how to measure 
 
us work that need to be ad
research can advance.  The lack of definitional clarity is certainly an issue.  With no agreem
as to what you are talking about, how do you start a meaningful analysis?  The tremendous 
variation between program goals is again problematic.  This creates problems with the selectio
of input and outcome variables.   
 
The problem is very 
h
overall success is a difficult task.  Rankings are common, however, and as with incubation,
change and evolve as efforts are made to understand and accurately assess success.    
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Technology Incubators 
Technology Incubation, Innovation, the Diffusion of Innovation, and High Tech Economic 
Development are often mingled together in academic literature and practice.  The media and 
common press of the day constantly refer to the new knowledge economy, where intellectual 
property and know how are now the raw materials of industry.  Technology incubators represent 
n ever growing section of incubators and merit a look at research focused specifically on this 
 optimal mix 
f industries (outputs).  Theoretical arguments and increasing empirical evidence that innovation 
hese 
ands while providing capital for innovation, particularly in start-up 
nterprises that are deemed too risky for many investors (Tornatzky et al. 1996; Smilor and Gill 
 
a
class of incubator.   
 
Some of the key ingredients of regional capacity to support innovation are the presence of 
technology generators, access to a skilled workforce, a culture of interaction, locally-controlled 
investment capital (inputs), resulting in a high-quality of life for residents, and the
o
fosters economic growth have been fundamental to the emergence of technology business 
incubation as part of an innovation-based economic development strategy at the state and local 
level (DiGiovanna and Lewis, 1998; Shahidi, 1998; Lewis, 2001; Tornatzky et al., 1996).  T
arguments indicate the need for a systemic context.28 
 
In theory, technology incubators stimulate the innovation process by linking technology 
development with market dem
e
1986). Proponents of technology incubators argue that they increase the pace of new job 
formation, foster an entrepreneurial spirit that will result in new firm formation, and increase
private investment in innovation, as well as create incentives for highly skilled individuals to 
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reside in the host region (Molnar et al., 1997; Allen and McClusky, 1990; Tornatzky et al., 1996
DiGiovana and Lewis, 1998). Furthermore, industrial innovation (product or process) create
first mover benefits for the innovating firm, which in turn leads to new agglomeration (Aga
and Gort, 2001). New agglomeration increases the prospects for additional wealth generation in 
the host region (Weber, 1929; Markusen, 1987; Marshall, 1987).29  
 
The combination of these factors should enhance regional economic growth (DiGiovanna and 
Lewis 1998). Technology incubators have a cost, and economic development officials must 
determine how to best invest scarce public resources to spur economic growth. The average 
annual operating cost of a technology business incubator is estimated to be $320,701 which is 25 




Lewis (200 37 in 
fiscal year 1995 to $520,533 in fiscal year 2000, 
period.30  The inclusion of specialized work spaces (wet laboratories, clean room ust 
hoods, high-speed broadband internet access, etc. fac e rela nger 
time fo  market products , and th  additio rtise to 
assist tech entrepreneurs drive up the costs of technology incubation in comparison with other 
types o
 
ublic sector support for incubation, in terms of funding, is still widespread. Over 65 percent of 
 
3) asserts that these costs have risen dramatically, from an average of $286,7
an 81.5 percent increase over a five-year study 
s, exha
), a larger ility size, th tively lo
r clients to develop and /services e cost of nal expe
f business incubators. 
P
technology incubators receive public funding for operating expenses from the federal, state, 
and/or local government. If one includes assistance from public universities, the figure rises to 
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71.2%. Only 20.5% of technology incubator programs are solely supported through client
and fees for services without external public funding (Lewis 2003). The breakdown of the 
revenue stream indicates that, on average, governments (federal, state and local) subsidize 
roughly 29.3% of the operating budget, rents and fees for services support approximately 5
academic partners cover 7.6%, royalties and equity agreements account for 2.1%, with the 
remaining 4.6% financed by private foundations. The primary expenditures in the operating 
budgets of technology incubators are staff salaries, facility maintenance and utilities expense




nt to 32.8% of the operating budget, and facility maintenance and 
tilities account for 31.0% (17.4% and 13.6% respectively). Client services are the next largest 
7.7%) and 
u
expenditure at 18.3%, which includes 4.3% for recruitment of clients. Debt servicing (
other non-specified costs (10.3%) account for the remaining operating expenditures.31 
 
Table 4:  Technology Incubators Compared to All Business Incubators 
 Industry Technology Average 
from  
Variable  Average Average  Survey 
Results  
Gross square footage  24,375 38,988 39,083 
Number of tenants  12.0 13.9 13.7 
Number of graduates pe 7 2.4 r year  3.3 1.
Percent of firms remaining in the 82.2 86.0 71.7 
metro area  
 
Above and beyond the annual operating cost, incubator programs typically need to acquire real 
estate before beginning operations. On average, the cost of purchasing the land and building a 
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facility (or renovating an existing structure) for technology incubator programs has been 
approximately $3.88 million ($3.04 million to build/renovate and $831,450 to acquire the la
and/or building to be renovated).32  The data also contains eleven incubators that had the
and/or building donated at no cost to the program, which means these averages somewhat 
underestimate start-up costs. Given the high cost to build and to operate a technology incubator
economic development officials need to understand the components of successful incubation 
the local characteristics that can either dampen or enhance the performance of a technology 
incubator and its client firms.  
 
Innovation in any industrial sector can lead to client firm success, as it has with Jobri 





cubator in Ada, Oklahoma, or Garrison Guitars, which pioneered new production technology 
 
Trends in Technology Incubators 
g on 
140 established sites to 548 in North America (McKinnon and Hayhow, 1998). In a few short 
in
for manufacturing high-end musical instruments in a technology incubator in St. John’s, 
Newfoundland (NBIA 2002). The phrase the “right tech” for your region, not “high-tech,” may
be more appropriate for the analysis of the performance of technology business incubation 
designed to catalyze growth through the formation of innovative new enterprises. 
 
At the state and local level, one of the favored policy options to spur innovation-based 
development has been public investment in business incubators, more recently concentratin
the development of technology business incubators (Preer, 1992; Lewis, 2001; NGA, 2002a; 
NGA, 2002b). From 1986 to 1996, the incubator population nearly quadrupled, from roughly 
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years, from 1998 to 2002, the population of business incubators in North America expand
roughly 40 percent to 900; while in the U.S., the number of technology incubators roughly 
doubled, from approximately 146 to nearly 300 (Lewis, 2002). Both public and private 
investment has fueled the growth, but the shakeout in the for-profit segment of the industry has 
resulted in a disproportionate number of publicly led incubators remaining (Adkins, 2002). Of 
the 900 incubators, which includes incubators without walls, the NBIA (Molnar et al., 19
estimates that 90% are not-for-profit and 10% are for-p
ed by 
97) 
rofit ventures. For technology incubators 








uggests that they have a low public 
ctor cost per job, their client firms have higher than average survival rates and there is a 
significant return on the public investment in terms of the taxes paid by the client firms and their 
employees (Molnar et al., 1997). However, this research has been criticized for small sample 
w
headed by public institutions, 38.5% are private not-for-profit entities, but only 6.9% are led 
private for-profit organizations.33  The latest survey also indicates that incubators exist in all the 
states, with roughly 45% in urban settings, 19% in suburban areas, and 36% in rural setting
 
The aggregate growth in the population of technology incubators masks the reality that their
performance varies unevenly across regions and that many technology incubators have c
operations (Hansen et al., 2000; Lewis, 2001). Recent research (Lewis, 2003) identified twe
six (26) cases of technology incubators that had closed or scaled back their operations to t
point that they could no longer be considered incubator programs since they had ceased t
provide a full complement of entrepreneurial services.  
 
The evaluative literature on technology business incubators s
se
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sizes that tend to favor more s irm data, lack of 
consistent measures of success, and the failure to investigate failed or less than optimal programs 
(Lewis, 2001; Mian, 1997; Grob, 1998; Bearse, 1998; Markley and McNamara, 1995). In the 
case of technology incubators, the research has also been impeded by the nascent nature of the 
industry (Mian, 1997; Lewis, 2001). Furthermore, most of the evaluative research on technology 
incubators has been conducted with incubators in more developed regions. Perhaps this 
variability clouds the issue in the mind of the public.  
 
For example, a survey of metropolitan-level economic development officials from 151 U.S. 
cities found that they perceived business incubation to be one of the less effective strategies for 
spurring growth (Clarke and Gaile, 1998). Quittner (1999) echoes this perception from the 
general public’s point of view and questions the wisdom of continued public subsidies for 
incubators and their client firms as the private market expands its investment in technology 
entrepreneurs. When we consider the rapidly escalating costs to establish and operate a 
technology incubator program in conjunction with the mushrooming of public investment, 
understanding how to maximize these investments is vitally important. While some have 
theorized about the characteristics of communities that have a greater capacity to host a 
successful technology incubator (Wolfe et al., 1999), there has been little empirical research that 
investigates what these factors are, or the degree to which technology incubator programs can 
compensate for the lack of regional capacity (Lewis, 2001). 
 
uccessful programs, unreliable graduate f
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Metrics for Technology Incubators 
5
Given the varied motivations and practices of incubators, a one size fits all approach to 
measuring success and henceforth incubator quality is difficult to derive. Universities struggle 
with this same problem when trying to assess their performance or quality.3  A recent attempt 
(Lewis, 2003) makes great strides in developing quantifiable measures of success for incubators. 
It does an excellent job of analyzing survey data on incubators but, as with Fry, relies heavily on 
proxies that may not be good approximations. He does a good job of examining client 
performance, and regional capacity using accepted statistical methods. The outcome measures of 
incubator success focus directly on new job creation and increases in incubator client revenue. 
The research advances a theory that incubator quality and regional capacity are the two drivers of 
client success and that incubator quality can make up for a lack of regional capacity.   Fry does 
not however, make assertions as to what incubator quality is except in terms of the client success 
measures mentioned earlier. 
 
Additionally, Fry’s research does not take into account the various motivations and expectation 
that different incubator stakeholders have for their programs. As mentioned previously, 
incubators are started for many reasons including job creation in the community, promotion of 
economic self-sufficiency for a selected population group, diversification of the local economy, 
transfer of technology from universities and corporations, or sharing venture experiences with 
new companies by successful entrepreneurs and investors.  
 
There are also incubators, such as the one at Rensselaer Polytechnic, that view the incubator 
primarily as a resource for the university’s students, faculty, and technology transfer staff. Their 
 62
incubator achieves its stated goal by e environment and by bringing 
ents 
y small 




nriching the academic 
together already existent but otherwise disjoined resources within the University. For stud
and faculty, the RPI Incubator acts as a “living laboratory” where ideas generated in the 
classrooms and research centers can be tested in a real-world environment36. 
 
A new incubator on the drawing board in Orlando37 will bring together talent in the 
entertainment industry to produce motion pictures. In this instance the idea is to form man
companies that will produce major motion pictures. These companies may or may not be 
disbanded when the projects are completed. They may also be reconfigured and reformed for a 
future project that requires their particular talent base. 
 
 incubation program becomes problem
success differ so widely. Although new jobs created and increases in revenue drive economic
development, sometimes those measures may be a fringe benefit but not required to me
stated objective. In the case of the incubator at Rensselaer Polytechnic, their client companies 
could achieve tremendous success, create many new jobs and generate wealth for the re





As this dissertation looks at relating the success of an incubator in terms of how well it is
in
context is required.  Unlike incubators, there is much in the literature about networking.  Thi
section provides a review of business or entrepreneur network theory literature, starting with a 
review of definitions of networking offered in the literature that most closely relates to iss
under cons
 
tegrated into an overall entrepreneurial development system, a review of networks in this 
s 
ues 
ideration in this dissertation.  Next, a number of competing theories regarding 
networ g ent of networks and lastly a 
discuss   to understand how networks function 
and how h come a part of these networks. 
 
nitions of Networking 
Despite e reneurial networks in many different ways, 
there is n erature that networks are relationships formed with 
organizations or individuals to improve their performance.  These relationships may be formal or 
 two 
ollowing manner:  Organization sets 
kin  are reviewed followed by a discussion of the managem
ion of the barriers to networking.  The purpose is
 t ey affect companies and entrepreneurs that be
Defi
 th  fact that the literature explains entrep
 ge eral agreement in the lit
informal, involve a specific business relationship, or consist of merely the exchange of 
information.  The establishment of these networks may be motivated by a number of factors 
including cost, resources, trust, and strategic considerations.  
 
Aldich (1979) defined inter-organizational networks as “all organizations linked by a specified 
relationship…  Networks constrain or facilitate the activities of organizations and action sets in a 
systematic way that can be identified at the aggregate level.”  Aldrich distinguished between
perspectives of organization sets and action sets in the f
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focus on a focal organization  set on the other hand, refers 
to an alliance among several organizations for a limited duration and a specific purpose. 
 
Dean, et al. (1997) developed a taxonomy of business networking definitions by examining 
perceptions of what constructing a network consists of.  In a survey of 912 small and medium 
sized firms in Australia, definitions of networking were solicited from these firms.  They 
included:  
• Companies joining together with a common objective 
•





and its relations with others.  An action
 Exchange and sharing of ideas or resources 
• Contacts and inter-business communications 
• Positive and beneficial for firms 
• Cost savings and better performance 
• Promotion and writing 
 
Additionally, informal networks were defined as “loose informal arrangements which facilita
the exchange of information”.  A formal network was defined as “a formal arrangement betw
three or more businesses to consolidate resources with a clear common business objecti
 
Jarillo (1989) defined networking as “use of personal relationships to obtain advice, financing,
sales, etc.”  Jarillo tested the hypothesis that growing firms make more use of external resources 
and found: 1) growing firms used networking 64% more than average 2) low growth firms 
exhibit the opposite behavior.  
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Transaction Theory of Networking 
Williamson (1979) offered a “transaction costs” approach to firm networking.  His model is 
more in line with the classical economic model where firms explicitly take into account the 
transaction costs of esta verall objective 
function of cost minimization.  In this model, as the firm engages in the production of a product 
that includes components and sub-components, necessary business linkages must be made in 
order to produce the final integrated product.  The business linkages incur costs that are 
ultimately included in the price of the product.  This model is heavily influenced by the 
traditional supplier network framework in which business linkages are conceptualized in the 
context of various suppliers, each of which is necessary to provide a certain component or 
service in the final production of a product. 
 
Dyer (1997) used the "transaction cost" theory developed by Williamson (1975) and suggested 
that transaction costs, contrary to Williamson's theory, do not necessarily increase with the 
number of relationships in which a firm engages in. Dyer suggested that firms in a production 
network can maximize transaction value which is asset specialization and lower transaction 
costs.  Dyer examined five variables: (1) firm commitment to supplier to engage in repeated 
exchange; (2) scale and scope of exchange between firms and suppliers; (3) inter-firm 
information sharing; (4) safeguards used in interactions; (5) investments in co-specialized assets. 
he author found that beyond minimizing transaction value, a firm’s trustworthiness can be a 
source of advantage because it minimizes transaction costs. Trustworthiness also helps in greater 
information sharing and longer investment payback time. An important finding was that building 
trust and engaging in repeated business is not without cost.  The cost of building trust includes 
blishing and maintaining business linkages in the o
T
 66
the opportunity cost of not taking advantage of one's suppliers and the loss of the opportunity to 
use lower-cost suppliers. 
 
Competitive Advantage Theory of Networking 
The classical competitive strategy paradigm (Porter, 1985, 1986, 1991) offers another context for 
understanding entrepreneurial networking. This paradigm views a firm as an independent entity 
engaged in entrepreneurial activity to enhance its relative competitive advantage. Business 
networks are considered as part of a firm's "activities" and the firm’s "competitive advantage 
results from [its] ability to perform the required activities at a collectively lower cost than rivals 
... A firm’s strategy is manifested in the way in which it configures and links the many activities 
in its value chain relative to competitors." (Porter 1991, p. 102). In Porter's model, reproduced in 
Figure 5, networks do extend outside the firm to include the activities of suppliers, channels, and 
customers. Porter's model is an integrative approach that includes both the Williamson's 
"transactions cost" approach and von Hippie's "user innovation" approach. Business network 
activities are simply part of the firm's "value chain" in producing a product (Porter, 1985) and are 
part of the components of Porter's value chain: firm infrastructure, human resource management, 
technology development, procurement, inbound logistics, operations, outbound logistics, 




Shah (1990) suggested a product life-cycle approach to firm networking. He proposed a model 
which suggests that the propensity for firms to establish relationships (cooperative, information 
omic 
n order to share the large amounts of 
search and development expenditures.  However, if a particular technology is evolving such 
that most, if not all, of the front-end developmental expenditures are sunk, then the propensity to 
operate independently increa ation of his model, in 
Figure 5:  Porter's Value Chain.  Source: Porter 1991 
sharing, joint ventures) is dependent on the time at which technology ceases to yield econ
rent. In his model, shown in Figure 6, there is a point at which a firm is indifferent between 
cooperation and independent operation. Shah suggests that in the early phases of a new 
technology development, there is a need for large research and development outlays and, as a 
result, there will be a tendency for firms to cooperate i
re
ses. Shah conducted an empirical investig
which he found that there is a significant relationship between the competitive position and 




His results show that a firm's expectation of improving its competitive position is one of the 
Other efforts examined entrepreneurial networking in the context of a firm's competitive 
advantage (Brown and Butler, 1995; Jarillo, 1988). They provide frameworks that (a) examine 
inter-organizational networks as a means for small entrepreneurial firms to gain some strategic 
advantage over the larger, more established competitors and (b) provide a better understanding of 
the cooperative behaviors and relationships of a firm. 
 
Aldrich and Zimmer (1986) view entrepreneurship as a process and suggest that as part of that 
process, certain networks or relations between and among key components is established. This 
directly supports the National Business Incubator Association’s position that incubation is a 
process.   
primary motivations for “strategic alliances.” However, these cooperative arrangements will not 
remain a viable organizational approach in the long run. 
  
 
Figure 6:  Shah's Life Cycle Approach.  Source: Shah 1990 
Social Context Theory of Networking 
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Aldrich and Zimmer proposed a paradigm for studying entrepreneurship through “social
networks" and define these social networks as relations or transactions among people. Th
relations contain: (1) communications (i.e., transfer of information); (2) exchange content and (3) 
normative content or the expectations of people with respect to exchange. A network is defin




of relationship and is constructed by 
nding the ties between all persons in a population under study..." Dimensions of networks are: 
density (i.e., extensiveness of ties); reachability (i.e., path or link between two people); and 
centrality (refers to the focal person's ability to reach the members of the network). The authors 
onships 
 
 via brokers or other intermediaries, will 
ave access to a wider range of information."  An incubator could be viewed as the “broker” in 
fi
discuss the role of a "broker" in the network, without whom numerous one-to-one relati
would need to be created. The authors also discuss the notion of the diversity of network: the
stronger the ties with network elements, the better the competitive advantage of the firm. "People 




Van de Ven (1993) discusses the role of the individual entrepreneur in the context of a social 
system and networks. He suggests firms establish cooperative relationships with suppliers, 
distributors and customers in order to make their own activities more meaningful. Common 
forms of networks include exchanging multiple resources, communicating and exchanging 




Bloodgood et al. (1995) suggest that economic imperatives alone do not determine the 
entrepreneur’s propensity to network. Rather, there is a broader social context that influences an




on-economic ties often bind and maintain relationships key to the 
survival of the entrepreneurial venture." In this context, there is clearly interplay between the 
economic and social motives in entrepreneurial activities." 
 
Impact of Networking on Firm Performance 
Why do firms engage in networking? This question has been explored extensively in the 
literature. What appears to have emerged as a conclusion from numerous research efforts is that 
entrepreneurial networking positively influences firm performance (e.g., Covin and Slevin, 1991; 
Zahra, 1993; Hansen, 1995; Human and Provan, 1997). 
 
Building on the original conceptualization by Covin and Slevin (1991), Zahra (1993) introduces 
a model for firm-level entrepreneurship in which the relationship between entrepreneurship and 
firm performance is postulated.  First, the model, reproduced in Figure 7, recognizes that there 
are both financial and non-financial outcomes associated with a firm’s performance. Second, the 
model acknowledges the possibility that growth and profitability are not always guaranteed 
through firm-type entrepreneurship. Third, both financial and non-financial aspects of venture 





The model suggests certain relationships between firm-level entrepreneurship and a number of 
components as follows: (1) external environment; (2) strategic variables; (3) internal variables
and (4) firm performance. In this model, establishment of business linkages is part of the 
strategic variable component. 
; 
ed to first year 





Hansen (1995) suggests that entrepreneurial networks (or "action sets") are link
Figure 7:  Firm Level Entrepreneurship Model. Source: Zahra 1993 
n
founding entrepreneurial network variables: (1) size of network; (2) degree of interconnectiv
within the network; and (3) frequency of interaction among the members of the network. The 
hypotheses that these variables positively influenced first-year growth were strongly supported
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Medcot (1996) examines the management aspect of external networks. He suggests that external
networks are increasingly becoming a complex activity and have evolved from the notions of 
internal technology network
 
s or single-partner collaborations. In examining the management 




995) studied six new technology-oriented entrepreneurial firms in China. 
Three high-growth firms reported more external relationships and greater interaction frequency 
c
policies, human resources, strategic networking, and harmonization with networks are addressed. 
 
While incubators are recognized for their ability to create networks, no research could be 
identified that specially addressed the issue of the management of complex networks by 
incubators.
 
Shaw (1993) studied 34 medical equipment innovations in the UK with respect to the impact of 
entrepreneurial networking in creation, development, design, manufacturing, and marketing 
activities. He found that entrepreneurial networks facilitated the process of learning by doing, 
learning by using and learning by interaction. During the learning process, capital and hum
resources were leveraged for technological and economic development. External linkages 
enabled entrepreneurs to accumulate knowledge and take advantage of existing research. 
Collaboration with users and other key players in the network facilitated a more effective 
prototype development, testing, evaluation and marketing process. This also led to the diffusion 
of research and developmental costs among a subset of the network members. 
 
Zhao and Aram (1
with external networks than the remaining low-growth firms. They conclude that networking 
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positively impacts firm growth, especially in the early stage of a firm’s development. T
growth firms found that the time and expense due to interacting with networks were justified 
given the realized benefits. 
he high-
 
consultancy, information and common facilities. The results indicated that the effect of support 
services were ed. While 
the support service variables were significant, the correlations were low, suggesting that most of 
the variance in any particular small firm performance was unaccounted for by the influence of 
support services. 
 
Dean, Homes and Smith (1997) analyzed the impact of networking on firm performance, using a 
Donckels and Lambrecht (1997) studied 900 entrepreneurs in Belgium to examine their network 
behaviors and explore the impact on firm performance. Two industries were examined: 
manufacturing and service. The authors found that firms in both the service and manufacturing 
industries used external consultants and that growth was partially supported by networking 
activities. 
 
Sarder, Ghosh and Rosa (1997) studied 161 small business firms in Bangladesh to examine the 
impact of business assistance on the performance of these firms.  Support services were defined 
as "any assistance, financial or non-financial, provided by any organization, public or private." 
Four performance measures of growth in sales, growth in employment, sales per full-time 
employee, and value added per full-time employee were used. The authors identified several 
types of assistance: financial, marketing, management education and training, technical, 
 significant and varied according to which performance measure was us
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broad definition of performance, and found the following benefits of networking: (1) 
profits/profitability; (2) sustainable growth; (3) exchange of information; (4) quality of product 
or service; (5) business recognition; and (6) expansion of sales. 
 
Brown et al. (1990) and Brown and Butler (1995) examined inter-organizational networks as a 
means for small entrepreneurial firms to gain some strategic advantage over the larger, more 
established competitors. They proposed a dynamic networking model which distinguishes 
various networks as a function of the entrepreneurial process (reproduced in Figure 8). Their 
examination was in the context of entrepreneurial marketing perspective and how networks 
impact market share growth and capture in the winery industry. Using a small sample of 54 small 
wineries, the authors tested four key hypotheses: (1) social networks are important during startup 
petitor 
gnificantly to improved market growth and product introduction.  The 
survey was based on how much time was “spent building networks” and the results were mixed. 
phase, but less so after firm establishment; (2) stakeholder networks are important when the firm 
is established; (3) competitor networks are primarily used to obtain strategic and functional 
information important to the firm after the startup phase; and (4) stakeholder and com
networks contribute si
 
Figure 8:  Dynamic Networking Model.  Source:  Brown and Butler 1995 
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Conversely, Carsrud, Gaglio and Olm (1987) in their study of 197 female-owned firms did not 
ay 
rm 
reneurs seek out venture capitalists 
them such as helping to find and select key 
manage
strategy. Venture capitalists 
networks and great intensity of involvem
innovative technological ventures
successful venture capital involv
firms. 
 
find that mentoring and network contacts improved firm performance. This did not support their 
theory that social networks improve firm performance (Aldrich and Zimmer, 1986).  This m
also be attributable to gender specific issues and warrant further review.     
 
Timmons and Bygrave (1986) studied the impact of venture capital on technology oriented fi
performance. They found that successful venture-capital investing in technologically innovative 
firms require more than just risk capital. Successful entrep
that can provide high value-added benefits to 
ment members, providing credibility with customers and supplies, and helping to shape 
possess specialized know-how, including a web of contacts and 
ent. The result of the comparative analysis of highly 
 and least innovative technological ventures suggests that 
ement is positively related to highly innovative technological 
Ostgaard and Birley (1996) in a study of 159 entrepreneurs in England explored the effectiveness 
of personal networks in terms of firm performance and growth. The results indicated a link 
between the entrepreneur's networking behavior and the growth of the firm. 
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Management of Networks and Barriers to Networking 
entrepreneurs in acquiring resources for new ventures. The authors suggest that 
ntrepreneurs develop social assets primarily as means to secure resources for their ventures. The 
entrepreneurs then leverage their social assets by building them into a network.  In particular the 
authors provide some discussion as to why entrepreneurs of new ventures are generally less 
on is 
ntures, where timing, action, and social 
interaction are critical. Further, social network resources are 'soft', affective, and 
tangible value ... [entrepreneurs] are 
conditioned by their corporate experience to be incapable of amplifying, and 
. 
ean, Holmes and Smith (1997) suggest a number of factors identified as inhibiting networking: 
Starr and MacMillan (1990) discuss the role of social contracting strategies by independent and 
corporate 
e
likely to take advantage of external networks or inter-organizational resources. The first reas
that these networking activities often take too much time: 
 
"...can be hazardous to fragile new ve
emotionally charged, with uncertain 
trained to look with disfavor on begging, borrowing, or scavenging" (Starr and 
MacMillan, 1990, p. 89) 
 
Second, organizational procedures may not allow building of social assets and networks. Third, 
inter-organizational relationship building often cannot be planned. Traditional strategic planning 
techniques rarely recognize the realities of managing inter-organizational collaborative efforts
Finally, entrepreneurs need time to build social assets and develop networks. 
 
D
(1) concerns with information disclosure; (2) want to remain independent; (3) uncertain 
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assistance to business; (4) distrust of other firms; (5) lack of suitable partners; (6) increased ri
to firm; (7) lack of suitable information/guidance; (8) uncertainty with initiating network; (9) 






In this section, literature that relates to specific network groups will be discussed. Network 
groups are distinct entities with whom an entrepreneur establishes relationships. These g
include customers, suppliers, financial entities, strategic partners, consultants, and trade 
organizations. 
 
Customers and Suppliers 
Customers and suppliers are the life line of the entrepreneur and his or her enterprise. For early-
stage high-technology firms the relationship between them and their customers and suppliers are 
often key determinants of business success or failure. Early rapport with customers, gain of their 
trust and business, establishment of a long-term relationship, individual attention and delive
needed products determine the stability of the revenue stream and, thus, the ability to refine and 
innovate for repeated and continual business. A similar close relationship with suppliers can 
determine the quality of the p
ry of 
roduct or service being provided and the timeliness of that product 
and service. 
 
A number of research efforts have been undertaken to better understand the relationship of the 
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entrepreneur with its customers and suppliers. For example, Holm, et al. (1996) suggest that 
cooperation between supplier and customer firms can raise the value of business relationships 
and that business network connections have an impact on cooperation.  In analyzing a sample of 
136 international business relationships, they found that relationship benefit is directly affected 
by relationship commitment and indirectly through commitment by business network 
connections. 
 
von Hippie (1988) has shown that interactions between suppliers and customers help to bring 
about product innovation. In particular his theory suggests that customers or users are a 




s "farm out" activities to the most efficient supplier, 
nd keeps internal to the organization those activities in which it has a comparative advantage, 
si
In examining the sources of innovation, von Hippie studied innovations that have taken place in 
the field of scientific instrumentation. He examined some 100 highly technical innovation
their histories. He found that 77 percent were developed by the users as: (1) first to innovation; 
(2) major improvements; (3) or minor improvements.  von Hippie has shown that close 
relationships between suppliers and customers provides firms with the most important source of
innovation. As shown in Figure 9, he conceptualizes networks as a mode of organization than 
can be used by managers or entrepreneurs to position their firms in a stronger, competitiv
stance. He focuses on the notion that firm
a
and lower transaction costs. 
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Figure 9:  von Hippie Supplier-customer model. Source: von Hippie 1988 p19 
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Another case depicts a model of supplier networks used by Japanese manufacturing firms (Imai,  
Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1985).  The model, reproduced in Figure 10, describes how large 
Japanese companies, in general, and the case firms studied, in particular, use supplier networks. 
In this topology, three business network types are described. Affiliated networks are those 




. Rather, it is more suggestive of the 
lassical supplier-customer paradigm. 
 
are comprised of small to medium firms that manufacture and process parts. R&D networks a
those research organizations (public or private) that engage in cooperative research an
development activities.  
 
This conceptualization is a departure from the competitive strategy or economic transaction cost 
paradigms in the sense that it suggests a broader and more complex entrepreneurial behavio




Zeffane (1995) examined the role of networking as it relates to supplier relationships. He found 
that outsourcing is a fundamental strategy in certain small high-technology companies an
result, a key aspect of the entrepreneur's overall network position. 
 
Trade Organizations
d, as a  
 
One approach for the entrepreneur, especially in the high-technology industries, to maintain 
current knowledge of products, markets, and technologies is through the use of trade 
the product development cycles are extremely short and time-to-market periods are compressed.  
the information to take appropriate actions. Trade organizations and trade activities can be 
effective and inexpensive in achieving this objective. 
organizations. This is especially important to entrepreneurs in the high-technology sectors since 
As a result the entrepreneur must gather all pertinent information at an acceptable cost and utilize 
 
 
Figure 10:  Imai Supplier Network Model. Source: Emai 1985, p.552 
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Consultants and Advisors 
Consultants and advisors play an important role in helping the entrepreneur initiate his or h
enterprise and help provide needed expertise throughout the early development phase of the 
business (Day and Reynolds, 1995; Birley and Niktari, 19
er 
95). Entrepreneurs in high-technology 
dustries tend to have higher levels of experience in their technical field, while lacking adequate 
 dimension of running an enterprise, such as management, human resources, 
legal, financial and the like. Research has shown that the use of consultants by entrepreneurs 
during the early stages of enterprise development is primarily to compensate for a lower level 
experience or expertise in certain areas (Bayer, 1991). Additionally, these entrepreneurs often do 
not have the time or resources to engage in long term planning (Robinson 1982). In this context, 
numerous studies have examined the use and role of consultants and advisors in helping 
entrepreneurs with their enterprise development (Kentzman and Samaras, 1960; Golde, 1964; 
Robinson, 1982). Some research has shown that the use of outside consultants and experts 
positively influences firm performance (Donckels and Lambrecht, 1997). 
 
Certain government initiatives and programs have been designed to provide needed business 
consulting and expertise in support of small businesses. These programs include Small Business 
Development Centers (SBDCs), Service Corps of Retired Executives (SCORE), Active Corps of 
Executives (ACE), the Small Business Institute (SBI) and the newly opened SBA National 
Entrepreneur Centers. These consulting services are generally thought to contribute positively to 
a firm performance. For example, some research has found that the consulting services of 
SBDCs positively impact firms’ performance (Sonfield, 1981; Robinson, 1982; Chrisman, 




analysis of the impact of SBDCs, Chrisman and Leslie (1985) found that outside counselors 
provided in the SBDC programs realized a short-term reduction in costs, as opposed to an 
increase in revenues with such outside assistance. Those receiving strategic assistance as well, 
owever, achieved the highest performance advantages. h
 
Financial Sources 
Financial sources constitute another key part of the entrepreneurs’ business network. 
Entrepreneurs need financial assistance, primarily, for three reasons: (a) to diversity or spread the 
start-up risk; (b) to accumulate start-up capital; and (c) to finance growth and expansion 
(Gnyawali and Fogel, 1994). For the most part, commercial financing and most venture capital 
financing are not available to small early-stage enterprises due their risky and uncertain future. 
Established firms with proven products and market share are more likely to obtain commercial 
and venture capital funds. 
 
Additionally, small early-stage enterprises do not prefer financing strategies that result in trading 
equity for funds and erode their control over the enterprise before they are ready. Several studies 
have considered the attitudes of the entrepreneurs towards financing. Some empirical studies 
have found that entrepreneurs in general prefer funds generated internally or their own personal 
funds since these would ensure control over the operations and assets of the firms (Holmes and 
Kent, 1991; Landstrom and Winborg, 1995). In the event that debt financing becomes necessary, 
entrepreneurs prefer short-term debt, often via business credits and other means, since this does 
not demand any collateral security. 
With respect to the sources of financing for small start-up firms, research has shown that 
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entrepreneurs’ own funds constitute the major source (Van Auken and Carter, 1989; Holmes and 
Kent, 1990). This research also concludes that loans from family and friends are commonly used
by small firms. 
 
In a study of 160 small firms in Indiana, Birley (1985) examined the role of formal and informal 
networks in regard to starting a venture. In particular, she found that formal networks came into 
play when dealing with securing funding from external organizations. Banks were cited as
primary source. External funding of the business was the primary help the business needed and 






rs and family) were the most common source of equity 
capital. For all investors, the size of the amount financed increased with the stage of the 
financing (i.e., seed, start-up, first-stage). The finding of the research is that private individuals 
tend to invest more heavily in the early stages of development. Venture capital financing tended 




Freear and Wetzel (1990) studied 284 technology-based firms founded in the New England 
region to determine the source of equity capital financing of new high-technology firms. They 
found several sources of financing for these firms: entrepreneurs and their relatives; private
individuals; venture capitalists; non-financial corporations; and public stock offering. Priva
individuals (excluding entrepreneu
 
It has been well established that technology can and should be used to enhance a firm's 
competitive advantage in the marketplace and it should be an integral part of the firms overall 
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business strateg gy industries 
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a timely ma  
an ever increasing manner, small f ining its internal core 
competencies on a par with the rap nology firms are 
 as an ex
A variety of terms have been used 
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d Smile
Rajaratnam, 1986). Forrest (1990)
ble 5. 
 
y (Porter, 1985). Small technology firms in emerging high-technolo
face the chal s in technological development that provide both opportunit
and risk. A firm’  the application of new technologies in product innovat
and successfully marketing these products is the major determinant of its success or failure. 
Often, however, a firm does n ssess all the necessary skills or technologies to pursue new
product innovations in nner.  In industries where technology changes are occurring in
irms face the challenge of mainta
id pace of technology. As a result, small tech
using "strategic alliances" plicit part of their overall strategy. 
in the literature to describe the relationships between 
organizations when they collaborate for strategi
operative ag
c reasons: strategic alliances, partnerships, co-
can be found throughout the literature (Porter, 1985; P
and Fuller, 1986; Mariti an y, 1983; Harrigan, 1985; Adler, 1966; Varadarajan and 
 provided a proposed taxonomy of these alliances. This 
taxonomy is presented in Ta
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Table 5:  Forrest Taxonomy of Alliances Source: Forrest 1990, p. 39 
Joint Venture An independent third enterprise formed by the company with another 
 
Malecki and Tootle (1996) examined the behaviors of firms with respect to the role played by 
networks in information flow as it relates to firm competitiveness. They suggest that for large 
firms, formal ties, such as strategic alliances and joint ventures are common, but for small firms 
more flexible, informal connections are the norm. 
 
Osborn and Hagedoorn (1997) conducted a review of the various theories and views concerning 
alliances and networks. In particular they reviewed three types of alliance and network 
company.  Assets are contributed by both parties, who also share the risk. 
Equity investment An investment by a large company in a smaller technology firm. 
Client sponsored research contract The small company is paid to conduct research on particular products or 
processes for another organization. 
Marketing/distribution agreements Agreements whereby another company will market and distribute the 
small technology based firm’s product. 
Manufacturing agreements An agreement whereby another company agrees to manufacture products 
for the small technology based firms. 
University agreement An agreement with a university whereby the small technology based firm 
pays the university to conduct research on its behalf. 
Research institute agreement Similar to above but with a research institute. 
Collaborative R&D An agreement between the small technology based firm and another 
company to collaborate on the development of specific products or 
services. 
Research and development limited 
partnerships  
A tax advantaged investment vehicle which provides funding for new 
product R&D at no cost to the company.  The company retains 
ownership of the technology and receives royalties if commercialized. 
Technology licensing (Inward) A contractual arrangement by which the small technology based firm is 
granted access to another company’s patents or technology for a fee 
(usually royalties). 
Technology licensing (outward) The reverse of above.  In this case the small technology based firm 
receives royalties from another company for allowing use of its 
technology. 
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paradigms: R&D tion approach. 
e 
elp in further understanding of 
alli e
 
Res rc rms consider forming alliances key to their initial 
suc s . 1995; Birley et al. 1991). In 
one u at some 67 percent of the entrepreneurs 
con e portant factor in their initial success (Freear et al. 1995). 
In a t 3 and 1989 over 2,200 cooperative agreements were formed 
betw e s in the biotechnology industry (Barley, Freeman, and 
Hyb s
 
collaborations, international business perspectives, and transac
The authors discussed management issues with respect to alliances and networks, the impact of 
technology on networks, social and individual characteristics, and institutional issues. Th
authors concluded that there is a need for an integrative theory to h
anc s and networks. 
ea h has shown that small, start-up fi
ces , especially in the high-technology industries (Freear et al
 st dy of the software industry, results indicated th
sid red forming alliances to be an im
no her example, between 197
e n start up and established firm
el  1991).   
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Environmental Factors Impacting New Venture Creation 
Given a satisfactory market opportunity, there are a number of environmental elements that m
be in place to support a successful start-up. William B. Gartner (Gartner, 1990) lists ten 
ingredients that are most important to successful venture creation: 
• Suitable financing 
ust 




• Support of local population 
l to one venture and 
ot another, but all of them have a considerable role in ensuring new venture success. Proximity 
r 
in 
• Accessibility to helpful suppliers 
Government support, or at least the absence of obstacles 
Proximity of universities to assist in research 
• Availability of land or facilities 
Access to transportation 
• Available support services - secretarial, telecommunications, etc. 
• Low entry barriers 
 
Each of the above factors is important. Some of them may be more critica
n
to universities is noteworthy in two respects. In high tech start-ups where new inventions o
technologies play a dominant role, these institutions can make significant contributions to a 
successful start-ups through research, problem solutions and engineering support. Another 
benefit of the university is often its business school and the availability of consulting services 
terms of marketing, production systems, MIS, accounting and finance advice, etc. 
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Benjamin Mokry suggests that in order to create a more receptive environment for 
entrepreneurship, a number of fundamental societal changes must occur (Mokry, 1984). He 
supports the major truism that “local communities are the breeding ground of entrepreneu
and are capable of creating an environment favorable to it. Mokry has added two factors to
Gartner’s 10 factors that affect entrepreneurial success: 
rship” 
 
• Existence of an entrepreneurial su tremendous success of Silicon Valley, 
eed off 
Prio e  incubators located in urban areas and / or 
asso a e value added services that are correlated with improved client 
per m n-urban incubators and incubators that are not 
asso a  al., 1996) 
 
ewis’ recent research supports the fact that younger incubation programs that adopt best 
practices can achieve great success (Lewis, 2003).  Lewis states that while temporal factors play 
an important role in the maturation of incubator programs, some younger programs also achieved 
top-performing program status. Of the sixteen top-performing programs in terms of graduate 
firm revenue, two were in operation for only two years and a third was operating for only three 
years. Though anecdotal, the success of these programs implies that younger programs can reach 
 
b-culture. The 
Boston, Austin and San Diego very much support the notion that entrepreneurs f
each other in a synergistic fashion and create their own dynamic environment. 
• Incubator organizations, many of which are initiated by local universities and 
governments as enterprise centers. 
 
r r search also concluded that technology business
ci ted with a university provid
for ance at a higher rate relative to no
ci ted with institutions of higher education. (Tornatzki, et
L
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optimal performance relatively fast. However, the success of these younger programs may have 
been the result of one or two star graduates whose revenue and employment skyrocketed. This 
theory is also supported by the UCF Technology Incubator’s ability to become a top ten 
technology incubator within a few years and then to become the 2004, National Business 
Incubator Association’s Incubator of the Year in only its fourth year.  
 
Conclusions 
The literature illustrates the difficulty of incubator research.  There is a wide variety of 
perspectives and a small amount of research.  The fact that the incubator phenomenon is 
relatively new is a factor contributing to the scarcity of research.  Another factor is the difficulty 
involved in the conduct of the research.  As discussed in the literature review, these problems 
include: 
• Complex multiplicity of needs and objectives  
• Wide range of approaches 
• Too many possible combinations 
• The need for contextual approaches to understanding 




                                                 
1 This story along with several others can be found at: 
http://www.geocities.com/capitolhill/2817/govern.htm 
2 The Florida High Tech Corridor Council (FHTCC)was formed as part of the effort to keep what is now 
called Agere Inc. in Orlando, FL.  The FHTCC mission now is to grow, attract and retain High Tech 
Industry in an eleven county region that covers Central Florida from coast to coast. 
3 This comes from personal conversations with Agere management and while accurate at the time of 
writing, could change as with any business decision.  
4 NSF’s Partnerships for Innovation Program is a modern version of this program that continues to 
provide funding to help communities capitalize on innovations.  
5 This is from first hand knowledge of the author as the UCF Technology Incubator had secured funding 
for its incubator from the legislature.  The state’s Innovation and Commercialization Centers funding was 
also vetoed that same year. 
6 The National Business Incubator Association’s most recently available figures indicate that 75% of 
incubators are non-profit. 
7 Udell (1990) and Bearse are especially critical of self reported measures of success. 
8 The NBIA web site allows for four categories of membership:  Incubation Professional defined as an 
organization that operates; sponsors or is developing an incubator; an Associate as an organization that 
operates, sponsors or is developing an incubator or represents an economic development agency or other 
non-profit organization; or a consultant or small service provider and corporate or large service provider.  
9 In principle, a research park (a.k.a. a science park) is a location for the conduct of basic research; a 
technology innovation center is a location for commercializing the results of basic research; and a 
business incubator is a location for fostering the development of new or young businesses. In practice, a 
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great deal of convergence amongst these three organizational forms has emerged; differences are in scale 
of operations and expectations. 
10 Business Accelerator was often used when the term incubator reflected negatively on a client 
company’s stage of development.  The term Venture lab is synonymous with Georgia Tech’s well 
respected program.  Innovation and Commercialization Centers are often associated with the public / 
public partnerships that lead to corporation such as the Central Florida Innovation Center and five (5) 
other such centers in Florida in the early 1990’s. 
11 The emergence of virtual incubators is problematic because it is questionable whether they can be 
considered ‘‘bona fide’’ (Bearse, 1998) incubators. If they can be considered incubators, then implicitly 
any entity that provides business assistance services can also be considered an incubator. This 
significantly increases the population and heterogeneity of incubators, further constraining the ability to 
generalize research findings. 
12 Campbell et al. (1985) are the rare group of scholars who attempt a definition, defining the value-
adding process of incubation as follows: “(1) The diagnosis of the total business needs of a new business, 
from the collective experience of a diverse group of business generalists and specialists. (2) The cost-
effective selection, provision and monitoring of the acquisition, implementation and coordination of the 
various business services needed by the new business. (3) The provision of capital—if needed—to pay for 
product development and the business services provided by third party professionals. (4) The provision of 
a growing network of business development expertise.” They locate this process inside the incubator. 
Alternatively, Brooks (1986) identifies the incubation process as a set of activities occurring in the 
community where the incubator is located. These activities include educating members of the community 
regarding the theoretical benefits of entrepreneurship and demonstrating the benefits of launching 
entrepreneurial ventures. 
13 Readers interested in learning how to conduct an incubator feasibility study should see the following: 
Bazan (1987); Meeder  (1993). 
 92
                                                                                                                                                         
14 This is not a trivial undertaking from my personal experience.  Keeping an incubator filled with perfect 
clients will never happen in real life. 
15 Rice (2002) provides a comprehensive discussion on the passive intervention effects associated with 
incubators.  
16 Resource gaps can include, for example, a lack of access to information, a lack of access to potential 
customers, a lack of expertise required to complete new product development, a lack of access to 
expensive equipment, or a lack of access to funding sources. 
17 Some clients that fall in the category of “don’t need incubation,” especially ones that have a high 
chance of success, are often the clients incubators seek most to help them show success. 
18 For additional examples: Brooks (1986); Campbell et al. (1985); Lumpkin and Ireland (1988); Smilor 
(1987b); Temali and Campbell (1984) 
19 Merrifield uses items related to business attractiveness and fit including finance, legal, regulatory, 
manufacturing, management, marketing, distribution, and technology factors.  
20 Initial Success is a function of Initial Quantified Success, comprised of: (Sales Growth, Employment 
Growth, Profitability, ROI, Sales/ Employee, Sales/Assets) and Initial Subjective Success (Original 
Expectation, Attainment, Probability of Survival, Ability to Attract Outside Capital, Employee 
Satisfaction, Contributions to Society).  
21 By definition, Incubator client studies are only at the level of the venture.  Dimensions of community 
and incubator would not be meaningful. 
22 See, for example, Allen and Rahman (1985); Hansen et al. (2000); Markley and McNamara (1995); 
Safraz A. Mian (1994); Roper (1999); Sherman (1999); Smilor (1987b); Temali and Campbell (1984)  
23 Richard Fox with the Central Florida Innovation referred to the gaps as the Fatal Flaw in their Business 
plan. 
24 This gap is often referred to as the “Valley of Death” (Branscomb and Aurswald, 2002). 
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25 Q = cRPdCPe: Q = value-added output (incubation process); c = a scaling factor; RP = regular producer 
(incubator manager) inputs; d = output elasticity; CP = consumer producer (incubatee) inputs; e = output 
elasticity.  
26 Originally published in 1958, Max Weber’s life spanned from 1864 – 1920. 
27 NBIA evaluations of sessions that feature research findings are not well attended and negative feedback 
sited the session as being too academic.   
28 Harrison et al. (1996), Malecki (1997) and Markusen (1987) all provide good reviews of the regional 
development literature regarding innovation and agglomeration. 
29 Lewis used constant 2000 dollars. His survey was based on 65 (83.3%) responses to the operating costs 
in 1995 questions, and 70 (89.7%) responses to the operating costs in 2000 questions. 
30 Sources: The industry average and results from previous research on technology incubators use sample 
data (Culp 1996; Wolfe et al. 1999, 2000, Lewis 2001). Lewis’ survey consisted of a population of 
technology incubators only. 
31 These numbers do not equal 100% due to rounding errors. 
32 Lewis again used constant 2000 dollars to calculate these values. 
33 Feller (1992, 1997) and Coburn and Brown (1997) present evidence that States are increasing their role 
in the national innovation system both as a result of federal devolution and as a catalyst for economic 
growth. 
34 These figures are from the national survey by the Department of Commerce of all technology 
incubators in the United States, established prior to 1999 and still operating in June 2001. 
35 Universities are under pressure to develop and implement effective assessment tools as part of their 
review and accreditation process. 
36 A complete description of the Rensselaer Incubator can be found on their web site at: 
http://www.rpi.edu/dept/incubator/homepage/mission.html 
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 The proposed incubator will be a partnership between the City of Orlando, the University of Central 37





CHAPTER THREE:  METHODOLOGY 
g 
Definition of Research Question
  RESEARCH
 
The goal of this dissertation is to better understand which factor(s) are key to incubator client 
success.  After combining a comprehensive literature review with extensive personal experience 
in operating an incubator, the research question of most interest that needs further understandin
is the following: 
 
 
What practices of University Technology Incubators create the largest increases in 
employment growth of incubator client firms? 
 
ve led 
 the following preliminary assertions / constructs:   
cal economic development system and their 
success is significantly tied to the larger development system. [Gartner, 1990; Smilor, 1987] 
 their 
entrepreneurial or other business skills. [Lewis, 2003] 
• Areas that take advantage of h they are able to draw upon 
cess 
A Priori Constructs: 
Previous literature (main references cited below) combined with personal observations ha
to
• Successful incubators are a part of a larger lo
• The best incubators fill in the gaps by connecting local, often disconnected resources, 
thereby allowing companies to fail or succeed because of market forces, not because of
“Steeples of Excellence” whic
contribute significantly to startup companies and hence incubator success. [Lewis, 2003; 
Tornatzki, 2003; Shane, 2004] 






s 2003).  
lp contrast practices.    
client performance interest include:  total 
vestment received; research grant support; patents held; copyrights held; and licenses. 
Instruments and Protocols
The population from which cases will be selected is university affiliated technology incubators in
the United States.  Cases will be selected by examining survey data from the following: a re
US Department of Commerce study (Tornatzki 2003); and David Lewis’ research (Lewi
Those university technology incubators identified by the studies whose firms show the largest 
increases of jobs will be selected.  Incubator firms that demonstrate the lowest job creation 
numbers will also be examined to he
 
Various tests were conducted using statistical software packages such as Minitab, SPSS, and 
Matlab to identify any significant factors or groups of factors that correlate to the primary and 
secondary outcomes.  Secondary measures of 
in
 
Once this was done, IRB approval was acquired. 
 
The number of case studies included in the project depended on the data collected.  Case studies 
will be added until the saturation point discussed in Eisenhardt’s (1989) paper is reached.   
 
 
Instruments will be constructed and modified prior to and during the data collection process.  
These instruments will help combine the various data collected from multiple sources.  Data for 
this dissertation will come from interviews, observations, and archival sources.  These 





emarcated boundaries -- it is easy to determine who is included and who is not, thus making 





It is speculated that the integration of the incubator into a larger system will be achieved largely
through networking type activities.  The importance of networks has been discussed in the 
literature review.  Unlike many other types of network settings, incubators have clea
d
attribute for limiti
drawing conclusions from the data. 
 
The permission of the incubator managers and clients will be obtained prior to collecting data for 
this dissertation.  Included in the request will be a commitment to share the results of the find
with the participants in the study.   
 
As an additional reference point, a reflective case study of the UCF Technology Incubator will 
be provided, detailing many of the operational and historical elements that have influenced the 
incubator’s growth. The incubator has received national recognition as a best practice and 
for success that includes receiving the National Business Incubator Association’s highes
Incubator of the Year, 2004, after being in operation for less than five years.  It was ranked in th
top 10 in terms of revenue growth of clients and increases in jobs (Tornatzki, 2003) in its third 
year. 
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Entering the Field 
The subject of networks and their significance for incubator success is a relatively unexamined 
issue.  For this reason and because developed networks within incubator settings are not often 
documented, the research is exploratory and descriptive in nature, not explanatory. 
 
Data Collection 
To p , multiple sources of evidence will be secured, a case study data base 
wil aintained.  Data will be collected through in-
depth interviews, client observations, and examinations of existing documentation. In the case of 





hel  insure data integrity
l be created, and a chain of evidence will be m
th
Incubator managers and clients will be the main source of data. 
 
The initial data will be gathered from documents such as incubator applications, web sites, a
other achieved data.  Next, interviews of at least one hour in length will be conducted with each
incubator manager, clients, and other appropriate people at the various incubators.  These
interviews will be conducted using the research instruments as a guide but allowing for 
deviations to explore areas of interest that come out of the interview itself.  Field notes will be 
taken to record whatever impressions occur during these interviews.  Whenever possible, these
sessions will be recorded to facilitate better recollection of details and allow for more 
engagement during the interview and less transcribing.  
 
Concepts and variables suggested by the literature will be used to construct the instruments that 
will draw out other insights as well as to check those arrived at empirically.  This analysis will be 
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nd Burgelman (1983) added interviews with individuals whose importance became clear 
uring data collection. Leonard-Barton (1988) went even further by adding several experiments 
investigation and
forward. This process may be replicated multiple times until the framework and the pattern
interaction or relationships emerge and the state of saturation discussed by Eisenhardt (1989) 
reached. 
 
After each interview or observation, the following questions will be addressed: 
• What was learned? 
• How does this case differ from the last? 
• How is it similar to the last? 
 
Preliminary findings will be presented to participants to get feedback as to interpretations.   
 
Additional adjustments may be made to data collection instruments, such as the addition of 
questions to an interview protocol or questions to a questionnaire (e.g, Harris & Sutton, 1986). 
These adjustments allow for probing of emergent themes or to take advantage of spec
opportunities which may be present in a given situation. In other situations adjustments can 
include the addition of data sources in selected cases. For example, Sutton and Callahan (1987) 
added observational evidence for one case when the opportunity to attend creditors' meetings
arose, a
d
to probe her emergent theory in a study of the implementation of technical innovations. 
The goal is that the methodology and the analysis will lead to confidence in the findings so that 
others asking similar questions and following a similar process would reach similar conclusions. 
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Data Analysis 
Data will be analyzed using Eisenhardt’s methods by beginning with a “within case” data 
analysis.  Within-case analysis typically involves detailed case study write-ups for each site. 
These write-ups are often simply pure descriptions, but they are central to the generation of 




 turn, accelerates cross-case comparison. 
Coupled with within-case analysis is cross-case search for patterns. The tactics here are driven 
ns 
oss-




with the often enormous volume of data.  The overall intent is to become intimately familiar with
each case as a stand-alone entity. This process allows the unique patterns of each case to emerge
before pushing to generalize patterns across cases. In addition, it gives a rich familiarity with
each case which, in
  
by the reality that people are notoriously poor processors of information, and leap to conclusio
based on limited data (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973), are overly influenced by the vividness 
(Nisbett & Ross, 1980) or by more elite respondents (Miles & Huberman, 1984), ignore basic 
statistical properties (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973), or sometimes inadvertently drop 
disconfirming evidence (Nisbett & Ross, 1980). The danger lies in reaching premature and even 
false conclusions as a result of these information-processing biases. Thus, the key to good cr
case comparison is counteracting these tendencies by examinin
w
 
Categories or dimensions will be selected and then within-group similarities coupled with inter-
group differences will be identified.  Dimensions will be derived from the research question or 
from existing literature.  Overall, the idea behind the cross-case searching tactics is to go 
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initial impressions, especially through the use of structured and diverse lenses on the data. 
tactic improves the likelihood of accurate 
This 
and reliable theory, that is, a theory with a close fit 
ith the data. Also, cross-case searching tactics enhance the probability of capturing a novel 
 will 
w
finding which may exist in the data. 
   
Every attempt will be made to reduce bias by sharing intermediate conclusions with committee 
members, incubator managers, or incubator clients as appropriate.  Participant observation




From the within-site analysis plus various cross-site tactics and overall impressions, tentative 
emes, concepts, and possibly even relationships between variables will begin to emerge.  The 
next step of this highly iterative proce atically the emergent frame with 
 
w insights 
ossible from the data and yields an empirically valid theory. 
 
th
ss is to compare system
the evidence from each case in order to assess how well or poorly it fits with case data.  The 
purpose is to constantly compare theory and data--iterating toward a theory which closely fits the
data. A close fit is critical to building sound theory because it incorporates the ne
p
 
Step one in shaping hypotheses is the sharpening of constructs.  This is a two-part process 
involving (1) refining the definition of the construct and (2) building evidence which measures 
the construct in each case. This occurs through constant comparison between data and constructs
so that accumulating evidence from diverse sources converges on a single, well-defined 
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construct.  This process is similar to developing a single construct measure from multiple 
ce, 
hile other times it is revised, disconfirmed, or thrown out for insufficient evidence.  Thus, the 
h 
logous to an experiment, and multiple cases are analogous to multiple experiments.  
his contrasts with the sampling logic of traditional, within-experiment, hypothesis-testing 
folding Literature
indicators in hypothesis-testing research. 
 
Step two for shaping hypotheses is verifying that the emergent relationships between constructs 
fit with the evidence in each case. Sometimes a relationship is confirmed by the case eviden
w
underlying logic is replication; that is, the logic of treating a series of cases as a series of 
experiments with each case serving to confirm or disconfirm the hypotheses (Yin, 1984). Eac
case is ana
T
research in which the aggregate relationships across the data points are tested using summary 
statistics such as F values (Yin, 1984). 
 
En  
n essential feature of theory building is comparison of the emergent concepts, theory, or hy-
t is particularly crucial in theory-building 
search because the findings often rest on a very limited number of cases. In this situation, any 
further corroboration of internal validity or generalizability is an important improvement. 
A
potheses with the extant literature. This involves asking what is this similar to, what does it con-
tradict, and why. A key to this process is to consider a broad range of literature. 
 
Overall, tying the emergent theory to existing literature enhances the internal validity, 
generalizability, and theoretical level of theory building from case study research. While linking 





he process of iterating between theory and data will cease again, when saturation has been 
reached.  That is, the iteration process stop cremental improvement to theory is 
g conclusions.   A high 
egree of consistency and consensus among the various sources used to develop patterns of 
interactions to ascertain the factors that support the hypothesis will be sought.  Points of 
divergence will be noted and discussed. 
 
Yin explains that one issue of potential concern for the conceptual framework is the development 
of programs over time and the processes by which they form. There are two ways in which this 
issue could be explored. One method is to survey the same incubator network at several points in 
time. The other method is to study several incubators at different stages of development.  As 
pointed out earlier however in Lewis’s work, the age of the program was not a significant factor 
and therefore may not present a significant problem. 
 
 
Cases will be added until theoretical saturation is reached. Theoretical, saturation is simply th
point at which incremental learning is minimal because the observed phenomena have been seen 
before (Glaser and Strauss, 1967).  Because of the availability of resources and because of time 
constraints, it is anticipated that the number of cases, will total between four and ten cases. 
 
T
s when the in
minimal. 
 




One method of uncovering biases in the analysis and interpretation of the data is to compare 
o our understanding of the 
ff rt will e made in the case study presentation to distinguish between the data and 
iew the data and determine for themselves whether 
Evaluation 
s that  evaluation. Conclusions on the value of external development systems 
using the empirical data to identify top 
s. 
several perspectives and to critically assess their ability to contribute t
data. Every e o  b
interpretation. This will enable others to rev
they would arrive at the same conclusions. 
 
The final issue i of
on incubator success will be drawn from the data by 
performers and using the case study method to identify best practice
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Proposed Case Study Outline 
 
anticipated that this will be iterative and adjustments are anticipated. 
I. Incubator   
 Selection Criteria  
 Leasing Arrangements and Services  
 Programs and Forums  
 Incubator Management and Staff  
II. Community  
 Interaction Among Entrepreneurs  
The following outline is suggested to begin the case study data collection.  As stated earlier, it is 
 Types of Firms  
 Location  
Interaction Between Entrepreneurs and Incubator Manager 
 Interaction Between Entrepreneurs and Outside Individuals 
 Access to External funding sources 
 Access to University 
 Interactions between Incubator and Community 
  Local Government 
  Local EDC 
  Other University Departments 
  Funding Sources 
  Other Entrepreneur Support Organizations 
III. Incubator Clients  
 Types of Businesses  
 Stage of Development 
 Norms and Attitudes  




 Access to Incubator Advisory Board 
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Summary of Research Method: 
The process of building theory from case study research is a strikingly iterative one. While an 
investigator may focus on one part of t the process itself involves constant 
ther 
to 
tanding the data and convergence onto a single theoretical framework. Each 
f these tactics involves viewing evidence from diverse perspectives. However, the process also 
involves conve ring the 
inally, t bed here is intim empirical ev
l methodology used for research is depic pr  Figure 11. 
 
 
Figure 11:  Research Methodology 
he process at a time, 
iteration backward and forward between steps. For example, an investigator may move from 
cross-case comparison, back to redefinition of the research question, and out to the field to ga
evidence on an additional case. Also, the process is alive with tension between divergence in
new ways of unders
o
rging on construct definitions, measures, and a framework for structu
findings. F he process descri ately tied with idence. 
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CHAPTER FOUR:  FINDINGS 
 
Research Method 
This study used a multiple case design that allowed replication logic; that is, a series of cases i
treated as a series of experiments, each case serving to confirm or disconfirm the inferences 




Table 6: : Description of University Affiliated Technology Incubators  
Incubator Region description Technology Focus Product/Service Focus 
Incubator A Large metropolitan Biotech/Biomed Product 
Incubator B Medium metropolitan Biotech/Biomed Product 
Incubator C Medium metropolitan IT/Electronics Product/Service 
Incubator D Large, high tech metropolitan IT/Electronics Product 
Incubator E Small town close to large metro 
region 
Mixed Technology Product 
Incubator F Small town  Biotech/Biomed Product 
Incubator G Small community adjacent to large Biotech/Biomed Product/Service 
metropolitan area 
Incubator H Not used in study (for profit)   
Incubator I Small town next to large Biotech/Biomed  Product 
metropolitan area 
Incubator J Medium metropolitan area Mixed Technology Product 
  
This study also employed an embedded design; that is, multiple levels of analysis, focusing on 




the issues from three levels:  (1) A revie
from top performing incubation programs and a program not in the top class of incubators; and 
(3) and introspective of the UCF Technology Incubator which was ranked the top incubato




pirical data wThe em as provided by a member of the research team at the University of Ohio that 
con c
dict e 
excepti  programs in terms of revenue increases and employment 
incr s . 
 
Dat o :  (1) archival data collected from web sites, the 
Nat a t the 
incu t cubator managers; (3) incubator 
lient interviews. 
onal recollections of the events that occurred during 
e time frame of 1998 through 2004. 
du ted the survey for the Tornatzki et.al., (2003) study.  Included with the data was the data 
ionary and copies of the survey documents used.  The data was in redacted form with th
on of the identification of the top
ea es.  Other sources of empirical data came from Lewis (2003) and Steven et al., (2005)
a f r the case studies came from three sources
ion l Business Incubator Association conference proceedings; and articles written abou
ba or programs or incubator clients; (2) interviews with in
c
 
The introspective of the UCF Technology Incubator was written by the founder of the incubator 
and author of this dissertation.  References for the introspective included: public and private 
memos; e-mails; meeting minutes; and pers
th
    
Interviews with incubator managers 
A request for interview was sent via e-mail to each incubator manager selected.  The names and 
e-mail addresses were obtained from the web sites of each program.  The managers were 
provided the questions below in an e-mail to help them prepare for the interview.  A copy of the 
actual e-mail is provided in Appendix A.   
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• What are the top things you feel have contributed most to help your companies become 
successful? 
• Is your incubator part of a larger incubation system or is it mainly a stand alone entity? 
• Do you feel your incubator fills in gaps in region resources, i.e., access to funding, 
 you had a few very successful clients that have driven a lot of your success? 
• What would you do different if you had it to do over? 
the 
 nine cases.     
 a 
uestion.  Responses were separately recorded on legal pads by both observers.  During 
e interview, copies of the questions and the evidence tools developed for this study were used 
as to 
professional service providers? 
• Do you feel your incubator adds significantly to the credibility of companies in your 
program? 
• How rigorous is your screening process? 
• Have
 
Appointment times were selected via e-mail or follow-up e-mail.  Follow up phone calls were 
necessary in two of the cases to arrange for an interview.  The interviews were scheduled so 
author of this work and the committee chair could both participate as whenever possible.  This 
was possible in seven of the
 
The interview began by thanking them for their participation and informing them that individual 
answers would be held in strict confidence.  Each question on the list was then asked in semi-
structured form but allowed for skipping around when the interviewees replies naturally lead to
different q
th
to insure that the questions of concern were asked and responded to.  The strategy used w
ask the questions and let the manager answer as they desired, elaborating on any point they felt 
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deserved it.  Once the questions were asked, the evidence tool was used to verify that the issues




clients or other constituents that they felt were appropriate to contact.  
 
uce 
.  At some point during the interview, the 
nswer to this question was paraphrased back to the interviewee to ensure the response was 
understood. 
s 
milar or differed from previous interviews, and to discuss how this confirmed or disconfirmed 
to 
 separate binder was created to store the field notes, archival data, regional data, client 
testimonials, and relevant data for each case study.  The reference documents in the binder often 
 
The first question asked was always: What are the top things you feel have contributed most to
help your companies become successful?  The intent was to address this topic first and red
the influence that subsequent would have on the answer
a
 
After the conclusion of the interview, a summary discussion was held between the two observer
arrive at concurrence as to the understanding of the answers given, to discuss what important 
points or information was learned from the interview was, to discuss how this program was 
si
the postulates of the study. 
 
Once the interview and discussion were completed, information was immediately transferred in
the evidence tool while it was fresh in the mind and to avoid confusion with other interviews.  





identified the participants and were therefore kept separate to ensure the confidentiality of the 
study participants while keeping important data available to assist with the data analysis given 
the number of cases.  
 
Eco System maps were created to allow for visualization of how the incubator was positioned 
among the various external resources and constituents of the region.  The maps were then 
included as part of the individual case study write up.   
 
Data Analysis 
ent growth so the various characteristics of the top ten 
incubation programs could be com erall average.  The 
iew section such as the additional 
quantitative data concerning university spin outs by Shane (2004).  
 
The data was analyzed as follows.  For the empirical data, copies of the survey documents were 
obtained to search for data that would confirm or not confirm the postulations of interest.  The 
data was examined to search for patterns and the analysis of the previous research was reviewed 
to understand what assumptions, bias, and level of confidence the authors had in their results.   
 
The raw data was sorted by employm
pared and contrasted against the ov
differences and similarities were noted.  Additional searches of the literature was conducted as 
part of the process to enfold additional literature into the research as is detailed in Eisenhardt’s 
(1989) methodology.  Sometime the additional information was added to previous sections of the 
literature review and other times it was discussed in the rev
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The results of the empirical data anal tulations for the study as well as 
stulations were revisited to see if the data confirmed the proposed relationships.  One 
al postulates was dropped because the research method did not provide relevant data. 
 each case study was captured in a binder.  This was then summarized in a set 
inding 
     
ysis helped form the pos
questions for the case studies.  The intent of the questions was to allow for an open dialog that 
would confirm or not confirm the indications from the quantitative analysis.  After each case 
study the po
of the origin
After several iterations, existing literature was reviewed again to sharpen insights yielded during 
the process. What emerged was a better understanding of the issues, the postulations, and the 
strengths and weaknesses of the research data, method, and postulations.   
 
Detailed data from
of evidence instruments for each case.  Upon completion of the summary, a separate summary 
instrument was developed that would allow data to be captured for each postulate, and for all of 
the case studies, on one document.  This instrument would summarize the case study f
allowing for a triangulation of the three sources of data (previous empirical, case study, and 
introspective) for each postulate. 
Review of Empirical Data 
Survey data utilized from a recent Department of Commerce Survey (Tornatzki, 2003) produced 
the following analysis.  The data was provided in redacted form with names stripped from
responses.  The nam
 




revenue and increase in employment, was provided.  
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Descriptive Statistics 
The survey data represents responses from 79 incubators in the US.  They are characterized by 




rs (38/79) focused on information technology and 
 
companies that primarily had product-oriented 




ubator clients had slower revenue growth than 
IT/electronics and mixed tec ixed technology 
incubators in employment growth. In other words, they grew but growth was based on 
investme ital. 
 
Serv ented incub r co s gr aste in te plo  
an product-focused incubator clients.   
Forty-eight percent of the technology incubato
electronics, compared to twenty-four percent (19/79) that focused on biotechnology and 
biomedical applications.  The remaining twenty-eight percent (22/79) of the incubators involved 
a mix of client company technology concentrations.   
Forty-four percent of incubators focused on 
business strategies, com
t on clients with a mix of strategies. 
 
The clients of incubators with a greater biotech / biomedical client focus had raised more m
obtained more research support, and possessed more patents and in-licensed more technolog
than their peers. Biotech or biomedical-focused inc
hnology incubator clients and fell behind m
nt cap  




The data yielded no strong direct statistical relationships between incubator business assistance
practices and primary outcomes defined as sales and revenue growth.  A possible reason 
is that individual business assistance practices of incubators will hav
 
for this 
e greater predictive 
ance outcomes only if most clients utilize certain practices. This is not 
likely , e a  d e  p e addresse
 
A predictive relationship was revealed between the busin  practices and the 
secon
ual property) that are important precursors to the primary 
outcomes.  
 
Table 7:  Incubator Client Characteristics 
Data Source: Tornatzki, Sherman, Adkins 2003 NBIA National Benchmarking survey 
 
The 79 incubators surveyed were characterized by nonprofit and for-profit status; urban, rural, or 
suburban location; and ties to government, industry, or universities. Table 8 summarizes this 
Product / Service Emphasis 
relationships with perform
, however as ev ry comp ny has a iffer nt needs rofile to b d. 
ess assistance
dary business outcomes (e.g., equity investment, patents, research grant support, 
copyrights, and licensed intellect
 
Summary and Comparative Results: Incubator Characteristics 
  As can be seen in Table 7, incubators that had an IT / electronics technology focus were also
somewhat more likely; in turn, to have clients that emphasized a service-oriented business 
strategy; either a pure service business or a mixed strategy. This perhaps reflects computer 
systems support companies or their equivalent.      
Product Service Mixed Total 
 
Technology 
Focus Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent 
IT/Electronics 12 31.6% 8 21.1% 18 47.4% 38 48% 
Bio related 11 57.9% 2 10.5% 6 31.6% 19 24% 
Mixed 12 54.5% 4 18.2% 6 27.3% 22 28% 
Total 35 44.3% 14 17.7% 30 38.0% 79 100% 
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information, which reveals that nearly half (46.8%) of the technology incubators examined in 
this study had university ties.  The great preponderance of the incubators surveyed were 
nonprofit entities, and most lo urban and suburban locales.  
 
Table 8:  Characteristic  o to urvey Sample 
Percent  N ffil No. cent 
cated in 
s status f Incuba rs in S
Tax Status No. Location o. Percent A iation Per
Non Profit 64 81.0% 3 .0% ove  or ot
Public entity 
20 % Urban 4 43 G rnment her 25.3
Profit 10 12.7%  33 .8% orp r 
ublic/Private 
artn  




Unknown 5 6.3% 1 .2% as U sity Ti 37 % Rural 2 15  H niver es 46.8
Data Source: Tornat 003 N Nat enchm  sur
 
 
Summ om tive R ts: ice M
For each of the 79 incubators that comprised the study sample, a “degree-of-utilization” score 
wa the twenty (20) services in the survey that incubation programs could offer to 
cli ale used in the survey was:  scale of 1-3, with “1” = did not receive, “2” = did 
receive, or “3” = constituted a m e scores are aggregated across the sample, as 
we ubgroups of in Tab r each service for th




zki, Sherman, Adkins 2 BIA ional B arking vey 
ary and C para esul  Serv ix 
s developed for 
ents.  The sc
ajor service.  Th
ll as within s cubators. le 9 summarizes this data fo e 
tire sample (in rank f use), the
aracteristics.   
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uct / Service 
Focus 









Bio Mixed Product Service 
Related Tech 
Networki 17 2. 2.40 ng assistance 2.33 / 2. 2.32 2.26 2.33 2.33 19 
Access to
services 
2.19 / 2.53 2.21 2. 2.14  internet/IT 2.30 2.11 2.19 26 
Mentorin .90 1. 2.13 g 2.17 / 1 2.27 2.06 2.17 2.33 85 
Linkages top strategic 
partners 
2.07 / 1.88 2.18 2.07 2.13 1.64 2.21 1.96 
Business plan assistance 2.06 / 1.90  2.22  2.17 1.71 2.09 2.04 2.06
Assistanc
angel/VC
9 1.94 2.18 1. 1.89 e obtaining 
 investments 
1.94 / 1.7 1.92 2.00 41 





 1 1.69  to University 
vices 
1.87 / 2 1.61 2.11 1.87 2.11 .62 
Help secu
interns/em
1.84 /2.04  76 ring student 
ployees 
1.81 1.83 1.84 2.05 1.55 1.
Managem
developm





81 /  1.61 1.79 1. 1.98  management 1.
e 
1.84 1.67 1.81 50 
Intellectu
assistanc
6 1. 1.77 al Property 1.78 / 1.7
e 
1.73 1.78 1.78 1.86 64 
Legal ser 1.74 / 1.50 1. 1.90 vices 1.88 1.63 1.74 1.71 49 
Access to
laborator









.66 / 1.83 66 1.84 1. 1.55 echnology 
ent assistance 
1 1.65 1.54 1. 46 
Regulato
assistanc
.52 1.36 1.43 1. 1.36 ry compliance 
e 
1.36 / 1 1.25 1.43 21 
Assistanc
related te
1.36 / 1.33 1. 1.42 e in process 
chnologies 
1.34 1.22 1.36 1.37 21 





1.23 1.07 1.19 1.24 1.05 1.20 
e 
 




The usage for the top ten was calculated as well compared in Table 10.   
 
Table 10:  Utilization Scores Comparison for Assistance Programs 
Programs 
Service Use Overall Score Service Use By Top Ten Score 
Networking assistance 2.33 Access to internet/IT services 2.53 
Access to internet/IT services 2.19 Linkages to University R&D 2.40 
services 
Mentoring 2.17 Networking assistance 2.17 
Linkages to strategic partners 2.07 Access to specialized laboratory 2.17 
facilities 
Business plan assistance 2.06 Help securing student 
interns/employees 
2.04 
Assistance obtaining angel/VC 
investme
1.94 Mentoring 1.90 
nts 
Marketing assistance 1.92 Business plan assistance 1.90 
Linkages to University R&D 
services 
1.87 Linkages top strategic partners 1.88 
Help securing student 
interns/employees 










1.81 Marketing assistance 1.77 
Intellectual Property assistance 1.78 Intellectual Property assistance 1.76 
Legal services 1.74 Management team development 1.61 
Access to specialized 
laboratory facilities 
1.71 Financial management assistance 1.61 
Human resource management 
assistance 





1.66 Regulatory compliance assistance 1.52 
Regulatory compliance 
assistance 
1.36 Legal services 1.50 
Assistance in process related 
chnologies 
1.37 1.36 Machine shop 
te
Machine sh Assistan cess related 
ech
33 op 1.24 ce in pro
nologies t
1.
Internationa ass t  a 1l trade istance 1.19 In ernat tradeional ssi  stance 1. 3 
    
Average 1.  9007875 1.7  
Data Sou rnatzki an, A 003 NB tional B ng y rce: To , Sherm dkins 2 IA Na enchmarki  surve
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It is worth noting some of the differences and similarities.  In general, the top incubators’ clients 
do not utilize more services (average usage 1.7875 verses 1.7900), but there is a differen
mix of services.  Included in the top five rated services for both categories were networking 
assistance and access to internet / IT services.  The top programs however made use of linkag
to university R&D services, access to students, and access to specialized facilities for the 
remainder of the top five with mentoring coming in sixth.  Mentoring, linkages to strategi
partners, and business plan assistance completed the overall top five used services.   
 
ce in the 
es 
c 
Summary and Comparative Results: Primary Outcomes 
rage changes in the scale scores on the questionnaire 
nd not real numbers of jobs and sales increments. The scale was (1) $0-$99K, (2) $100 - $499K, 
Table 11:  Primary Outcome Results 
The two primary outcome scores are:  
• employment change, from entry into the program to the current period. 
• sales revenue change, from entry into the program until the current period.  
 
The cell entries in Table 11 represent ave
a
(3) $500 – $999K, (4) $1M - $5M, (5) $5M - $10M, (6) > $10M.  The data is broken down and 
presented by incubator characteristics.   
 


















Employment 1.62 1.56 1.61 1.72 1.44 1.89 1.38 
Growth  
Revenue 1.35 1.37 0.97 1.63 1.22 1.57 1.10 
Growth 









 academic campus, (3) the years of experience 
f the manager, and (4) the percentage of the population between the ages of 25 and 54.  The 
ewis’ data indicated that incubator programs that developed a strong strategic alliance with an 
 
Lewis cautions however that interpreting the results of his analyses of the growth of tenant firms 
is hampered by the lack of variation in the dependent variables. For example, the distribution of 
the change in tenant revenue indicated that sixty-five (65) cases were low growth, twelve (12) 
were medium growth and three (3) were high growth. He states that the lack of variation also 
diminished the predictive value of his analyses 
extended product development as compared to IT / electronics. However, there are few 
differences in employment growth as a function of technology. Biotech / biomed companies
grow, but they grow on investment capital longer than in other industries. In the product and 
service comparisons it is clear that both employment and revenue growth favor service-o
client companies. This is not too surprising in that product-oriented companies typically 
encounter hurdles in accumulating the necessary capital and production equipment in order to g
to scale, whereas service businesses are by definition not capital-intensive.   
 
Lewis (2003) postulated that that firm employment growth is predominantly a function of (1) the
strength of the advisory board, (2) location on an
o
fourth, the percentage of population between 25 and 54, is used as a proxy a measure of the 
quality of life in the region of interest.   
 
L
academic institution enhance tenant growth in terms of both employment and revenue.  
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Lewis’ data indica re loca mp s, ave a  
mix stable ma en ette tio v e 
defi  o n t ion als portant for 
attracting potential clients and 
tech th ist in ew dy o
predictor variables suppor mpensate for regional 
cap . The t t p or les gem tability 
and d) are bot r tr o tor .  His 
model ses (p < .05) with a high canonical correlation (.480), 
suggesting rela
the community through their advisory board or other means deliver more effective programs in 
 
tes tha  incubators that at ted on an academic ca u h n optimal
 of advisory board members, and nagem t are b r posi ned to o ercom
ciencies in regional capacity.  The quality f life i he reg  may o be im
retaining the high-skilled workers necessary to staff new 
nology enterprises. As seen in Table 12, e F stat ic rank g in L is’ stu f the 
ts his hypothesis that incubator quality can co
acity during the client firm’s tenancy wo bes redict variab  (mana ent s
 composition of the advisory boar h measu es he at ibutes t incuba  quality
correct  predicted 65.2% of the caly
tively strong predictive power. 
 
This implies that incubators with managers that have developed strong relationships over time to 
terms of the number of employees generated by client firms.    
Growth of tenant firm employment = ƒ(BOARD, ACADEMIC, YEARSEMP, %WORKAGE) 
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Table 12: Analysis of Growth of Tenant Firm Employment (Correctly classified cases 65.2%) 
 Mean for Each Category 
Discriminating Variable 
(Range of each variable) 







Number of Years manager employed (1-6) 3.250  5.000 4.000 2.917* 0.506 
Weighted index of advisory Board members ((0-35.5) 18.356  20.875 25.750 2.457* 0.503 
Quality of life, % regional population between 25-54 
(43%-63%) 
0.510  0.535 0.470 2.255* 0.282 
Percent of regional population over 25 with a 
college degree (11%-44%)** 
0.234  0.273 0.250 2.006* 0.356 
Industrial mix (25%-55%)** 0.339  0.375 0.330 1.784* 0.322 
Located on an academic campus (0=no; 1=yes)  0.321  0.167 1.000 1.387 0.269 
Weighted index of higher educational 215.911 355.500 175.540 0.513 0.218 
institutions (4-1501)** 
Percent of regional income from interest, 
dividends or rent (5%-21%)** 
0.0736  0.0733 0.0600 0.201 -0.175 
Percent of regional population living in an 0.715  
urbanized area (35%-95%)** 
0.760 0.700 0.101 0.350 
Weighted index of services (0-41.5)** 34.446  34.583 37.500 0.099 -0.041 
Number of years of operation (2-35)** 8.214  8.167 8.000 0.001 0.099 
Data Source: Lewis 2003 survey 
Notes:  * predictor is significant at p < .05 
All independent variables were used in the analysis, with F in =1.00 and F out =1.01. 
Though the location of an incubator program on an academic campus did not rank in the top five 
** variable not entered into the discriminant function 
 
of the predictor variables (as measured by the F statistic), Lewis entered it into the discriminant 
function. Perhaps the most revealing data point in Lewis’ survey was that all of the top-
ic 
campus. The incubator industry should also note that the age of the program was the least 
s that have 
stable management, provide the key entrepreneurial services, develop close linkages to an 
academic institution, and have an optimal mix of advisory board members enhance tenant firm 
 
at the list of the top performing incubators in employment growth and the 
list of top performing incubators in terms of revenue growth are significantly different.  Only 
performing programs, in terms of the growth of tenant employment, were located on an academ
important predictor variable, suggesting that younger technology incubator program
growth.  
It is also interesting th
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three programs showed up on both lists.  Of the three, one was in IT and the other two were 
mixed technology.   
 
This difference between employee growth and revenue growth was also demonstrated by the 
predictor models that Lewis developed in his study.  The revenue model predicted fewer cases 
accurately (59.2%), and the functions contained only one overlapping variable, the location of
the incubator on a university campus.  The other two predictor variables for revenue were 
percent in an urban area and robus
 
t level of services.   
Lewis’ conclusio al capacity, 
 
he aggregate size of the facility did not distinguish cases, suggesting that incubator 
erformance is more a function of other attributes. There is no evidence to support arguments of 
n optimal facility size, minimum facility size, or increasing returns of scale for the incubator.  
 
n was that incubator quality can compensate for a lack of region
indicating that successful incubators are part of a larger system and that their roles should be 
determined by the needs of the region’s overall economic development system.    
 
Lewis’ case-by-case analysis also suggests three important findings. First, the location 
(northeast, south, etc.) or size of a host community did not distinguish the individual cases. He
concluded from this that regional capacity is not a function of size, climate, or proximity to 







Finally, the evaluation of the ncubator personnel supports 
prio research conclusio s tha mong tenants and between the tenants 
and the staff is more a function of the m nager than of the size of the staff. The other important 
facto ny technology incubators provide the key services through networks with the 
area bus s community, therefore staff size is less im t if the in ator is embedded in 
business community networks.  In discussions with m
point is stressed, asser that the networks are fundamental to success and retaining the 




esults are not comparable across 
utcomes. However, the outcomes themselves are comparable across different subgroups of the 
 
 
ratio of tenants to full-time equivalent i
r n t the quality of interaction a
a
r is that ma
ines portan cub
anagers and other industry experts, this 
ting 
 
Summary and Comparative Results: Secondary Outcomes 
Five items were surveyed in the Tornatzky (2203) survey to assess the performance of seco
outcomes. The secondary outcomes included two measures of financing outcomes, and three 
measures of intellectual property outcomes. These are not the usual indicators of business vitali
such as growth in revenues, profits, employees, or assets. However, these items are important in 
the world of technology-based start-ups as they are often precursors to those more traditional 
outcomes. The results are presented in Table 13.  It should be noted, however, that since diffe







Table 13:  Secondary Outcome Scores 





























2.04 3.21 2.51 2.97 1.83 2.51 
Rese
Gr




1.59 3.02 2.27 
Copyrights 1.85 2.00 1.29 1.85 2.48 1.00 1.85 
(5) 
Licensed IP 1.65 1.26 2.12 1.65 1.79 1.54 1.65 
(5) 
   
spection of the data suggests some trends that are quite understandable. For one, there seems to 
be more money and mpanies as 
ies have a much stronger basis in scientific research and associated patenting 
and lic  typically take a longer time to get to market, with 
associa  larg  greater importance of copyrights 
among  ele plained by the fact that a large fraction of 
softwa  pro ather than patenting.  
 
 well as 
protecting intellectual property. As Table 13 indicates, biotech / biomed companies are more 
likely to be product oriented, which could accou dings here: 
1. Product-emphasis incubators reported more equity investment than service-emphasis 
incubators. 
In
 intellectual property supplied to biotech / biomed client co
opposed to IT / electronics or mixed technology areas.  This is explained by the fact that biotech 
/ biomed compan
ensing than do IT companies. They also
ted er capital demands. The only exception is the
 IT / ctronics client companies. This is ex
re is tected by copyright r
These results complement the findings favoring pure product strategies over service  
and mixed approaches in terms of garnering research and investment financing as
nt for the fin
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2. Product-emphasis i rvice-emphasis and 
mixed-e phasis incubators. 
3. Product-emphasis incubato te copyrights than both service emphasis and 
ncu rs. 
4. Both biomed / biotech and mixed technology incubators reported more research grant 
support than IT / electronics incubators. 
5. Both biomed / biotech incubators reported more patents held than IT/electronics. 
6. Both biomed / biotech and mixed technology incubators reported more patents in-
licensed than IT/electronics.  
 
Summary and Comparative Results: Client Screening 
One question of particular interest in the study was the question related to client screening.  The 
scale used was: 
4 Mandatory and rigorous 
rmittent or used primarily for diagnostic 
ormal and infrequently u
 defined process 
As Table 14 shows, the answer across all s ints ous screening process.  






ncubators reported more patents than both se
m
rs repor d more 
mixed emphasis i bato
3  Inte
2  Inf tilized 
1  No
 
urveyed areas po to a rigor
T
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Table 14:   Client Screening Characteristics 
Score for 
Fo
co e Technology 
cus 























Rigor of screening 3.7 
process  




 Best- ator P s 
Of the 79 Technology Incubators that participated in the study, the top ten in terms of revenue 
growth and job growth are listed in Tables 15 and 16.  They are listed in order of performance on 
prima evident from this list. Virtually all of the best-in-class 
stitutions have physical adjacency to a research university, and none is focused exclusively on 
a service business strategy. Also, both for-profit and nonprofit incubators appear on this list.   
 
Primary Outcomes: in-Class Incub rogram
ry outcomes.  Two things are 
in
 
Table 15:   Top 10 Programs in Employment Growth 
Program Technology Focus Product / Service Focus 
Incubator A Biotech/Biomed Product 
Incubator B Biotech/Biomed Product 
Incubator C IT/Electronics Product/Service 
Incubator D IT/Electronics Product 
Incubator E Mixed Technology Product 
Incubator F Biotech/Biomed Product 
UCF Technology Incubator  Mixed Technology Product 
Incubator G Biotech/Biomed Product/Service 
Incubator H Biotech/Biomed  Product 











Table 16:   Top 10 Programs in Sales Revenue Growth 
  Program Technology Focus Product / Service 
Focus 
 
Long Island High Technology Incubator, 
Stony Brook, NY 
Mixed Technology Product 
Technology Innovation Center, 
Wauwatosa, WI 
IT/Electronics Product/Service 
Ceramics Corridor Innovation Center, 
Painted Post, NY 
Mixed Technology Product 
Anonymous US Incubator Mixed Technology Product 
Anonymous US Incubator IT/Electronics Service 
Panasonic Incubator, Cupertino, CA IT/Electronics Product 
Center for Emerging Technologies, St. Biotech/Biomed Product 
Louis, MO 
University of Central Florida Technology Mixed Technology Product 
Incubator, Orlando, FL 
Business Technology Center of Los Mixed Technology Product 
Angeles County, Altadena, CA 




regression analyses to determine the extent to which incubator practices and services delivered to 
client firms predicted performance outcomes achieved by those firms. It was stated that their 
yielded strong statistical relationships between incubator practices and outcomes.   
 
The studies came to the same empirical conclusion that none of the incubator business assistance 
practices, nor the environment and management practices appeared to show any predictive 
relationships with the client outcomes of firm employment or sales growth. Statistical difficulties 
such as sample size and shortcomings in instruments could account for some of this. For 
example, a rule of thumb in conducting regression analyses is to have at least 15 times the 
Previous studies (Allen, 1990; Lewis, 2003; Tornatzki, 2003) conducted standard multiple 
analyses were also considered exploratory in nature, in that existing research in the field has not 
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number of subjects as the number of potential predictors. In several of the regressions conducted, 




vel of predictive 
lationship between services and outcomes in the research literature on incubators.  
t in which these programs operate.  
However, perhaps a more enlightened explanation may lie in a rethinking of how business 
incubation works generally in a systemic context. In order for a predictive relationship to exist 
between a service practice and a performance outcome, that practice would need to be import
and strenuously applied to most clients that come through an incubator program.  This is not th
case however as most companies have different needs or gaps that need to be improved in order 
to achieve business success. This might contribute to the generally low le
re
 
However, when considering technology-based entrepreneurial companies, there may be some 
assistance needs that are consistent across clients and that in effect define the field. Intellectual 
property protection is a good candidate, as is accumulating support for research and development 
and access to capital.  In fact, the regression findings reported above are consistent with this 
interpretation for the first two listed.  What is also missing from the few empirical analysis 
conducted to date is any consideration of the larger contex
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Case Study Review 
 
ase Study Popula
his chapter contains write ups of the incubators that pa i mes are 
ot disclosed to facilitate open, honest communications o
nd qualitative data was collected but not specifically attributed to any individual or specific 
incubator program.  The source of information for the documentation was obtained from their 
web sites, the interviews, and National Business Incubator Association materials.  The Regional 
information was obtained from the web site: http://www.city-data.com/
C tion 
T rtic pated in this study.  Their na




The data was collected over a six (6) week period.  Requests for interviews were sent out in 
advance by an e-mail that included the list of questions to be addressed.  The interviews lasted 
less than one hour each with some follow up calls or e-mails as necessary to address additional 
questions that arose after the initial interview.  The majority of the interviews were conducted by 
Tom O’Neal (author of this work) and Dennis Kulonda (chair of this dissertation committee).  
The rest were conducted by Tom O’Neal solely.  Interviews were conducted until the additional 




Population: greater than 1 million 
Median household income: $38,293 
 
• Serves four medical schools 
• Robust region with many VC
Location:  large metropolitan region 
Median age: 34.2 Years 
Median household value: $211,900 
 
 
Characteristics of Incubator A: 
• Specialized real estate development 
s, 
investors, service providers, talent 
• No structured real business 
assistance help 
• Access to facilities key service  
 













Spin out into 
develop 
technology





resource rich community 
Large technology & 
in area that city wanted 
to revitalize
Large pool of Venture 







The Incubator located at
(not a supplier of companies)
 
 the University medical center brings medical advances from the 
ough the development of pioneering biotechnology underlying new 
medical treatments, technologies, and therapies. As the City’s only biotechnology business 
Figure 12:  Incubator A Eco System  
laboratory to the bedside thr
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incubator, the incubator supplies the structure and organization to facilitate developments in 
biotechnology that will ensure improved health care while contributing to economic growth 
through the creation of private sector research collaborations and the generation of new 
biomedical related business. 
 
This is a 100,000 square foot, state-of-the-art research incubator managed by a University and 
developed in partnership with the City in which it is located. Incubator A is the only 
biotechnology business incubator in the city, housing private research and development life 
sciences companies. The incubator supplies the infrastructure and equipment to take medica
advances from the laboratory to the he
l 
alth care industry while contributing to economic growth 
rough the creation of private sector, biomedical related businesses.  
dical Science Pavilion. The Pavilion houses a comprehensive diabetes center, 
enetics research, and a research program in pediatrics. Work started on the third building in the 
Park, a Cancer Research Center, in the summer of 2001. The Center will house research on 
cancer, genetics, and cell biology. The Medical Center comprises more than four million square 
feet of space and is home to approximately 14,000 employees, including more than 4,000 faculty 




Incubator A is located in a Biomedical Science and Technology Park, a one million square foot 
development adjacent to a large Medical Center. The Biomedical Science and Technology Park 
is composed of the Biomedical Research Building, which houses the Business and Technology 
Center and a Me
g
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The executive director of the incubator indicates that it provides firms with clean, appropriate 
space at market price, access to state-of-the-art equipment, and access to the medical community. 
The impressive facilities also attract potential inv loyee or program 
has very stringent entrance criteria. Potential entrants must have people, money, and intellectual 
property in place before they will be accepted. Th st be n ial and 
controlled by scientists who ha e medical center is a nationally 
recognized leader, and the incubator management t want to negatively impact that 
r p ation. The center house  firms, of which nineteen (19) have already received 
p iv  one licly traded and one has received federal Small Business 
Innovation Research (SBIR) money.  
 
The incubator manager considers its program a specialty real estate operation and believes that 
clients select them.  The incubator does not provi entrepr  or assistance 
to its clients.  The assistance they do provide is p ed to ensure clients get their 
labs and equipment fully functional.  One of their success measures is maximize the number of 
deals (leases).  
 
estors and emp s. The incubat
e science mu on-controvers
ve an established reputation. Th
 does no
e ut s twenty (20)
r ate venture money; is pub




Table 17:  Incubator Specific Data; Incubator A 






  Support level: Support level: Support level: 
Indicator ncubator Documents 
erviews with 
ubator Man
Interv ws with 
r Clients 
 Selection Criteria E Ea Easy asy sy 
          
  S el: Su : Support vel: 
 Types of Firms Bio tech Bio tech  
upport lev pport level  le
     
  S l: Su  Support vel: 
 Leasing arrangements Deals 
Actively recruits 
clients  
upport leve pport level:  le




ducation and other 
rograms Rare Rare  
     
  S Su Support
cubator management Facility support 
Exec s and 
keeps facilities 
run ing  




     
  S Su Support
 Robust area Robust area  
upport level: pport level:  level: 
Location 
     
     
  Support level: Support level: Support level:  
redibility S Str   C trong ong 
     
  S evel: Su el: Support vel: 
hat is most important 
nction Specialized facilities   




     
     
Note:  Support levels:  Strong = dominant theme in this data that is consistently supported;  
    Moderate = a frequent, but not constant theme; Rare (Weak) = this theme rarely is found; 





Community specific issues - Incubator A   
Incubator Documents 




  Support level: Support level: Support level: 
Table 18:  Community Specific Data; Incubator A 
Indicator In
 
Interactions between clients 
nd community a Sporadic Sporadic  
 Support level: Support level: Support level:  
 
mong 
Entrepreneurs Moderate Moderate  
Interactions a
     








Moderate  a Moderat  
     
     
l: : 
  Rare  
  
Access to incubator 
advisory board 
Support leve Support level Support level: 
     
  Support level: Support level: upport level: 
 
Access to external funding 
sources  Strong (in community)  
S
     
 Support level: Support level: 
 steeples of 
xcellence Strong 







     
     
o  = d  this data th
     ut not constant theme; Rare (Weak  




N te:  Support levels:  Strong
 Moderate = a frequent, b
 Sporadic = a theme that appe
ominant theme in at is consistently supported;  
) = this theme rarely is found; 










  Support level: Support l
s with Incubator Interviews with 
Incubator Clients 




community  strong  
 
  Support level: Support level: Support level: 
 
Interactions between 
incubator and Local 
Government 
moderate (once helped 
revive run down 
section of town) moderate   
     
  Support level: Support level: Support level: 
 
Interactions between 
incubator and local 
Economic Development 
agencies  moderate  
     
     
  Support level: Support level: Support level: 
 
Interactions between 
incubator and funding 
sources  
sporadic but most companies 
have funding prior to joining 
program  
     
  Support level: Support level: Support level: 
 
Interactions between 
incubator and other 
entrepreneur support  
sporadic but relies on region 
to provide talented 
entrepreneurs  
     
Note:  Support levels:  Strong = dominant theme in this data that is consistently supported;  
      Moderate = a frequent, but not constant theme; Rare (Weak) = this theme rarely is found;  
      Sporadic = a theme that appears now and then in this data source.   
Table 19:  Other Community Specific Data; Incubator A 
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Incubator B 
Location: metropolitan region 
Median resident age: 30.6 years  
2000) 
 
Characteristics of Incubator B: 
• Partnership between region and 
regional utility 
• Local resources, SBDC & Score 
support 
Population: 215,000 
Median household income: $41,941 (year 





• Located in successful research park 
• Shared, specialized equipment and 
facilities key to success 




to complement facilities 
• Tight integration with local 
economic development agencies 
 
Incubator B Eco System
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New Tech Spin out into 
and technology, 
Students, faculty, tech 
transfer entrepreneurship 
New 







Research Park with 102 
companies, 3,500 
employees
Credible introduction to 
providers







moderate level of 
Community with some 






Figure 13:  Incubator B Eco System  
This program is a partnership between the Region’s university and Gas & Electric company.  It 




e growth of technology businesses. The program reports to the 
hancellor of the university. Usually, the most successful firms have entered the incubation 
rogram with patents, or are based on biotechnology research at the university. These firms must 
ave been identified as having high growth potential before they are admitted.  
ncubator B is located in the University Research Park (URP). This is a separate non-profit entity 
at develops the land and buildings and leases them to companies interested in maintaining 
lose contact with the university community. Companies that have graduated from the incubator 
r companies from outside the university can choose to lease facilities in this research park. 
Currently 34 buildings, including Incubator B, are located in the park. Unlike most research 
parks, URP receives no city or state funds to support its infrastructure. The park houses more 
than 102 firms employing more than 3,500 people.  
 
The Associate Director of the park says there are two important reasons for the program’s 
success. The first is that clients have access to laboratory facilities and university infrastructure 
The facility houses 35 office suites, 40 laboratories, 9 conference rooms, and shared shop 
facilities, laboratories, and commons areas. In addition there is 60,000 square feet 
office and lab space for established firms.  
 
The center has provided laboratory, office space, and support equipment and personnel to nea
50 early stage companies. The purpose of the program is to facilitate technology transfer fro










and resources. The second is that firms locating in the center achieve “branding” or a reputation 
benefit that helps them to find venture money, employees, and customers.  
The university resources include a strong technolog e a iness 
Development Center. In addition, the College of Business has a strong C
Entrepreneurship. The Associate Director also mentioned that the Center has a growing 
reputation f rm
Center to establish their credibility. Investors and local service s visit the Center to offer 
assistance, providing client firms with a network of angel investors and a network of local 









y transfer offic nd a Small Bus
enter for 




Table 20:  Incubator Specific Data; Incubator B 












In ws with 
r Clients 
  Support le Support level evel: 
 Selection Criteria Moderate 
erate 
(expanded space)  
          
: l: Support
mod
  Support level Support leve  level: 
 Types of Firms ch 
Bio tech, mixed 
 on-line  Bio te coming
  Support level: : Support lSupport level evel: 
  Flexible leases  Leasing arrangements 
  Support level: Support level: Support vel:  le








     
  Support level: l: Support
r management Full service  




     
  Support level: Support level: Support level: 
ocation   L   
     
  Support level: l: Support vel: 
 
Support leve  le
 Credibility Strong Strong 
     
  Support level: Support level: Support vel: 
function facilities 
ared services 
backbone of center  
 le
What is most important Specialized Sh
 
     
Note:  Support levels:  Strong = dominant theme in this data that is consistently supported;  
    Moderate = a frequent, but not constant theme; Rare (Weak) = this theme rarely is found; 











Table 21:  Community Specific Data; Incubator B 
Community specific issues - I
Indicator Documents 




  Support level: port level: Support level: 
 
Interactions between 
clients and community ng  strong stro
          
  Support level: Support level: Support level: 
Interactions among 
ntrepreneurs Mod E Moderate erate  
     
 Support level: Support level: Support level: 
 
etween 
lients and outside 




     
     
Sup
  Rare  
  Support level: port level: Support level: 
Access to incubator 
advisory board 




ccess to external funding 
urces 
Strong, introductions when 
appropriate   
     
  
Access to steeples of 
excellenc
Su Supp  
e rong 
Strong (Location in university 
rese
pport level: ort level: Support level:
 St arch park)  
     
Note:  Support levels:  Strong = dominant theme in this data that is consistently supported;  
      Moderate = a frequent, but not constant theme; Rare (Weak) = this theme rarely is found;  






   S ow and then in th .   
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Community 2 - Incub
Indicator Incubator Docum
  Support level: 
iews with Incubator Interviews with 
s Incubator Clients 
por evel: Support level: 
 
Interactions between 
incubator and community 
Strong (good board from 
community) Gas 
company wants to sell 
electricity 
Stro $
from util   
ng ( 1M donation 
ity company)
  Support level: Support l  evel: Support level:
 
Interactions between 
incubator and Local 
Government Strong (shared vision) Strong  
     
  Support level: Support level: Support level: 
 
Interactions between 
incubator and local 
Economic Development 
agencies  Strong  
     
     
  Support level: Support level: Support level: 
 
Interactions between 
incubator and funding 
sources  Strong (Good deal flow)  
     
  Support level: Support level: Support level: 
 
Interactions between 
incubator and other 
entrepreneur support  Strong (SCORE, SBDC)  
     
Note:  Support levels:  Strong = dominant theme in this data that is consistently supported;  
      Moderate = a frequent, but not constant theme; Rare (Weak) = this theme rarely is found;  
      Sporadic = a theme that appears now and then in this data source.   
Table 22:  Other Community Specific Data; Incubator B 
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Incubator C  
Location: metropolitan region 









Characteristics of Incubator C: 
 
technical support from faculty 
university and community officials 
resources 
• Incubator also heads up SBDC, 




Median household income: $30,368 (year 
Median house value: $94,700 (year 2000) 
 
• Tightly integrated into university 
• Many interns, MBA projects,
• Strong advisory board with high 






 Provides many programs and 
networking events 
• Strong University Connections key
to success 

















Advisory board, local 




Incubator, SBDC, other 
statewide small business 
development services
Community with 
moderate level of 
resources





Figure 14:  Incubator C Eco System  
 143
Mission Statement: 
The incubator strives to assist entrepreneurs and small businesses with access to the resources 
they need to grow and attain long-term success. The incubator plays a crucial role in the 
economic development future of the state by supporting statewide initiatives and by promoting 
the formation and growth of businesses, cultivating jobs, and commercializing technology. 
ess 
ff members are university employees, with 





 for meetings or to satisfy their curiosity about how one becomes an entrepreneur. The 
hysical presence tends to legitimize these new roles for faculty. Of note, two university vice 
 
The local business community and leadership of the State University embraced this busin
incubation program, which started in 1988. Both groups are prominently represented in its 
governance structure, and representatives of the academic and business communities play key 
roles in brokering various relationships, meetings, and business partnerships. For example, the 
program is part of the College of Business and all sta
th
relationship with the College of Business is the assignment of MBA students to the incubator to
work as consultants to client companies. Under the direction of the incubator staff, they assist in
developing business plans, marketing plans, and financial statements.  
 
Currently, incubator operations are spread over four buildings encompassing 47,000 square feet
in the central part of campus. The Executive Director indicates that this central, highly visible 




chancellors and five deans sit on the incubator’s board of directors.  The president believes
strongly in the program and often references the program in his speeches.  
 
The program does not pay rent or utilities on its buildings, and it is permitted to keep its renta
income from clients to cover staff and related costs. The number of incubator tenants averages 
two dozen and there are currently 25 in residence. The program emphasizes technology-b
new enterprises, and about a third of the current clients have some form of strong university 
linkage (e.g., a faculty member is a principal and/or the company is based on university 









ntually become resident clients of the incubator. The program 
also operates, for the University’s  Economic Development Department, the State Technology 
Transfer Office, which functions to transfer University technology and as a portal for the transfer 




this area, extending ties to the medical center and agricultural research operations and enhanc
the positive links to university technology transfer.  
 
The incubator benefits significantly from directly operating several programs that complement 
its incubation activities. For example, it runs the Small Business Development Center (SBD
which serves upwards of 300 clients per year. This activity functions as a “farm team” for t
incubator and some start-ups eve
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While not nominally focused on startups, this activity tends to be a source of research and 
development resources for clients of the incubator and occasionally yields a new client for the 
program. The program organizes the state’s efforts  flo siness 
Innovation Research (SBIR) grants es various training and briefing 
activities, as well as a “Phase at subsidizes proposal writing efforts. One incubator 
client has thirteen current SBIR grants alone.  The incubator also has a large network of 
relationships with local business service providers (e.g., attorneys and accountants) that refer 
p t tial clients. The upshot o  comple ities ubator is seen 
as the “go to place” in the state for activities related to technology entrepreneurship.  
 
I  s  the keys to succe s for this program is its strong univers y connections and the 
l v age that it provides to cli nterns, t tance culty and 
l b ly it o ide relationships, complementary 
program activities conducted for the State, and a stable and visible presence on the campus of a 
ma benefit of a stable core of program staff and 
leadership with seventeen years of experience, an excellent reputation, and credibility that 
benefits clients immediately.     
 to increase the w of Small Bu
 into the state. This includ
 0” service th
o en f these many mentary activ is that the inc
n ummary, s it
e er ents such as i echnical assis , access to fa
a oratories.  Additional ffers a rich network of statew
jor research university.  It has also had the 
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Table 23:  Incubator Specific Data; Incubator C 









In iews with 
ator Clien
 
 Selection Criteria Strong g  Stron
  Support level: Support level: Support level: 
 Types of Firms mixed   Tech based, 
     
  Support level: Support level: Supp  level: 
 Leasing arrangements  
Flexible 1 year 
lease  
ort




ducation and other 
rograms  Very Strong  
     
  Support level: l: Supp
ement   




     
  Support level: Support level: Support level: 
  Location  
strong (on 
campus) 
     
  Support level: ort level: Supp  level: 
redibility  Very Strong  
Supp ort
 C
     
  
 
   




 Support level: ort
 function with program functions  
What is most important resources associated complementary 
     
Note:  Support levels:  Strong = dominant theme in this data that is consistently supported;  
      Moderate = a frequent, but not constant theme; Rare (Weak) = this theme rarely is found; 






cubator  Incubator 
 
Table 24:  Community Specific Data; Incubator C 
Community specific issues - I   





  Support level: Support level: Support level:
 
Interactions between 
clients and community  Strong  
  Support level: Support level: Support level: 
 
teractions among 
 Moderate  
In
Entrepreneurs 
     
  Support level: Support level: Support level: 
Interactions between 
lients and outside 
 
c
individuals  Moderate  
     
  Support level: pport level: Support level: 
 
Access to incubator 
advisory board  
Moderate to strong 
(situational)  
Su
     
  
ccess t
Support level: Support level: 
o external 





     
  
Access to steeples of 
excellence 
Support level: Su : 
 
pport level: Support level
  Moderate to strong 
     
     
ely is found;  





Note:  Support levels:  Strong = dominant theme in this data that is consistently supported;  
      Moderate = a frequent, but not constant theme; Rare (Weak) = this theme rar
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 lev l: Support level: 
 
Interactions between 
incubator and community  Strong  
  Support level: Support leve : l: Support level
Interactions between 
incubator and Local 
Government  Moderate   
  Support level: Support level: Support level: 
 
Interactions between 
incubator and local 
Economic Development 
agencies  
Strong (they are local 
EDC)  
     
  Support level: Support level: Support level: 
 
Interactions between 
incubator and funding 
sources  Moderate to strong  
     
  Support level: Support level: Support level: 
 
Interactions between 
incubator and other 
entrepreneur support  
Very Strong (part of 
extended program)  
     
Note:  Support levels:  Strong = dominant theme in this data that is consistently supported;  
      Moderate = a frequent, but not constant theme; Rare (Weak) = this theme rarely is found; 
      Sporadic = a theme that appears now and then in this data source.   
Table 25:  Other Community Specific Data; Incubator C 
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Incubator D 
Location: high tech based metropolitan 
Population: 900,000 
Median household income: $70,243 (year 
Median house v
Characteristics of Incubator D: 
• Robust high tech region with many 
VCs, investors, service providers, 
talent 
• No structured real business 
region 
Median resident age: 32.6 years  
2000) 






• Access to connections 
• No direct university spinouts 
• Software specific, short tenure in 




program (24 months) 
• Great success of clients getting 
funding of those few that seek 
 

















Large, Technology Rich  
Community
Large pool of Venture 
Capital, specialized 
investors, talent







Figure 15:  Incubator D Eco System  
This program typically has ten (10) to twenty (20) companies as resident clients that range in size
from two (2) to twenty four (24) employees. All are software companies and as a requiremen
entrance they need to show a demo or pre-Alpha level of p
 
t for 
roduct, plus offer a semblance of a 
usiness plan. The focus of the Incubator is on market development, management development, 
 
bit the “Fire in the Belly” that he feels is 
ital to entrepreneurial success. 
ocal 
cally 
 creates many partnering opportunities.  
uilding rent is paid by the City and rental revenues cover the balance of operating expenses. 
owever, program staff is very clear to note that it is “not a real estate operation.”  Staff consists 
b
and financing.  
 
Most of the entrepreneurs come out of larger regional companies. To date, none has come 
directly out of a local university. This is more by choice than by happenstance as the manager 
focuses mainly on experienced entrepreneurs.  Recruiting tends to be word of mouth or by 
referral from a venture capitalist, angel investor, or accounting and legal professionals working 
with start-ups. There is a great deal of informal networking, as is a tradition of the region.  The
manager specifically looks for entrepreneurs that exhi
v
 
The region has an entrepreneurial culture and context, and local government is interested in 
fostering technology-based start-ups as part of its economic development strategy. The rich l
supply of talented people also contributes to the program’s success. The program utilizes an 
extensive informal network of advisors and business assistance companies, as well as lo
based equity and debt financing. The presence in the region of a number of large, nationally 





of 3.5 Full time equivalents (FTE’s), including a full-time manager, a business manager, and an 
office manager. The incubator manager comes from an entrepreneurial background, having 
successfully launched and sold two software comp
 
One of the incubator’s most popular programs is the Executive Associate Program, which 
assigns senior level interns to work on a pro bono b  residen on specific 
issues, such as marketing or fund raising. About 85 percent of companies that enter the program 
o t  or inst stment. me e clients to 
c m lete and polish their form iness plans and then provides assistance in developing 
presentations for investors. Once incubator firms are ready to deliver formal pitches, Incubator 
D’s Venture Capital Referral Program provides ref s. Given the quality of the 
i c lientele, investors value these referral
 
I  s cubat r that exploits a technological niche, benefits from location 
advantages, demands a significant level of pre-adm pment has an 
experienced entrepreneur at the helm, and focuses its efforts on a few key areas of business 
development.  The manager also stated that the pro lished in the region and its 
c ie nstant credibility by participating in . A large portion of this 
incubator’s job creation resulted from four highly successful clients that continue to provide 





asis with the t companies 
b ain venture funding itutional inve Incubator manage nt requires th
o p al bus
errals to investor
s.  n ubator’s c
n ummary, this is an in o
ission develo from clients, 
gram is well estab




ts  Managers 
te
Inc
  Support level: Support level: Support level: 





In rviews with 
ubator Clients 






  Support level: : SupSupport level port level: 
  Software   Types of Firms 
     
  Support level: Support level: Support level: 
 Leasing arrangements  14 month lease  
     
  
 
   
Support level: Support level: 
 
ducation and other 
programs  
Individual support 
with referrals to 
communnity events  
 Support level: 
E
 Support level: Support level: Support level:  
















     
  Support level: Sup
Stro
port level: Support level: 
redibility 
ng credibility of 
proven success and 
ROI for previous 
  C Strong companies 
     
    
Support level: Support level: Support level: 
function region 
t relationship 
with city  
 
  
What is most important Partnership with grea
Credibility, 
connections, hard 
nose business advice 
 
     
Note:  Support levels:  Strong = dominant theme in this data that is consistently supported;  
      Moderate = a frequent, but not constant theme; Rare (Weak) = this theme rarely is found; 
    Sporadic = a theme that appears now and then in this data source.     
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Community specific issues – ncubator D   
s 
r  







  Support level Support level Support level:
 munity  Moderate  
Interactions between 
clients and com
  Support level: Support level: Support level: 
 
Interactions among 
ntrepreneurs E  Moderate  
     
  Support level: Support level: Support level: 
  Strong to moderate  
Interactions between 
clients and outside 
individuals 
     
     
  Support level: Support level: Support level: 
 
ccess to incubator 
Strong Strong  
A
advisory board 
     
  Support level: Support level: Support level: 
 
ccess to external 
Region strong, 
sn't fill 




     
  Support level: Support level: Support level: 
 
  excellence  tie) 
Access to steeples of Sporadic (Strong indirect
     
Note:  Support levels:  Strong = dominant theme in this data that is consistently supported;  
      Moderate = a frequent, but not constant theme; Rare (Weak) = this theme rarely is found;  











  Support level: Support l l: t level: 
Community 2 - D  
s w th Incubator Interviews with 





community  Moderate  
  Support level: Support level: Support level: 
 
Interactions between 
incubator and Local 
Government  
Strong (city provides 
building)  
     
 
Interactions between 
incubator and local 
Economic Development 
agencies  Strong  
     
     
  Support level: Support level: Support level: 
 
Interactions between 
incubator and funding 
sources  
Strong (city provides 
building)  
     
  Support level: Support level: Support level: 
 
Interactions between 
incubator and other 
entrepreneur support  Strong (networking key)  
     
Note:  Support levels:  Strong = dominant theme in this data that is consistently supported;  
      Moderate = a frequent, but not constant theme; Rare (Weak) = this theme rarely is found;  
      Sporadic = a theme that appears now and then in this data source.   
Table 28:  Other Community Specific Data; Incubator D 
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Incubator E  
Location: Small town 
Median age: 38.8 




Characteristics of Incubator E: 
• Significant Research Univers
technology region 
• Semi structured  
• University and community spin outs 
• Strong tie to community econom
development (incentives) 
Population: 13,727 






• Located in robust business and 

























Large Technology Rich 
Community
Good pool of Venture 
Capital, specialized 






 Figure 16:  Incubator E Eco System  
 
Incubator E is located at a State University in a small town that is relatively close (50 miles) to a
large metropolitan region. This program’s vision and dedication i
 
s to the concept of transferring 
chnology and ideas from the University to the private sector.  Incubator E has been in 
er 
state. 
he first incubator established under this initiative was at another research university.  
 from 
n twenty-five (25) companies had successfully graduated 
rom the incubator. These companies were generating revenues of more than $175 million 
rough state sales alone and had created over 800 employees. One graduate firm, which has 
ince moved to another city, now has annual sales of more than $350 million.  
o enter the incubator a prospective client must have its intellectual property secured or have an 
pplication for a patent or a license. In addition, the firm needs to have some relationship with 
e university; that is, the university must be able to supply something the client needs.  The 
te
existence for a relatively long time, having been founded in 1984 (although in a much small
space than it occupies today). The idea for the incubator came from a State Urban Development 
initiative in the early 1980s, which established small business incubators throughout the 
T
 
The purpose of this incubator is to commercialize technology and to support early stage 
businesses, thereby expanding jobs and the tax base in the state. The university president 
typically serves as the chairman of the incubator board. Most client firms have originated
off campus. Only five clients have originated from the university.  
 
Since the founding of the incubator more than 100 companies have been associated with its 









incubator manager stated that there is a rigorous screening process in place, but also stated that 
95 percent of companies that apply to the program are accepted. 
 
The incubator manager attributes program success to the incubator’s ability to offer clients 
access to world-class scientists, engineers, and g he university is in the top 50 
n t search ns, with $13 t s arch.  
 
Of secondary importance is that the program provides firms access to laboratories and equipment 
and other university resources. Among the resou vailable to clients are a Small Business 
Development Center and a state program that provides companies a 50/50 match when hiring 
c m  help ms. In addition, the incubato cess to 
n m rous world class research centers and labo cluding an animal research facility, 
c m e y. The o has an 
effective Office of Technology Transfer and Lic ich gener an $12 million 









0 million in direca ionally ranked re institutio ponsored rese
rces a
a pus researchers to  solve proble r provides ac
u e ratories in
o puter science departm nt, and a materials research facilit university als
ensing, wh ated more th










Table 29:  Incubator Specific Data; Incubator E 
Incubator E  
Indicator Incubator Documents 
nterviews with 
ncubator M
Inte ews with 
tor Clients 
  Support level: upport level: t level: 
 Selection Criteria 
9
b erybody 
s Okay pRigorous 
5% acceptance rate 
ut makes ev
ubmit application rocess 
  Support level: S Supporupport level: t level: 
 Types of Firms  M hnology  ixed tec
     
  Support level: Support level: Support level: 
easing arrangements 1   L   year 
     
  Support level: S pport level: Suppor evel: 
 
Education and other 
programs  Strong strong (lunch & learn) 
u t l
     




upport level: Sup t l
 Inc  
     
  Support level: S Suppor
Resource rich  
upport level: t level: 
 Location  
     
  Support level: S pport level: Suppor evel: 
redibility V  
u t l
 C  ery strong 
     
     
upport level: S pport level: Suppor evel: 
ffiliations with 
niversity, other Strong affiliation 
s, animal care 
ess o specilaized 
wet lab io company) 
  S u t l
 function facilities facilitie
What is most important incubators, services, access to labs, Acc
A
u
established with university, 
 t
s (b
     
     
 Support levels:  Strong = dominant theme in this data that is consistently supported;  
      Moderate = a frequent, but not constant theme; Rare (Weak) = this theme rarely is found; 






Table 30:  Community Specific Data; Incubator E 
Community specific issues Incubator E   
 
  Support level: Support level: Support level: 
Indicator Incubator Documents 










clients and community Strong 
Strong (univer
  Support level: t level: upport level: Suppor S
 
Interactions among 
Entrepreneurs  Strong  
     
  
In
Support level: upport level: 
 
teractions between 
clients and outside 
individuals 
Strong (some out of 
state) Strong  
Support level: S
     
  
ccess to
Support level: upport level: 
 incubator 




a   
     
 Support level: Support level: Support level: 
ources g 
 
Access to external 
funding s Strong Stron  
     
  Support level: Support level: Support level: 
 
ccess to steeples of 
Strong Strong  
A
excellence 
     
     






      Moderate = a frequent, but not constant theme; Rare (Weak) = this theme rarely is found; 
      Sporadic = a theme that appears now and then in this data source.   
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Community 2 - Incu
Indicator Incubator Document
  Support level: 
s w th Incubator Interviews with 
s Incubator Clients




moderate (not covered 
a lot) Strong   




incubator and Local 
Government Strong Strong (joint program)  
   
  Support level: Support level: Support level: 
 
Interactions between 
incubator and local 
Economic Development 
agencies Strong Strong working relationship  
     
  Support level: Support level: Support level: 
 
Interactions between 
incubator and funding 
sources Strong 
Strong (introductions for 
VCs)  
     
  Support level: Support level: Support level: 
 
Interactions between 
incubator and other 
entrepreneur support Strong 
Strong, (shared person with 
SBDC)  
     
Note:  Support levels:  Strong = dominant theme in this data that is consistently supported;  
      Moderate = a frequent, but not constant theme; Rare (Weak) = this theme rarely is found;  
      Sporadic = a theme that appears now and then in this data source.   
Table 31:  Other Community Specific Data; Incubator E 
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Incubator F 
Location: small town with large university Characteristics of Incubato
Population: 29,000 
edian resident age: 22.3 years  
Median household income: $24,869 (year 




• Major program of university 
• Seed fund available through 
 
park 











• Located in college town, statewide 
vision for development 
• Located in university owned research
• Makes extensive use of alumni 
 
Incubator F Eco System
New 
technology




Students, faculty, tech 
transfer entrepreneurship 









Credible introduction to 








State with moderate 
resources
startup
College town with no 
real tech industry outside 





Figure 17:  Incubator F Eco System  
The mission of Incubator F is focused on the retention of technology talent in the State, work
to end "brain drain" there and create a situation 
ing 
characterized as "brain gain."  
d up 
 Center and the Business and Technology 
enter.  In addition, the university has an additional center that comprises two facilities to serve 
th has 
ncing rooms, 
ecialized labs, and secretarial support) and professional business assistance (access to 
university faculty as well as accountants, lawyers and bankers).  
 
The director of university real estate indicates that there are two key reasons that Incubator F has 
been so successful. The first is that, in 1993, the university publicly endorsed its role as an agent 
of economic development. The university subsequently developed a comprehensive, internally 
 
This is a university driven incubator located in a college town that is relatively close (60 miles) 
to a large metropolitan region.  The University has long been one of the nation’s top 25 public 
research universities. In 1993, when the university’s first incubator opened, the facility fille
quickly with firms started by faculty and graduate students. Currently, 75 percent of incubator 
firms are still generated from the university.  
 
Over the past decade, the Research Park has continued to enlarge its program, which now 
includes two incubation facilities: the Technology
C
maturing and graduating companies. Collectively, they offer 150,000 square feet of space, 
housing more than 90 companies, including more than 40 high-tech start-ups. This grow
enabled the incubation program to become the largest based at any US. university.  
 
Similar to other incubators, the program offers various services for start-up firms including 
business infrastructure (inexpensive office space, two-way video confere
sp
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coordinated program that fosters faculty entrepreneurship, commercialization of intellectual 
property and assistance to local start-up firms.  
 
S  a sophisticated busi nce prog th a panies. 
Started in 1998, the program was designed to mirror corporate “intrapreneur” programs at 3M or 
Hewlett - Packard. It provides or brokers services s evaluation, planning, 
product dev nt, access t capital ce in dev agement 
teams. In addition, a mentor (usually an alumnus) is assigned to each start up firm to help with 
overall business development. Mentors are assigned based on firms’ needs. In addition to 
fulltime staffing, the program uses undergraduate students and graduate research assistants, with 
ma ing from the School of Management.  
 
F n ly, a pre-seed fund was re d by th Foundat  provides 
up to $250,000 for each selected start-up firm (high preference for university IP based 
c m anies). The program offers initial funding to velop th es and to 
leverage private seed and venture funding; providing gap financing between start up and the 
acquisition of outside financing. To qualify the applicant needs a license agreement in place with 
t e niversity, and the univers quity p h firm.  
 
econd is ness assista ram that works wi ll incubator com
including busines
elopme o early-stage , and assistan eloping man
ny com
i al cently create e University ion. This fund
o p help firms de eir technologi
h  u ity takes an e osition in eac
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Table 32:  Incubator Specific Data; Incubator F 
Incubator - Incubator F   
    











 Selection Criteria 
te to strong, 




 Support level: Support level: Support level:  
 Types of Firms   Mixed, biotech  
  Support level: SuSupport level: pport level: 
    Leasing arrangements 6 month lease 
  Support level: Support level: Support level: 
 
Education and other 
moprograms  Strong derate 
  Support level: pport level: Su ort level: Su pp
 Incubator management ong 
moderate to strong 
(ha Moderate to str d turnover) 
     
  
ocation 

















     
  Support level: pport level: Su ort level: 
rch park 
University and critical 
ma  high tech in 
uni ersity research 
par  
   
     
Note:  Support levels:  Strong = dominant theme in this data that is consistently supported;  
      Moderate = a frequent, but not constant theme; Rare (Weak) = this theme rarely is found; 
      Sporadic = a theme that appears now and then in this data source.   
Su pp
 function University  resea
What is most important including university 






Table 33:  Community Specific Data; Incubator F 
Community specific issues - Incubator F   
     
Indicator Incubator Documents 
Interviews with Incubator 
Managers 
Interviews with Incubator 
Clients 
  Support level: Support level: Support level: 
 
Interactions between 
clients and community  Strong  
  Support level: Support level: Support level: 
 
teractions among 
 Moderate to strong  
In
Entrepreneurs 
  Support level: Support level: Support level: 
 
Interactions between 
clients and outside 
viduals 
moderate to strong ( in 
indi  park)  
  Support level: Support level: Support level: 
 
Access to incubator 
dvisory board ong a  Str  
     
  
Access to external 
funding sources 
Support level: Support level: 
moderate to strong (SBIR
seed fund for their tech) 
Support level: 
, 
   
     
  Support level: Support level: Support level: 
ccess to steeples of 
xcellence  
A
e Strong very strong  
     
No g = dominant theme in this data that is consistently
    Moderate = a frequent, but not constant theme; Rare (Weak)  this theme rarely is found; 
 
 
te:  Support levels:  Stron  supported;  
  =  
      Sporadic = a theme that appears now and then in this data source.  
 166
 






Community 2 - Incubator
   
Indicator Incubator Docume
  Support level: 
 Incubator 
rs 
Interviews with Incubator 
Clients 
 lev l: Support level: 
 
Interactions between 
incubator and community  moderate to strong  
  Support level: Support vel le : Support level: 
 
Interactions between 
incubator and Local 
Government  moderate  
  Support level: Support e lev l: Support level: 
 
Interactions between 
incubator and local 
Economic Development 
agencies  moderate to strong  
     
  Support level: Support level: Support level: 
 
Interactions between 
incubator and funding 
sources  
moderate to strong 
(working with university 
faculty, staff, students)  
     
  Support level: Support level: Support level: 
 
Interactions between 
incubator and other 
entrepreneur support  
moderate to strong 
(depends on strength of 
client)  
     
Note:  Support levels:  Strong = dominant theme in this data that is consistently supported;  
      Moderate = a frequent, but not constant theme; Rare (Weak) = this theme rarely is found;  
      Sporadic = a theme that appears now and then in this data source.   
 
Table 34:  Other Community Specific Data; Incubator F 
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Incubator G  
Location: metropolitan region located 
Population : 52,000 
Median household income: $68,074 (year 
Median house value: $198,700 (year 2000) 
 
Characteristics of Incubator G: 
• Abundance of talented scientists and 
researchers 
• Access to National labs and state of
• National in scope but focus on state 
• Incubator tied in to multiple sources 
adjacent to larger region 









the art facilities 
economic development  
of Biotech technology spin outs 







• Uses separate entrepreneur 
development programs for c
development  
• Local gap fund and loan program 
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Incubator G Eco System
New medical 
discovery




















Community, with good 
resources that can also 
easily attract resources 
from other areas
Good pool of venture 















 Figure 18:  Incubator G Eco System  
Incubator G was established in 1984, and operates as a for-profit incubator, or in its own 
terminology, a “provider of scientific business services.”  It is located in the heart of a sig
biotech / biomedical corridor, within the same community that is home to Federal biotech / 
biomedical research labs. Since its start, the program has served seventeen (17) biotechnolog
start-up companies, which collec
nificant 
y 
tively have raised more than $500 million in investment capital, 
reated more than 450 jobs, and have an annual payroll of more than $30 million.  
r 
) companies have graduated and 
ve (5) are currently in residence. For the most part, client companies are led by entrepreneurs 
coming out of area biotech / biomedical companies, with only two (2) firms originating from 
Federal lab spin-offs. These are sophisticated individuals, although a number have not previously 
participated as a principal in a start-up and are somewhat naïve at first.  
 
Second, the 40,000 square foot facilities are state of the art and include an approved animal 
facility, an animal treatment room, a low temperature repository, a clean room, and warehouse 
space. The program also incorporates several standing committees that guide the utilization of 
the laboratory including animal care, radioactive use, and general laboratory safety. The 
participating companies are research and development intensive, and the quality of their science, 




Aside from its for-profit status, several other features distinguish the program’s approach. Fo
one, there is no set graduation expectation and companies stay in the facility as long as 
appropriate to execute their business plan. Thus far, twelve (12
fi
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Participating companies pay rent that is priced at the low end of the local market and receive 
some administrative services from staff. However, there is no fulltime staff, and the real 
attraction for companies is access to the physical facilities. In return, Inc  an equity 
position in each of the member companies, typically about 5 percent. Incubator G does not 
invest in any of the compa
 
In summary, this is a program that leverages the research and development excellence of its 
region, offers a first-class physical environment for growth, operates a flexible and low-key 
approach to incubation services, and attracts a cadre of companies and entrepreneurs with 














Table 35:  Incubator Specific Data; Incubator G 
Incubator G  





  upport level: pport level: port level: 
 moderate moderate  Selection Criteria 
  S el: Su  Support level: upport lev pport level:
 Types of Firms B Bio t  io tech ech 
  S l: Su  Support level: upport leve pport level:
 Leasing arrangements  
Flexible, longer term if 
necessary  
 Support level: Support level: Support level:  
 
Education and other 
rograms S ong Str g  p tr on
     
  S Su Sup
nt Well rounded leaders Un nds bio market  
upport level: pport level: port level: 
 Incubator manageme dersta
     
  S ort level: Su ort level: Support level: 
 Location Robust area Robust area  
upp pp
     
 Support level: Support level: Support level: 
ty Strong Str  
 
Credibili ong 
     
     
S Su Sup
t 
S d facilities 
Fac
acc resources  
  upport level: pport level: port level: 
 
What is most importan
function pecialize
ilities, services, 
ess to area 
     
     
ely is found;  




Note:  Support levels:  Strong = dominant theme in this data that is consistently supported;  
      Moderate = a frequent, but not constant theme; Rare (Weak) = this theme rar
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Table 36:  Community Specific Data; Incubator G 
Community specific issues - Incubator G   
s tor Managers 








 Sporadic Sporadic  
In
clients and community
  Support level: pport level: pport level: Su Su
 
Interactions among 
Entrepreneurs Moderate Moderate  
     
  Support level: pport level: pport level: 
 
Interactions between 
clients and outside 
individuals Moderate Moderate  
Su Su
     
 Support level: Support level: Support level: 
dvisory board  Rare 
 
Access to incubator 
 a  
     
  
Access to external fund
sources 
Support level: vel: 
ing 
Support le Support level: 
  Strong (in community)  
     
  Support level: Support level: Support level: 
 
ccess to steeples of 
Strong 





     
No g = minant theme in this data th ;  
  Moderate = a frequent, but n theme; Rare (Weak = this theme rarely is found; 
 
te:  Support levels:  Stron do at is consistently supported
    ot constant )  
      Sporadic = a theme that appears now and then in this data source.  
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Community 2 - Incub
Indicator Incubator 
  Support level: 
s w th Incubator Interviews with 
Incubator Clients 




community  strong  
  Support level: pport level: Support level: Su
 
Interactions between 
incubator and Local 
Government 
Strong (complementary 
services) strong  
  Support level: Support level: Support level: 
 
Interactions between 
incubator and local 
Economic 
Development agencies Strong Strong  - state wide initiative  
     
  Support level: Support level: Support level: 
 
Interactions between 
incubator and funding 
sources Strong 
Very Strong (seed fund, loans, 
VCs)  
     
  Support level: Support level: Support level: 
 
Interactions between 
incubator and other 
entrepreneur support  
Strong (part of focused cluster 
development program)  
     
Note:  Support levels:  Strong = dominant theme in this data that is consistently supported;  
      Moderate = a frequent, but not constant theme; Rare (Weak) = this theme rarely is found;  
      Sporadic = a theme that appears now and then in this data source.   
Table 37:  Other Community Specific Data; Incubator G 
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Incubator H  
Location: small town adjacent to Large 
Population: 9,000 (adjacent city (500,000) 
Median household income: $44,728 (year 
Median house value: $128,200 (
Characteristics of Incubator H: 
• Location near major research 










 For profit entity 
• Invests in high percentage of clients 


















Large pool of Venture 
Equity and or 
companies
Capital, specialized 











Figure 19:  Incubator H Eco System  
 
The incubator is a business unit of a for profit company, which has much larger interests in 
operations management and investment in the information technology sector. The technolog
focus of the incubator is in software applications. The incubator program has a core senior staff 
of three full-time-equivalent employees, all of whom have personal entrepreneurial experien
and has the back-up help of eight to ten company staff members who provide as-needed 
assistance
ce, 
 to client companies. Started in the late 1980s, the for-profit program has attained a 
otable level of stability and sustained performance, particularly given the recent churning in the 
information technology sector.  
 
The incubator is housed in a 137,000 square foot facility located in the Northeast section of a 
large metropolitan area, an area that technology companies heavily populate. Individuals with 
prior experience as a principal or senior manager in a software company lead many of the client 
companies in the program. A fairly flexible approach to incubation services parallels this 
experience base. There is no imposed structure or strict milestones, although incubator staff can, 
and do, move quickly when a client need arises. Typically, there are about 15 companies in the 
incubator, and at any given time the incubator is a major investor in about 25 percent of them. 
The size of the facility is conducive to clients staying longer, and the average company residency 
is three to four years. Since the program is not conceived as an economic development initiative 
per se, and there are no federal or state agencies demanding turnover, its policies on graduation 
are quite flexible. Clients pay a monthly fee that covers rent and services. While the program has 
amicable relations with university-affiliated incubators in the adjacent metropolitan area, this is 
not a significant source of deal flow or clients.  
 
In summary, this is a program that leverages the assets of an experienced base of entrepreneurs, a 
location in an area that is heavily populated by information technology companies, a large 
facility that permits companies to reach greater size and maturity, a flexible approach to services 
n
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and milestones, and access to the parent company’s capital and technical assistance.   This 





Location: small town near a large research 
university 
Median resident age: 37.1 years  




Characteristics of Incubator H: 
• Located near major research 
university 
• Specialized bio med facilities 
shared equipment) 
graduates from region, happy if they
• Good connections with university 
tech transfer office, fou
research centers 
Population: 10,000 
Median house value: $91,700 (year 2000) 
 
(animal care facility greenhouse, 
• Statewide mission (lose most 
 
can keep company is state) 
ndation, 
• Good supply of technology from 
university  
 • Facility key to success 
 
Incubator I Eco System
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New medical 

















Small Community with 
limited resources








with no spin 
outs to date
 
 Figure 20: Incubator I Eco System  
Organized in 1987 as an activity of a large research university’s Biotechnology development 
Program, the Incubator I is located in a 40,000 square foot facility and is designed to acceler
development of early-stage biotechnology companies. Currently, eleven (11) companies 
participate in the program and most of these firms are based on University technology. T
incubator manager identified three reasons for their success. First, the incubator provides 
ate 
he 
onsiderable technical resources for start-up biotech firms, including state-of-the-art laboratory 
econd is the incubator’s affiliation with the university. The University is one of the nation’s 
rm may be licensing university technology or a professor may be involved with a client firm.  
se 
ervices and 
hen the firms are 
ady.   
 
c
facilities, central instrument rooms, and shared equipment rooms. It has more than $1,000,000 in 
equipment available for tenant use, a small animal care facility and a greenhouse. 
 
S
leading research institutions, boasting $450 million in research expenditures. In 2002, the 
university experienced a 70 percent increase in licenses issued and processed 191 invention 
disclosures. All incubator firms must have some relationship with the university; for example the 
fi
 
The third reason is that the incubation program provides professional assistance through in-hou
and networking activities. Specifically, the incubator offers business development s
assistance in raising capital. The incubation program also provides companies with access to a 
number of subscription-only web sites and databases for use in accessing information on 
markets, competitors, and full-image patents. They also help companies with funding by 
advising and preparing them to meet with investors and making introductions w
re
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The incubator thoroughly assesses potential clients by evaluating the candidate’s technology and 
its business plan and milestones. The firm must possess adequate start-up funding and have 
prospects for obtaining ad nds. A si ntage siness 
Innovation Research (SBIR) awards. Applicants must also have the potential to develop 
c l nships ith the Universit ength s three to six years.   
 
The incubator’s economic development focus is statewide but the mission of the incubator is not 
e o .  T e main objective ercializa on of the university’s 
intellectual property.   
 
When asked about job creation, the manager stated it was fairly evenly distributed among their 
clients with one large exception.  
a fe ti  for most of the g enu stment.   
 
Networking activity at the incubator was moderate with some com anies working for and with 
each other.  She stated tha ot an  betwee  and the 
c m anies as the board was essentially limite  to the selection pro ess.  There is a 
com i nsiderable assistance to companies and is comprised 
o  members from the university’s technology ransfer office, the in
u zes its alumni database to 
l or the incub tor clients. 
 
ditional fu gnificant perce of firms have Small Bu
o laborative relatio  w y. The average l  of stay i
c nomic development h is the comm ti
She stated that funding and revenue was not as distributed with 
 w companies accoun ng rant funding, rev e generation, and inve
p
t there were n y interactions n the advisory board
o p d c
mercialization counc l that provides co
f  t cubator, the incubator and the 
niversity’s foundation.  An example of this is that the foundation utili










Su Support Support level
Table 38:  Incubator Specific Data; Incubator I 




Interview ith Incubator 
  pport level:  level: : 
 Selection Criteria  weak t rate Moderate o mode
  Support level: Support level: Support level: 
 Types of Firms  Biotec  h 
  S pport level: Suppo evel: Support lev  u rt l el:
 Leasing arrangements  Yearly lease  
     
  
ducation an
S pport level: Suppo Support lev
d other 
rograms  Moderate moderate 




     
 Support level: Support level: Support level: 
cubator management  Moderate to strong 





     
  S Suppo Support lev
  Strong  
upport level: rt level: el: 
Location 
     
  S pport level: Suppo evel: Support lev  
 Credibility  Very strong  
u rt l el:
     
    
S vel: Suppo Support lev
hat is most important 
nction 
Facility, access to 
university Facilit Facility, access to university 
 




     
     
Note:  Support levels:  Strong = dominant theme in this data that is consistently supported;  
      Moderate = a frequent, but not constant theme; Rare (Weak is theme rarely is found; 







Table 39:  Community Specific Data; Incubator I 
Community specific issues - Incubator I 
  Support level: Support level: Support level: 
  
Indicator Incubator Documents 
Interviews with Incubator 
Managers 




 clients and community  weak 
  Support level: Support level: Support level: 
 
Interactions among 
ntrepreneurs E  weak to moderate weak to moderate 
     
  Support level: Support level: Support level: 
Interactions between 
clients and outside 
viduals  indi  moderate moderate 
     
  
A
Support level: pport level: 
ccess to incubator 
dvisory board 
Support level: Su
 a  Weak Weak 
     
  
Access to external 
funding s
Support level: Support level: Support level: 
ources   moderate to strong  
     
  Support level: Support level: Support level: 
ccess to steeples of 
 
A
excellence Strong very strong Strong 
     
     
No   Support levels:  Strong = dominant theme in this data that is consistently supported;  
    Moderate = a frequent, but not constant theme; Rare (Weak) = this theme rarely is found; 
   poradic = a theme that appears now and then in this data source.  
te:
   










Community 2 - Incub
Indicator Incubator Docume
  Support level: 
ew  with Incubator Interviews with Incuba
Clients 
rt l vel: Support level: 
 
Interactions between 
incubator and community  Mode  trate o strong  
  Support level: Suppo e ort level: rt l vel: Supp
Interactions between 
incubator and Local 
Government  Moderat   e  
  Support level: Support level: Support level: 
 
Interactions between 
incubator and local 
Economic Development 
agencies  Weak to moderate  
     
     
  Support level: Support level: Support level: 
 
Interactions between 
incubator and funding 
sources  Moderate to strong   
     
  Support level: Support level: Support level: 
 
Interactions between 
incubator and other 
entrepreneur support  Moderate  
     
     
     
Note:  Support levels:  Strong = dominant theme in this data that is consistently supported;  
      Moderate = a frequent, but not constant theme; Rare (Weak) = this theme rarely is found;  
      Sporadic = a theme that appears now and then in this data source.   
Table 40:  Other Community Specific Data; Incubator I 
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Incubator J 
Location: large metropolitan area 
Median resident age: 34.7 years  
2000) 
 
Characteristics of Incubator J 
• Part of large university, located 1 
mile from campus, weak relations 
with tech transfer, research office 
•
Population: 450,000 
Median household income: $34,415 (year 






 Student help from entrepreneurship 
program 
• Only serve faculty spin offs 
• City created separate incubator 





• Manager provides most of the 
assistance 
Incubator J Eco System
New 











Identification of Venture 
Capital, specialized 
service providers, Angel 



















Figure 21:  Incubator J Eco System  
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Incubator J is a part of a large research university.  The program is currently in transition having
not yet achieved the level of success it originally envisioned when creating the incubator.  The 
 
The university is modifying its current economic development infrastructure so it can provide a 
single point of contact for businesses and entrepreneurial communities to access many of the 
resources necessary for success: intellectual property, management expertise, capital partners and 
support services.  
he university is constructing a 60,000 sq. ft. incubator facility located in the University’s 
d 
ost start-up companies.  
 
e 
current location of the incubator is in a commerce park approximately one mile from the main 
campus.  This location has not helped the incubator in terms of interactions with other units of 




Research Park directly adjacent to the university.  Facilities will include quality office and 
laboratory space designed for biotechnology and life sciences research. Shared laboratory 
facilities provide technology businesses with access to critical research equipment that woul
otherwise be cost-prohibitive to m
 
The Incubator provides office and laboratory space and professional advice for companies that
meet the requirements.  Companies are selected based on criteria that assesses whether the 
company is a technology based company, has or requires a relationship with the university, and 
if it needs services supplied by the incubator.  Their application consists of five questions that th
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and community businesses. 
 
The Incubator is supported by the City and County, but only recently.  Previously the Incubator 
was a stand alone operation focused entirely on university based spin offs.  This strategy was 
abandoned after the first three years and the incubator and the community have both realized 
benefits in the number of clients now being incubated in the program.  Currently half of the 
clients are from the community. 
 
Incubator J does not have an advisory board but, refers clients to a list of service providers that 
that offer discounts to client companies.  The program also refers clients to entrepreneurship 
seminars and programs in the community and at the university that provide the educational 
programming for the incubator.  
 
When asked what Incubator J does that helps its clients the most, the incubator manager cited 
one on one coaching and mentoring and the ability to identify the specific needs that need to be 
addressed by the company to reach their goals and objectives.  He also stated that the incubator 
significantly increased the visibility of its clients and that networking and other activities have 
helped clients to gain improved contacts in the community.   
improve the stringency of the selection process once the new facility is closer to full occupancy
Incubator J works in partnership with the university’s Center for Entrepreneurship.  The C
for Entrepreneurship provides a wide array of successful entrepreneurial business and technology
programs to enhance entrepreneurial education, research and training for both incubator c
 185
 
When a client was asked which services were most helpful, hands on help and cheerleading of 
the incubator manager were reported.  Th ompany rticipat
I  cred  bu ny r fif es, 
the reverse is true.  As a result, the firm is gra e progra
e client c  stated that pa
 ove
ing in the 
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Community 2 - J     












community  Rare  
  Support level: Support level: Support level: 
 
Interactions between 
incubator and Local 
Government  
sporadic (provides 
funding recently)  
  Support level: Support level: Support level: 
 
Interactions between 
incubator and local 
Economic 
Development agencies  Rare  
     
  Support level: Support level: Support level: 
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sources  
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recently)  
     
  Support level: Support level: Support level: 
 
Interactions between 
incubator and other 
entrepreneur support   Sporadic  
      
Note:  Support levels:  Strong = dominant theme in this data that is consistently supported;  
      Moderate = a frequent, but not constant theme; Rare (Weak) = this theme rarely is found; 
      Sporadic = a theme that appears now and then in this data source.  
Table 43:  Other Community Specific Data; Incubator J 
Fairfield Iowa 
Location:  Small Town 
Median resident age: 41.5 years  
Median household income: $31,202 (year 2000) 
Median house value: $73,200 (year 2000) 
 
Fairfield Iowa is located two hours southeast of Des Moines--80 miles from the nearest interstate 
highway or commercial airport, population 9,500. Twenty-five years ago, it was just another 
small town surrounded by cornfields and hay. 
 
Today, it is a high-tech hotbed known affectionately as “Silicorn Valley.”  The credit appears to 
belong to followers of Maharishi Mahesh Yogi for transforming this remote crossroads into a 
thriving cosmopolitan pocket of high-tech, New Age entrepreneurs. Since 1974, members of the 
Transcendental Meditation movement have been moving there from around the globe to study 
and meditate at the Maharishi University of Management.  An economy of small companies 
using tools like the World Wide Web and e-mail to conduct business was a perfect solution for 
Fairfield; it created jobs but did not disturb the quiet lifestyle that drew these meditators to Iowa 
in the first place. Fairfield Mayor Robert Rasmussen commented that "Meditation may be 
wonderful, but you still need dollars to live." As a result, many residents became very 
entrepreneurial to survive and in turn created a significant number of at-home occupations.  
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Transcendental Meditation (TM) practitioners account for 3,000 of the town's 9,500 residents. 
Only 1,148 of them are working toward undergraduate or graduate degrees at the university; the 
rest are singles, couples and families who have made Fairfield their home because they do not 
want to leave the company of other TM devotees, who meditate together for two hours every 
morning and for another two hours every evening.  The remainder of the population lives 
harmoniously, not as a melting pot, but more as a vegetable soup, according to the head of their 
Chamber of Commerce.  
 
Since 1988, 400 new companies have sprung up in Fairfield, creating an estimated 2,000 new 
jobs while attracting over $250 million dollars in investment.   That equates to a new company 
and five new jobs roughly every 10 days over the last 11 years -- enviable growth by any 
standard.   
 
Even given the large pool of creative people, the growth is unprecedented.  When asked what 
factors account for such growth, leaders quickly point to peer to peer mentoring and community 
involvement.  Virtually every successful entrepreneur volunteers significant amounts of time to 
assist new start ups.  Mentors often invest in ventures, which leads to angel investment and 
eventually formal investment structures.   
 
Networking is a part of the community, culture, and design at Fairfield.  Lunch hour is a daily 
networking event at the local restaurants and there are more restaurants per capita than San 
Francisco.  The town has three local papers and a monthly magazine.   
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Residents also have a great tolerance for failure.  There have been many failures over the years 
and it is not uncommon for a single entrepreneur to have more than three failures before finding 
something that works.    
 
There is no formal incubator in Fairfield.  There is a volunteer entrepreneur association that 
provides a forum for issues and brings in outside speakers on occasion, but the association does 
not take credit for the culture that is prevalent in the community. 
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Reflective Case Study 
 
The UCF Technology Incubator 
A discussion on why an incubator is started is important, particularly if an understanding 
of the meaning of success is desired. Incubators are often evaluated using easily measured 
metrics such as how many square feet the building occupies or how many companies are 
participating in their program. An incubator started for one reason and measured against 
outcomes unrelated to that reason can easily fail, while still fulfilling its intended mission. 
 
The idea for the UCF Technology Incubator started in the mid 1990's, in several areas of 
the university: the office of the Vice President for Research; the College of Engineering; 
the Small Business Development Center (SBDC) in the College of Business; and the 
Center for Research and Education in Optics and Lasers (CREOL). 
 
The environment and support for incubators was never stronger than at this time. The “dot-
com” era was charged with multi billion dollar successes filling the news media of the day. 
For-profit incubators emerged across the country as a way for venture capitalists to keep 
close tabs on their investments. 
 
There were different but complementary motives for starting an incubator at UCF. The 
Vice President for Research at the time felt pressure to create an incubation program 
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mainly for political reasons (bandwagon effect). Many metropolitan universities had 
incubators and the UCF mission mandated partnerships with the community. 
The SBDC felt an incubator was an interesting idea that would provide contact with the 
companies that would count as counseling time to the SBA. In return, it would elevate the 
visibility of the SBDC, which at the time was located on the third floor of the Business 
Administration building on campus. The Director of the SBDC was the person promoting 
the creation of the incubator at the Center. 
 
The College of Engineering wanted to be able to establish closer ties with industry. The 
College already had two companies sharing space with them in rented space in the research 
park. These startup companies were working together with College faculty on Small 
Business Innovative Research contracts and recognized the productive benefits of being in 
such close proximity to one another. One of these companies, Electrodynamics, became 
one of the first companies admitted into the program.  The College's development officer 
was also the College’s champion in the establishment of the incubator program.   
 
CREOL’s motivation was founded on a need to spin out technologies developed at the 
Center into companies.  Tom O'Neal (author of this work) was then the Associate Director 
of the Center and an experience serial entrepreneur. While at the Center, he helped two 
faculty members start new companies based on research technology developed at the 
Center. These companies continue to thrive but the process of starting the companies was 
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challenging in the existing university environment. 
 
The University environment was such that faculty starting companies faced severe 
criticism and scrutiny. In one instance, O'Neal and the faculty members were reported to 
the State Controller's Office under the whistle blowers act for operating a company while 
at the university. While both participants were very careful to follow all the policies and 
were cleared of doing anything inappropriate, the investigative process was quite 
unsettling and demonstrates the cultural barriers that previously existed at the University. 
 
Starting a new company is daunting enough, but the added complexities and challenges 
under the existing infrastructure was formidable. The university administration at that time 
was just beginning to re-think the role that universities play in regional economic 
development in the new emerging knowledge based economy. Previously it was thought 
that the best way to deal with issues such as conflicts of interest was to avoid them rather 
than manage them. There was little history at the relatively young university to guide 
administrators. 
 
The second motivator for CREOL was a sincere interest in gaining faculty access to 
competent assistance in their quest to start a new company. Generally speaking, university 
scientists have little training or understanding of detailed business issues. O'Neal witnessed 
first hand that faculty will mortgage their house on their technology without a clear 
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Having learned of these other efforts through a conversation with the Executive Director of 
the Central Florida Research Park, O’Neal called a meeting between the College 
Engineering, the SBDC, and himself.  The three agreed to join forces to establish an 
incubator.  O’Neal then asked for a meeting with the existing VP for Research.  The VP 
was also investigating the opening of an incubator.  O’Neal was informed that the VP was 
working the issue, that it was difficult, and that she would let him know when there was 
something to work on.  This essentially stopped any further development on the incubator 
project.  A few months later however, the VP for Research was released from 
administrative duties and a new VP was put in place.  The new VP knew of the incubator 
effort, was not necessarily sold on the idea, but did support the idea of the joint 
partnership.  The only condition was that someone had to be in charge of the project.  
O’Neal was given that responsibility.  O’Neal then began the work of getting everyone 
together on the project.  This also included another organization named the Central Florida 
Innovation Corporation (CFIC), a not for profit “virtual incubator” with a mission of 
building investment grade high tech companies in Central Florida.  The vision was to have 




Making it happen 
As with many similar projects, several key things must happen before the doors can 
actually open.  Funding, staff, and other support had to be garnered for the program.  There 
was no existing funding available for programs such as the incubator at UCF.  This meant 
that more creative means needed to be employed. The next task focused on finding seed 
money to launch the incubator program.  Three $8,000 investments were secured from The 
College of Business Administration, the College of Engineering and CREOL.  This 
$24,000 seed fund was then matched with $26,000 from the Office of Research, 
establishing a $50,000 baseline to operate from.  A proposal was written to the Florida 
High Tech Corridor Council for matching funds and another $40,000 was acquired for the 
project.  At this same time, the Scottish Government which had an economic development 
office located downtown at City Hall, was looking to open a series of technology centers in 
the US. The idea was to provide Scottish companies with a “stepping stone” to help them 
penetrate the US market.  After several meetings with O’Neal, including a trip to Scotland 
with then Governor Chiles, the Scottish government agreed that the best place to locate a 
new facility would be in Orlando at the university’s incubator once realized. This was a 
key event that validated the idea to various university administrators.  There would now be 
an anchor tenant in the incubator, providing a steady stream of revenue to offset the costs. 
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Arrangements were made to place the Small Business Development Center in the 
Incubator to have them close to these new companies.  The College of Business made 
arrangements to pay for the cost of locating them in the incubator.  In addition, it was 
decided that the Central Florida Innovation Corporation would also be located in the 
incubator.  The UCF Office of Research was already providing space to CFIC and agreed 
to continue to provide space and house CFIC in the incubator.  With this, and a multiyear 
commitment from the Scottish government, UCF entered into an agreement to lease 12,000 
square feet of space in the University Tech Center.  The building required moderate 
renovations over approximately in order nine (9) months in order to open it to tenants.  In 
the mean time, a proposal was written to the Technology Research and Development 
Authority (TRDA) for funding of the incubator, using the funding already committed as 
match (including rent from the Scottish Government), an additional $300,000 was 
acquitted for the incubator.  Some of the funding ($70,000) was provided to CFIC to 




With enough funding now in hand to start the incubator, a grand opening event was held 
that included 40 visiting companies from Scotland, then City of Orlando  Mayor Glenda 
Hood, Orange County Chairman Martinez, UCF President Hitt, TRDA Head Frank 
Kinney, Greater Orlando EDC Chairman Darryl Kelly, and the Head of the Scottish 
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Technology Initiative.  More than 150 community leaders attended the event generating a 
great buzz in the community regarding the potential for high tech economic development 
in the region.  The opening also featured the incubator’s first clients.  There were four 
companies on day one that moved into the incubator, in addition to the Scottish 
Technology and Research Center.  These companies were based on technologies in the 
areas of Engineering, Optics, and Computer Science, or Information Technology.   
 
A public relations firm was hired to manage the opening event by the Scottish group to 
ensure maximum return on the event.  The event did meet or exceed expectations, 
including significant coverage in the local and Scottish press.  This early exposure resulted 
in many inquiries into the incubator from new companies as well interested community 
organizations.  O’Neal quickly realized the impact that the media could have on the 
incubator and hired the public relations (PR) firm that managed the opening event to 
conduct PR for the incubator during it’s first year of operation.  The scope of work focused 
on introducing the incubator and the concept of incubating companies to the Central 
Florida Community.  The decision provided excellent returns.  Within the first year, the 
incubator was featured in the Orlando Sentinel, the Orlando Business Journal, the Tampa 
Tribune, the St Pete Times, Florida Trend Magazine, and the Wall Street Journal.  It was 
called out as a “bright light” for Central Florida by the Orlando Sentinel.  Indeed, the 
region embraced the incubator. 
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The problem remained that the incubator still only had funding secured for the first year.  
Long term funding had to be secured to keep the incubator open.  O’Neal began soliciting 
support from the City of Orlando, Orange County, and the State of Florida. 
 
Learning the Incubator Business.   
One of the benefits associated with the length of time it took to get the doors open for the 
incubator is that it allowed key constituents an evolutionary period for on how to run an 
incubator.  O’Neal learned that a strong National Association existed to support the 
industry, the National Business Incubator Association (NBIA).  The NBIA holds two 
major events per year, their annual conference and the Fall Training Institute.  The timing 
worked out such that O’Neal was able to attend three key events prior to opening the 
incubator.  These proved to be invaluable in understanding what incubators do on a day to 
day basis.  Each event featured a host incubator and included tours of their facilities.  In 
addition to the formal sessions during these three day-long conferences, there were many 
networking activities that provided additional information and sharing between the 
participants.   Each event drew approximately 800 participants, most of which eagerly 
shared ideas, practices, and policies and procedures.  O’Neal used many of these materials 
to establish the initial policies for the incubator.  It also became clear that someone would 
need to be hired soon to take care of the day to day management activities of the incubator.  
He began searching for someone to put into the position at least temporarily until a 
permanent person could be hired.   
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O’Neal hired a development person with excellent networking and people skills, that was 
working for the Scottish Center, into the position of Chief Operating Officer for the 
Incubator. 
  
Providing Business Assistance 
The original idea to provide service for incubator clients was to co-locate the Small 
Business Development Center, the Central Florida Innovation Corporation, and the 
Incubator in one facility.  It was assumed that the placement of these service providers in 
such close proximity would create an environment where each company would seek 
assistance when needed.  Within a relatively short time frame however, it was clear that 
close proximity alone was not enough to insure that the incubator companies were 
receiving the services they required.  In fact, O’Neal observed that the companies and 
service providers were not really interacting at all.  The halls were empty with companies 
and service providers simply working in their designated space, with little or no 
interaction.  
 
An investigation into the lack of interaction presented interesting results.  The on-site 
service providers, The Central Florida Innovation Corporation and the Small Business 
Development Center stated that companies had not been in to see them.  The same 
response was obtained from the companies.  Both were literally waiting on the other to 
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initiate contact.  Neither had a clear understanding of what each needed to start the process.  
The SBDC required companies to fill out a client request form prior to services being 
rendered and therefore was not initiating the process of providing services to the incubator 
clients.  CFIC simply felt the clients would come to them if and when they needed help.  
The clients were reluctant for a number of reasons including not knowing who to go to for 
different advice and being afraid of not knowing enough to ask the right questions.  
 
At that point, O’Neal simply began scheduling monthly meetings with each client between 
CFIC, the SBDC, or other external service provider.  The SBDC forms were handed out 
and each client returned the filled out requests.  Brown bag luncheons were held once a 
month to encourage interactions, and bi-monthly seminars were scheduled that covered a 
wide variety of topics. 
 
Selection of Clients  
For the first year, applicants to the incubator filled out some application forms and then did 
a one hour presentation to a selection committee.  The process was moderately effective, 
but was not a consistent predictor of how well a client would fit into the program in terms 
of their receptiveness to the services of the program.  O’Neal and others simply believed 
that the process did not reveal the true potential of a client company.  
 
It was decided that a pre-incubation program should be developed as a way to help the 
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community and become the selection process for the incubator.  A program was developed 
that eventually serve as the filter for new companies applying to the incubator.  The seven 
session course, called “Excellence in Entrepreneurship,” was developed with the assistance 
of a professional curriculum developer and is delivered in cooperation with UCF's College 
of Business Administration. Faculty from UCF’s Management Department facilitate and 
oversee the sessions that incorporate many industry practitioners in the delivery of the 
material. 
 
The final session of the Excellence in Entrepreneurship program is a presentation of the 
business opportunity to the incubator's CEO, advisory board members, and invited guests.  
Evaluations of the business opportunity, the presentation itself, and fit into the incubator 
are reviewed by the CEO and COO of the incubator to determine acceptance.  Acceptance 
is based on the final evaluations and the applicant’s commitment exhibited throughout the 
course. 
 
Types of Firms 
UCF accepts all types of technology companies but prefers companies that have 
technologies that complement the university’s expertise. The definition of technology is 
somewhat ambiguous but is generally defined as new, innovative products or services, that 
are scaleable, and that hopefully provide a sustainable competitive advantage for the firm.  
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The incubator companies can be categorized in the following manner: 
Technology Area Number of Clients 
Software 16 






Leasing Arrangements and Services 
The UCF Technology Incubator requires every client to execute a sub lease for the space 
physically occupied by them.  These leases are flexible and allow companies to expand and 
contract without penalty. Companies are given a one year lease, with an option for a 
second year. Companies wishing to remain longer than two years must meet with the CEO 




The initial facility of the UCFTI consisted of 12,000 square feet but demand quickly forced 
the incubator to expand. Space was acquired gradually over the first three (3) years to its 
present inventory. At this writing, the UCF Technology incubator consists of 66,000 sq ft 
of space, in four separate buildings. Three of these buildings are located in the Central 
Florida Research Park (CFRP). The CFRP is one of the top ten Research Parks in the US 
and boosts over 100 companies with approximately 10,000 high tech workers.  The fourth 
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location of the UCF Technology Incubator is in downtown Orlando. 
 
      
 
 
Client offices range in size from 150 square feet to 7,000 square feet. Some specialized 
capabilities have been added to the facilities, including wet labs and clean rooms. These 
resources and capabilities are developed on a case by case basis, with the clients off setting 
a large portion of the costs. Rent waivers and other accommodations have also been made.  
 
Clients are not charged for shared resources, which includes three conference rooms, work 
rooms (copy machine, etc), halls, break-rooms, rest rooms, and a small business library. 
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Programs and Forums 
The UCFTI offers a full menu of entrepreneurial support services. These services include 
but is not limited to: 
• Boot camps for entrepreneurs 
o 2 per year minimum 
• Business plan competitions 
o Winners receive incubator support 
• Excellence in Entrepreneurship certificate course 
o Selection filter providing community entrepreneurship support 
• Assist other incubator programs 
o Sanford, Tampa, Melbourne, St Pete, Puerto Rico, etc 
• Support for industry associations 
o AEA, Photonics Cluster, Florida Business Incubator Association  
• Technology entrepreneurship workshops · Seminars on various topics 
o Average of 1 per week 
• Emerging business network 
• Entrepreneur in residence  
• In house networking events 
o Brown bag luncheons, barbeque, etc. 
 
The number of events offered clients is more than most would be able to attend. Clients 
attend sessions they are most interested in and can fit into their schedule. In some cases, 
certain clients are strongly urged to attend workshops that incubator personnel believe they 
would benefit the most from. 
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Early in the history of the UCF Technology Incubator program, it became clear all the 
talents of the SBDC, CFIC, and the incubator staff combined were not going to be able to 
provide the broad range of services necessary to properly assist the clients of the incubator. 
A strategy to enlist addition resources was necessary. 
 
After conferring with other incubator managers at an NBIA conference, O'Neal began 
recruiting professional service providers from the community to help. This included brand 
name accounting legal, financial, marketing, HR, and other firms. The response was 
remarkable with nearly 100 percent of the firms approached more than willing to dedicate 
time to assisting these young firms. While none of the organizations offered financial 
support to the incubator, the time they dedicated assisting clients quickly represented a 
major asset to the Incubator that would not otherwise have been affordable to the clients or 
the incubator. 
 
With that, the quality of the program grew rapidly, as did the reputation of the incubation 
program. The perceived value attracted an increasingly more sophisticated client, allowing 
the incubator to achieve better results with less effort.  The program began attracting more 
attention, ultimately reaching a critical mass resulting in a snowball effect in the region in 




Integration into larger technology development system 
 
Since its inception, the UCF Technology Incubator has always been a partnership.  The 
City of Orlando, Orange County Government, the Florida High Tech Corridor, the 
Technology Development and Research Authority, and others have been critical to the 
establishment and success of the incubator.    
 
The City of Orlando and Orange County jointly funded a study examining how to diversify 
the region’s economy.  A prominent consulting firm from Austin made many 
recommendations including the recommendation to significantly increase the capabilities 
of the UCF Technology Incubator.   
 
Orlando’s Mayor then formed a task force to review the recommendation.  The committee 
consisted of several community leaders including high level UCF administrators.  One of 
the ultimate recommendations of the study was to significantly strengthen the UCF 
Technology Incubator as part of the economic development agendas of the City and 
County.  Both agreed to financially and otherwise support the program and are providing 
supporting funds in excess of $100,000 per year each to the program.   
 
The Mayor’s task force was another key event that cemented the incubator into an overall 
high tech development agenda for the region.  The funding was also a key resource 
necessary for the expansion of the program.    
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Incubator Management and Staff 
The incubator team at UCF consists of the following positions: 
• CEO 
• COO 
• Business Development Manager 
• Event planner, marketing 
• Receptionist 
• Facilities manager 
• Site coordinators for the downtown and second research park locations 
 
The Chief Executive Officer: This position has been held by Tom O'Neal since the 
beginning of the program.  O'Neal was part of the team that originally founded the 
incubator and remains its champion at the highest level. He is also the Associate Vice 
President for Research at UCF, a position that has been very beneficial to the development 
of the Incubator. O'Neal makes all of the typical decisions a CEO would make concerning 
strategic issues, budgets, and personnel.  He also represents the incubator to university and 
community leaders (along with the COO), helps connect the incubator to other university 
and community needs and resources, interfaces with sponsors, makes the final decision as 
to which applicants are accepted into the incubator, if the firms can stay longer, if the firms 
can increase their space, and if a firms needs to be asked to exit the program.   
 
O’Neal also provides valuable linkages between other UCF Colleges, Research Centers 
and programs including the Colleges of Business Administration, Engineering and 
Computer Science, and Optics and Research Centers such as the Center for Research and 
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Education in Optics, the Institute for Simulation and Training (IST), the BioMolecular 
Science, and others.  This also includes connecting clients to the programs of the Florida 
High Tech Corridor which can represent a significant financial opportunity for the clients 
involved in research. 
 
Chief Operations Officer:  The responsibilities of this position are to facilitate the day to 
day operations of the incubator.  This includes supervising the remaining staff of the 
incubator, daily interactions with clients to resolve issues, scheduling appointments for 
regular meetings, connecting incubator clients with external resources, and many other 
duties that vary daily.  Because O’Neal’s time is not dedicated full time to the incubator, 
the COO position was filled with a person that could provide more than COO level 
assistance to the team when necessary.   
 
This person is exceptional at networking and maintaining an extensive network from 
which to draw upon.  This has helped to increase the size of the external resources 
available to incubator clients. 
 
Business Development Manager (BDM):  This position is responsible for providing 
strategic and tactical support to companies, identifying gaps in the development of the 
company or entrepreneur, and working with the CEO and COO to identify the best 
resources to address those gaps.  Each client is required to meet with this person at least 
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once a quarter.  The BDM meets with the CEO at least once a month to review client 
progress, concerns, and other issues.   
 
The BDM also provides the CEO with support related to university spin offs, conducting 
due diligence for opportunities under consideration, and serving as interim CEO for new 
spinouts until a permanent CEO can be recruited.  The BDM also provides support to the 
local angel investor group and assists in the production an annual venture capital 
conference targeting young companies.   
  
Event planner and marketing:  This position is responsible for logistical and other 
infrastructure support for the programs, seminars and marketing efforts of the incubator.  
This includes scheduling, announcements, booking venues, tracking RSVP, producing 
newsletters, and other materials.  Support is also provided to clients as they prepare 
collateral materials for their companies.   
 
Receptionist:  Provides traditional support as a receptionist for the incubator, schedules 
conference rooms and provides limited administrative support to clients.  Also helps with 
other duties on a non-interference basis, such as helping with the newsletter or other client 
needs. 
 
Site Coordinators:  Act as receptionist and facilitator at the additional facilities.  Site 
coordinators also act as a conduit to the resources at the main incubator facility as well as 
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other complementary organizations.  These individuals also assist with other tasks such as 
helping with events at their locations, lease tracking, and other administrative duties. 
 
Facilities Manager:  This person is responsible for maintaining the physical infrastructure 
of the incubator; including preparation of client space, network (internet) connections, 
reconfiguration of space for existing clients, plus oversight of all the maintenance issues of 
the four buildings the incubator occupies.   
     
Location within the Central Florida Research Park  
The UCF Technology Incubator is located in the Central Florida Research Park (CFRP).  
The Central Florida Research Park, abutting the main UCF campus, is a university related 
research park established as a result of legislation passed by the Florida Legislature in 
1978.  
 
The objectives of the Central Florida Research Park are in keeping with the legislative 
action which enabled its creation "to encourage and promote the establishment of research 
and development activity combining the resources of institutions of higher learning, 
private sector enterprise involved in pure or applied research, and state or federal 
governmental agency research." 
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Totally planned to provide a campus-like environment for businesses adjacent to UCF, the 
Central Florida Research Park consists of over 1,000 acres of land. Businesses which 
desire a "university relationship" can purchase or lease land in the Research Park on which 
to construct a facility or can lease space for office, office / lab, or light manufacturing 
activities. 
 
University organizations, including the Institute for Simulation and Training and the Office 
of Research and Commercialization, are located in the Research Park. The Naval Air 
Warfare Center Training Systems Division, and the Army Simulation, Training, and 
Instrumentation Command (STRICOM), the focal point of the nation's simulation and 
training industry, are headquartered in the Research Park. Over $700 million in federal 
contracts are granted by the Army and Navy each year. 
 
Currently over 100 companies are located in the Research Park pursuing activities in 
simulation and training, lasers, optical filters, behavioral sciences, diagnostic test 
equipment, and oceanographic equipment. Approximately 10,000 employees currently 
work in the Research Park, including many University students and faculty. 
 
Research Park tenants are involved with the University of Central Florida through 
sponsored research, employing faculty as consultants, and utilizing graduate and 
undergraduate students for intern programs and part-time employment. Research Park 
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tenants can also contract with the University for use of the library, computer resources, and 
laboratory facilities. Cooperative projects range from technical research to developing 
business plans and employee training programs. 
 
Current status of the incubator 
 
As of this writing, the UCF Technology Incubator has assisted more than 70 firms.  It has 
55 current clients and has graduated 10 companies.  It was named the Incubator of the Year 
at the National Business Incubator Association’s annual conference in 2004.  It has ranked 
in the top ten listing of incubator programs nationally in terms of revenue growth and jobs 
created for the past three (3) years.  In summary, over the first four (4) years, clients in the 
program have: 
• Created more than 600 jobs, with an average salary of $58,000 
• Raised more than $150M in investment funding 
• Generated more than $140M in revenue 
• The total number of patents held by clients in the incubator = 286 
• The total number of copyrights held by clients in the incubator = 74 
• The total number of trademarks held by clients in the incubator = 47 
• The total number of trade secrets held by clients in the incubator = 64 
Several UCF Technology Incubator clients that have experienced significantly growth 
since entering the program.  In fact, the top five companies account for more than 40 
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percent of the jobs created with one company creating one-sixth (110) of all the jobs 
created.   
 
Incubator Interactions: 
Interaction between clients 
Client interactions range from heavy to non-existent with the average being more toward 
having regular interactions.  Organized events facilitate introductions with other members, 
but the incubator does not require, or force, these relationships.  Relationships formed to 
date include: 
• Buying and selling of services between clients 
• Informal discussion and shared experiences 
• Conducting joint research programs (sub-contracting) 
• Sharing resources 
• Sharing space 
• Bartering for services 
• Sharing of CEO (only in two instances) 
 
Interactions between clients and incubator management 
The UCF Technology Incubator has three management level resources for clients to draw 
upon:  the CEO; COO; and Business Development Manager.  The bulk of management 
time is spent helping entrepreneurs solve their problems by identifying and referring them 
to the right person, or by working as an agent on their behalf.  Between the three 
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management personnel, the incubator has an extensive pool of contacts and resources 
available to clients in a wide range of areas, including accounting, legal, human resources, 
grant writing, and funding.   
 
The interactions and relationships between the entrepreneurs and the staff flow in two 
directions.  Client problems, issues, opportunities are discussed regularly.  Entrepreneurs 
engaged in the program have become the significant source of new clients for the 
incubator.  Their knowledge of the program and its benefits, from the perspective of an 
emerging company, is a valuable recruiting tool.  
 
An example of one of the more interesting interactions was between an existing client that 
needed to expand into specialized facilities.  The client fronted the money to the incubator 
to build out a 6,500 sq ft wet lab.  The incubator is providing a large discount on their rent 
until the $300,000 build-out is paid back with the understanding that when the firms 
graduates, the dept is paid in full.  Another client constructed a clean room from a DARPA 
funded research program that will again, revert to the incubator upon graduation.   
 
There is large component of public relations support in the client – incubator interactions.  
The UCFTI often showcases client accomplishments and sends out regular press releases 
on their behalf.  The incubator also provides regular tours of the incubator to dignitaries, 
politicians, and other officials.  This publicity increases the incubator’s credibility, making 
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it easier to attract external support as well as potential clients.  A large number of existing 
companies first heard about the incubator through the media coverage. 
 
The Incubator CEO has an office located near the incubator and available to clients as his 
schedule permits.  Periodic meetings scheduled between incubator clients and the CEO, 
and planned networking events also help to increase and facilitate consistent interactions.  
E-mails are sent regularly notifying clients about opportunities or upcoming events.  The 
CEO connects people together, with or without himself being present, if he thinks there is a 
possible mutual benefit, such as a qualified applicant looking for a job, a VC looking to 
fund certain types of business, a potential customer or supplier, etc.   
 
The COO is the hub for day to day communications and is accessible at the Incubator or 
through cell phone or e-mail.  She occupies the office at the beginning of the hall across 
from the conference room and posts messages outside her door as to where to reach her 
when she is out.  She is adept at networking and making connections for clients. 
 
The Business Development Manger meets regularly with clients but also participates in 
several informal, hallway discussions.  His main responsibility is to provide strategic and 
tactical support to the clients and plot their progress against milestones developed with 
them.  Clients view him as an excellent person to bounce ideas off and he often provides 
them with advice on how to execute portions of their business plan.    
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Interactions with other staff: 
Clients interact daily with the other staff.  They often find out what is going on with others 
through their encounters when they use their services, or pay rent, or just stop by and chat.  
The communications person constantly provides clients with updates of seminars and 
events; produces a monthly incubator newsletter, and organizes and promotes the 
networking functions.  The facilities manager works with companies to resolve their 
infrastructure needs and helps with their individual production and equipment problems.  
The site managers act as a bridge to the other incubator resources and communicate across 
the various facility boundaries.   
 
Interaction between clients and outside individuals 
Clients spend a large percentage of their time interacting with customers and suppliers and 
other professional service providers.  The majority of these interactions would be similar to 
non-incubator companies.  Additional interactions however, resulted from formal meetings 
such as the UCFTI’s Emerging Business Network and introductions from incubator 
management and staff. 
 
The College of Business Administration facilitates three to seven internships to incubator 
clients as well.  Internships last approximately 9 months (2 semesters) and provide benefits 
to both clients and students.  Students learn first hand about the issues facing start up 
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companies and clients gain access to young talented help that they might otherwise not be 
able to afford.  Students share their experience with others which helps attract more 
students and showcases the College of Business’ entrepreneurship programs, as well as the 
incubator program. 
 
The UCFTI also has an Entrepreneur in Residence program that brings experienced 
entrepreneurs into the incubator.  These mentors maintain office hours several days a 
month, are given business cards, and interact at a very detailed level with a subset of 
incubator clients that aligns with their expertise.  Incubator personnel facilitate 
introductions but after that, the serial entrepreneur and incubator clients are on their own in 
establishing a relationship.  Clients acquire access to talent that they would otherwise have 
a difficult time identifying and affording; and the entrepreneurs in residence are able to 
investigate companies that could represent a new investment or partnership opportunity.   
 
Interactions between Incubator clients and the Incubator Advisory Board 
The incubator management facilitates most of the interaction between the advisory board 
and its clients.  The board supplies most of the professional service provider support for 
the incubator and, as shown below, is broad enough in skills and abilities to address many 
client issues. Current University of Central Florida Technology Incubator Advisory Board 




Baker & Hostetler 
Central Florida Innovation Corporation 
City of Orlando 
Deloitte & Touche 
Ernst & Young 
Foler & Lardner 
Gallogly Fernandez & Riley 
Greenberg Traurig, P.A. 
Grubb & Ellis 
Florida High Tech Corridor Council 
Inflexion Partners 
Commission 
NAI Realvest Partners 
Orange County Government 
Orlando Business Journal 
Benefits Division Inc. 
Seminole Technology Business 
Incubation Center 
SolomanSmithBarney 
Technological Research and 
Development Authority  
University of Central Florida   
Wordwise 
Metro Orlando Economic Development 
 
Access to external funding sources 
Incubator management helps companies identify potential funding sources and facilitates 
introductions at appropriate times.  This ranges from joint university / business research 
grants to loans to angel investors and VC firms.   
 
The University’s Office of Research and Commercialization provides access to staff that 
specialize in locating funding sources, and help identify faculty with matching technical 
expertise.  This service is provided at no charge to the clients.  Joint research can also 
qualify for matching research funds under the Florida High Tech Corridor program which 
is administered by the Office of Research and Commercialization.  The Small Business 
Development Center maintains an office in the incubator and provides assistance to 




The UCFTI’s Business Development Manager works closely with Angel Investment 
groups to marshal or guide introductions of attractive opportunities, when the company is 
at the right stage.  While no guarantees can be made, the BDM does conduct a first level 
screening of the companies to provide the angel investors with a list of high quality 
companies for consideration. 
 
The incubator has a Venture Capital firm on site to provide assistance to companies and to 
encourage investment in promising ventures.  Inflexion Capital group pays for one office 
and the incubator pays for one in exchange for them acting as a resource in the 
development of incubator firms that ultimately desire institutional funding for their 
companies capital needs.  The University’s Research Foundation also invested capital in 
Inflexion to help the firm raise its initial fund.  The investment did not carry any 
stipulations requiring investment in university spin outs or incubator clients.  The aim is 
that the relationship will eventually provide much needed community infrastructure and 
benefit the region in general. 
 
Access to the university 
The incubator is part of the university and acts as a conduit to many resources.  The recent 
annual survey of clients reveals the following: 
Number of faculty working with companies:   54 
Number of students working part time or interning:  46  
Number of UCF students hired:    56 
Level of research funding to UCF from joint research: $5M 
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Additionally, clients can access the UCF library, recreation facilities, internet backbone, 
technical, business, and even cultural assets.  UCF has a student body of approximately 
45,000 students and 1,200 faculty members. The university also offers shared user 
facilities, with access available to the clients.  A most notable resource from the 
incubator’s perspective is the Material Characterization Facility (MCF).  Access to this 
facility and its state of the art equipment formed the basis for starting one incubator 
company, NanoSpective.  NanoSpective rents time on the facility’s equipment, off hours, 
to perform the majority of the diagnostic services it provides to customers.  NanoSpective 
staff, which are well trained in the operation and use of the equipment, often help train 
university graduate students on how to use the equipment. 
 
Access to Community and local Government Economic Development Agencies 
The incubator works closely with several local and state economic development 
organizations including the Greater Orlando Economic Development agency, Enterprise 
Florida, City and County municipalities, The Florida High Tech Corridor Council, and 
UCF’s Office of Economic Development.  These resources have helped put together 
incentive packages for several incubator clients, secure workforce development dollars, 




A notable example is Orange County and UCF sharing the cost to build a biotech 
greenhouse on the campus of UCF.  The green house will support research being 
commercialized by a UCF faculty spin out company.  UCF transferred the technology in 
exchange for an equity position in the company, and royalties based on sales.  This enabled 
UCF to retain the researcher at the university and hopefully, preserve a large part of the 
company’s operations in Central Florida.     
 
The City of Orlando and Orange County both are major sponsors of the incubator program, 
providing $100,000 per year each.  Both support the Incubator and its programs in non-
financial ways as well and the incubator is an integral part of both organization’s economic 
development initiatives.   
 
Access to other entrepreneurial support organizations 
Incubator clients are introduced to and encouraged to interact with external entrepreneurial 
organizations including: 
• The National Entrepreneur Center 
• The Small Business Development Center 
• The Kauffman Foundation 
• The National Inventors and Innovators Alliance 
• The UCF Student Entrepreneur Society 
• The NSF funded Center for Entrepreneurship and Technology Commercialization 
• The Florida Business Incubator Association 
• The UCF College of Business and its Technology Entrepreneurship Institute 
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As would be expected, the interactions vary considerably from client to client but most 
have contact at some point during their residency in the program..  
 
A notable relationship is the National Colligate Inventor’s and Innovators Alliance 
(NCIIA).  Funding provide by this organization helped to create “E-Teams” focused on 
developing companies based on university technology.  These student teams worked with 
faculty to test the market and technical feasibility of a technology at UCF’s Institute for 
Simulation and Training (IST), eventually winning the annual UCF business plan 
competition and opening a company in the incubator.  Additionally, the NCIIA sponsors a 
one day “Invention to Venture” entrepreneurship boot-camp that provided more than 230 
attendees last year with a crash course in business.  The event featured the former CEO of 
America On-line as a key note speaker.  In addition, the founder of Atari and Chucky 
Cheese gave a session on “Is Entrepreneurship for you?”      
 
Summary 
The success of the UCF Technology Incubator has been well publicized in various media 
and with the National Business Incubator Association.  This revolutionary growth occurred 
so quickly that it is difficult to confidently point to any particular set of factors that stand 
out as differentiators.  The incubator provides many tours and overviews of the program, 
however, to groups from around the world seeking to understand and replicate the formula 
for their regions.  The goal of these visits is to identify specific practices and hallmarks of 
it’s success. 
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The keys to success appear to be the network of partners, service providers, and 
entrepreneurs that contribute to the program, access to the resources of a large research 
university, and a healthy or beneficial reputation as the place to go to start a high tech 
company.  The reputation benefits have been key for attracting increasingly sophisticated 
and successful clients.  A positive feedback loop has been established in the sense that 
better companies add to the credibility of the incubator, attracting better clients that add 
credibility, and so on.  The current twenty-one hour selection process has proven to be an 
effective self filtering process and helps ensure high quality clients. 
 
The incubator is a fully functioning part of a larger incubation system.  It is however, one 
of the more visible parts of the system that facilitates and catalyzes much of the high tech 
economic development activities of the region, particularly when the university is 
involved.  It is a tool for the university’s technology transfer activities and the region’s 
local economic development partners.  Local Angel and Venture capital firms view the 
incubator as a place to find the best investment opportunities and appreciate the monitoring 
services provided by the incubator program.    The eco system for the UCFTI is shown in 


















Figure 22:  UCF Technology Incubator Eco System 
Incubator - UCFTI Eco System
New 














Research Park with 100 
companies, 10,000 high 
tech workers
Credible introduction to 
























  Support level: Support level: Support level: 
 Selection Criteria rigorous 
Rigorous (30 % 
acceptance, 21 
hour course) rigorous 
  Support level: Support level: Support level: 
 Types of Firms  Mixed technology  
  Support level: Support level: Support level: 
 Leasing arrangements  flexible leases  
  Support level: Support level: Support level: 





Strong (more available 
than possible to attend) 
  Support level: Support level: Support level: 
 Incubator management Strong 
Experienced 
managers (CEO & 
COO) strong 
  Support level: Support level: Support level: 
 Location  
Medium to large 
metro  
     
  Support level: Support level: Support level: 
 Credibility Strong Strong Strong (place to be) 
     
  Support level: Support level: Support level: 
 











Note:  Support levels:  Strong = dominant theme in this data that is consistently supported;  
      Moderate = a frequent, but not constant theme; Rare (Weak) = this theme rarely is found; 
      Sporadic = a theme that appears now and then in this data source.   












  Support level: Support level: Support level: 
 
Interactions between 
clients and community strong strong strong 
  Support level: Support level: Support level: 
 
Interactions among 
Entrepreneurs moderate strong varies by company 
  Support level: Support level: Support level: 
 
Interactions between 
clients and outside 
individuals strong 
strong (frequent leads 
provided) Strong (great rolodex) 
  Support level: Support level: Support level: 
 
Access to incubator 
advisory board Strong 
Strong (provides many 
hours of help) Strong 
  Support level: Support level: Support level: 
 





introduction, some success, 
could be better 
Good introductions 
provided, deals slow 
to materialize 
     
  Support level: Support level: Support level: 
 
Access to steeples of 
excellence Strong 
strong (Location in 
university research park) Strong 
     
     
Note:  Support levels:  Strong = dominant theme in this data that is consistently supported;  
      Moderate = a frequent, but not constant theme; Rare (Weak) = this theme rarely is found; 
      Sporadic = a theme that appears now and then in this data source.   




Community 2 - UCFTI    
Indicator Incubator Documents 
Interviews with 
Incubator Managers 
Interviews with Incubator 
Clients 
  Support level: Support level: Support level: 
 
Interactions between 
incubator and community 
Strong, many partners 
listed 
Strong, often team up to 
meet regional goals and 
objectives  
  Support level: Support level: Support level: 
 
Interactions between 
incubator and Local 
Government Strong (shared vision) Strong (shared vision) 
Strong, local mayor county 
chair visits 
  Support level: Support level: Support level: 
 
Interactions between 
incubator and local 
Economic Development 
agencies Strong 
Strong, EDC co-sponsor 
& partner 
Strong (EDC staff 
frequents monthly brown 
bag luncheon) 
  Support level: Support level: Support level: 
 
Interactions between 
incubator and funding 
sources 
Strong (VC located in 
facility) 
Strong, could always be 
better, need gap fund 
Good, VC and angel 
investor frequently 
available 
  Support level: Support level: Support level: 
 
Interactions between 
incubator and other 
entrepreneur support Strong 
Strong (SCORE, SBDC, 
NEC, others) Strong (buffet) 
Note:  Support levels:  Strong = dominant theme in this data that is consistently supported;  
      Moderate = a frequent, but not constant theme; Rare (Weak) = this theme rarely is found;  
      Sporadic = a theme that appears now and then in this data source.   
Table 46:  Other Community Specific Data; UCFTI 
                 CHAPTER FIVE:  CONCLUSIONS 
 
Discussion of Common Findings 
The top-performing incubators in terms of new job creation, as identified by the previous 
empirical studies from which these cases were selected, are all located within or adjacent 
to a major research university, medical institution, or federal laboratory, or in an otherwise 
resource-rich environment. The incubators themselves have become known for assisting 
fast-growth technology firms and as a place to be and be seen for up and coming 
companies.  These technology incubation programs have successfully exploited the nearby 
research institutions and environments to provide their start-up firms with networks of 
highly specialized technical assistance providers, qualified workforces (including relatively 
low-cost graduate students), specialized laboratories, and equipment. In addition, these 
affiliations provide the entrepreneurial firms with credibility and reputation benefits.  The 
result is these firms are able to attract highly qualified employees, have credibility with 
suppliers and customers, and have priority access to private venture and angel financing. 
 
In terms of better understanding what the best practices are in technology business 
incubation, these cases reinforce the importance of the organizational and economic 
context in which technology incubators operate. This includes their linkages to research 
universities and laboratories, and their relative location to a high concentration of 
technology-based companies and associated business support firms (e.g., accountants, 
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intellectual property lawyers, human resource consultants).   Incubators can help fill 
resource gaps in regions where the concentrations of business support firms or specialized 
resources are low.  To achieve the desired level of success, it is therefore imperative that 
incubator and community economic developers pay attention not just to creating a sound 
incubation program but also to the contextual and linkage issues.  While colleges and 
universities are not the primary owners and operators of business incubators, they are 
affiliated with a disproportionately large share of technology incubators and account for 
most of the top performing programs.   
 
Scott Shane’s (2004) research into academic entrepreneurship reveals some very 
interesting information concerning university based startups in general.  He asserts that:  
• University-Based Ventures (UBVs) increase local economic strength and 
diversification 
– Average UBV creates $10M in economic value  
– 80% of UBVs operate in the same state as the university that they came 
from 
– UBVs serve as magnets attracting the infrastructure to support new 
venture creation (VC firms, etc.) 
• UBVs generate 83 high-paying jobs per US UBV 
• UBVs are a unique outlet for uncertain early-stage technologies that would 
otherwise remain unlicensed  
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• UBVs are disproportionately successful 
– 18% of MIT UBVs between 1980-1996 went public - 257 times the rate 
of non-university startups 
– Only 20% of 134 UBVs formed in MIT between 1980-1996 failed by 
1997  
– 68% of 3,376 UBVs founded between 1998-2000 remained open in 2001, 
much higher than the average survival rate of new firms in the US 
– UBVs produce significantly more income for universities than licenses 
• UBVs are emerging as an important source of new ventures 
– US Universities generated an average of 83.5 UBVs from 1983-1990  
– 454 UBVs were created in 2000 – a 444% increase (Pressman, 2002) 
 
 These results provide insight into why university technology incubators would have an 
advantage over non-university based programs and therefore have disproportional 
representation in the top programs rankings.  Shane also reports that over 40% of 
university ventures receive VC or angel funding compared to 1% of traditional startups. 
  
The previous empirical studies that have investigated incubator practices were unable to 
link any of the predictor variables to firm performance. The search for a quantifiable set of 
best practices seems elusive.  Some secondary outcomes however have been shown to have 
statistically significant relationships with such variables as gaining financing and acquiring 
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intellectual property. Perhaps these results reflect what actually is important in technology 
business incubation.  
 
In other words, assistance services that directly impact significant business issues are what 
matter most.  Other issues are most affected by external markets and economic events, far 
beyond the reach of the incubator.   It is intuitive that funding, and the ability to maintain a 
sustainable competitive advantage over the competition (patents), would be more 
important than items such as shared conference rooms, formal coaching programs, an 
internet connection or the background of the incubator manager. 
 
The case studies of top ranked programs reflect on these issues as well. It was not obvious 
from the cases studied that there is any consistent pattern of incubator assistance programs 
that are consistently present in the top programs and conversely absent in programs that 
have not performed as well using job creation as our base line indicator.  Some incubators, 
particularly those with relatively naïve entrepreneurs leading client companies, had fairly 
structured programs, with clear milestones and mandatory reviews of progress towards 
expectations.  Others, with more experienced entrepreneurs, had a much more relaxed and 
available-on-demand approach to assistance.  The biotech incubators that dominated the 
top ten program list, all cited the facility as the most important service provided and did 
not offer the type of entrepreneurial development content present in other programs.  It was 
also clear across all of the exemplary programs that incubator managers judged no single 
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assistance practice to be of such importance that they universally applied it across clients. 
This, in itself, would account for the low quantitative relationships between practices and 
outcomes reported elsewhere in this report.  
 
The obvious conclusion would be that the value of services is more a function of client 
entrepreneurial skill level, business needs, or regional deficiencies than by specific 
program offerings.  The case studies also revealed a vast difference in the skill levels of 
entrepreneurs both between programs and within individual incubators. While difficult to 
quantify, all entrepreneurs are not created equal and that the ability to enhance the skill 
level of any individual entrepreneur varies considerably.  Further review of the literature 
revealed that Thomas Lyons (2004) recently explained this phenomenon from the 
perspectives of entrepreneurial skills verses the stage of a firm’s development.   
 
Lyons refers to the movement from left to right as a pipeline of entrepreneurs and 
enterprises.  He further asserts that entrepreneurs are successful to the extent that they have 
the necessary skills; entrepreneurs come to entrepreneurship at different levels of skill and, 
entrepreneurial skills can be developed.   This is illustrated in Table 47 based on a recent 






Table 47:  Movement of Entrepreneurs 
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The notion is that entrepreneurs need to reach certain skill levels to move firms down the 
pipeline.  He asserts the following:  
• Movement to any other segment of the pipeline (i.e., cell in the map) requires a 
transformation.  
• The ability of an enterprise company to move to the next stage in its lifecycle 
depends on the skill of the entrepreneur and/or his or her “team.”  
• There are a variety of possible outcomes in the pipeline: movement to another 
section of the pipeline, stagnation / arrested development, exit or death.  
• Entrepreneurs and enterprises in each segment of the pipeline have different 
requirements in terms of their needs and the service infrastructure that is 
necessary to support them.  
• Movement within the pipeline is dynamic; companies do not necessarily stay in 
a particular segment for long.  
• “Peers” are entrepreneurs at the same skill level, no matter what stage in the 
lifecycle their business is operating. 
• “Role models” are entrepreneurs who are at a higher skill level and/or whose 
business is at a later stage in its development.  
 
Given the realities of what incubators do during a company’s tenure in the incubator, it 
follows that the higher the skill level of the entrepreneurs attracted to a particular program, 
the more quickly the firm will progress in the pipeline.  This would manifest itself as more 
jobs created, more revenue, and a higher success rating for the incubator.   
 
The shortcomings observed in the empirical research data is a reflection of shortcomings in 
the incubator industry.  The Advisory Committee for the Tornatzki (2003) survey and the 
field-testing of the questionnaire used in the study showed that incubator managers did not 
feel that they were able (or inclined) to provide detailed numbers on either the past and 
current performance levels of client companies or the scope and extent of services that they 
delivered to client companies. In effect, it appears that most managers do not consistently 
monitor theses actions or the resulting impact.  The results suggest that future 




This is not just a research methodological issue. It raises the question: What is the level of 
firm diagnosis and proactive provision of assistance, or organized programming that is 
actually operating in incubator programs?  Put another way, if incubator managers and 
staff are operating primarily or exclusively as referral or networking operations or 
specialized real estate operations, then we are back to the question of what is business 
incubation?  
 
Additional insight on this may be derived by looking at the town of Fairfield Iowa.  A 
recent trip there by this author uncovered some exceptional findings in terms of what 
defines incubation.  A case study on Fairfield was added to the case studies.   Certainly one 
could argue that this town is a very effective incubator that is conceptually outside the 
traditional incubator model. 
 
Wu (2005) asserts that creativity and curiosity are key ingredients for innovation, so it is 
not too surprising that many communities are looking for ways to increase the creative 
spirit among their residents and businesses.  Wu examined seven American cities as well 
as Dublin, Bangalore and Hong Kong to identify common factors and public policies that 
have built these cities into urban hubs of creative industries. Wu defines these cities as 
having a concentration of creative industries that generate products protected by 
intellectual property (IP) laws and that house the creative workers for those industries. Wu 
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notes the “creative class” includes occupations in architecture, design, engineering, 
entertainment and science.  
 
According to Wu, several factors appear to form an important role in boosting the 
creativity quotient of an urban area, including:  
• Clustering of activity – geographic concentrations of interconnected businesses and 
organizations in a particular industry or sector;  
• Ease of entry for small firms and a supportive environment within the cluster;  
• Higher levels of new business formation via start-ups and spin-offs;  
• An existing and growing pool of labor talent; and,  
• A creative milieu that nurtures creativity and innovation.  
 
Many creative clusters emerge because they have successfully leveraged a “locational 
advantage.” Wu cites a number of locational factors, including successful anchor firms, 
mediating organizations, an appropriate base of knowledge and skill, and diversity and 
quality of place. He also cites recent research that indicates high levels of R&D spending, 
effective IP protection, openness to competition, and a focus on higher education spending 
positively influence innovative input.  This again points to the importance of understanding 
the larger context in which incubators operate. 
 
 238
The case studies also pointed out some additional deficiencies in the empirical data.  The 
first issues relate to how the top ten incubators were identified in general.  As shown 
earlier in Table 15, five of the top ten incubators in terms of the increases in jobs were in 
the biotech / biomed sector, but only one biotech incubator appeared in Table 16 which 
displays the top ten incubators in terms of revenue generated.  The conclusion from the 
previous empirical study assert that these companies added jobs at a faster rate based on 
venture funding instead of revenue.  When incubator managers were asked to explain this 
phenomenon the conclusion was more attributable to the fact that these companies are in 
incubators for much longer periods of time.  These companies added jobs at a rate that 
some thought were slower than most other companies.  Incubator managers stated that the 
average stay for a software company was 24 months while a biotech company was 
typically four to seven years.  The study did not take this into account only asking for 
increases in jobs from entry into the program until the time the company completed the 
survey. 
 
Discussion of Specific Findings 
Postulation 1: Successful incubators are a part of a larger local economic development 
system and their success is significantly tied to the larger development system. 
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Prior research has suggested that incubation should be viewed in the larger context.  This 
research explored the notion that successful incubators are integrated into a larger 
enterprise development system (Smilor 1987). Theoretical arguments and increasing 
empirical evidence that innovation fosters economic growth have been fundamental to the 
emergence of technology business incubation as part of an innovation-based economic 
development strategy at the state and local level (DiGiovanna and Lewis, 1998; Shahidi, 
1998; Lewis, 2001; Tornatzky et al., 1996).    
 
Table 48 summarizes this study’s evidence on the issue of successful incubators as part of 
a larger local economic development system.  As the evidence shows, all the successful 
incubators exhibited strong ties to a larger system.  The roles varied significantly as was 
illustrated in the maps of the Eco Systems developed in the case study section.  Incubators 
A, B, G and I were biotech incubators with roles contributing to their Eco Systems focused 
on providing specialized facilities, shared resources, and access to protected intellectual 
property.  Incubators C, D, E, and F were mixed technology or software / IT focused and 
concentrated much less on the facility and more on networking and company development.  
Incubators A, D, and E provided significantly less entrepreneurial development assistance 






Table 48: Summary of case study finding: Degree of Integration into larger ecosystem 
     







From Interviews with 
Incubator Clients Comments 
Incubator 
A Strong Strong   
Small part in one sense of 
larger, well developed system 
(role player) 
Incubator 
B Strong (web) Strong Strong 
Part of regions plans to 
develop high tech region, lots 






presentations) Strong   
Integrated into or leads many 
to many state programs.  
Entry point for many new 




articles) Very strong   
Relies heavily on existing 
system to provide talent, 
entrepreneurial support, 







talent   In very rich community 
Incubator 
F Moderate - strong Strong   
The university is basically the 
majority of the eco system 
Incubator 
G Strong Strong   
Part of  state private / public 
partnership to build strong 
biotech pipeline 
Incubator H       
Incubator 
I Strong Strong   
Part of university and state 




J Strong Moderate Moderate 
hard to determine how well 
actual integration realized, 
contradictory evidence 
UCFTI Strong Very strong Strong Built into program from start 
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Conversely, Incubator J, which was not one of the premiere programs, was not as well 
integrated into the region or within the university of which it was a constituent.  The 
incubator’s stated mission centered only on incubating university faculty startups; 
interactions between the community and the program were essentially no existent.    
Incubators B, C, E, H and to a lesser degree, incubator G are from regions not associated 
with large numbers of venture capital firms or angle investors.  The incubators in these 
areas all had well established relationships with investment firms from other regions and 
had the ability to provide credible introductions between viable investment opportunities 
and investors.  They often provided regional angel investors with seminars or other 
training opportunities, and regularly entertained venture capitalists with tours of their 
facilities.  These incubators often had to reach out to their community as well to help 
provide professional services to clients. 
 
Incubator G exemplifies an attempt to create an Eco System for a specific cluster, i.e., 
biotech.  In addition to seven specialized incubators, the state has created a venture fund, 
seed and gap funds, project funds, and also supports numerous industry associations.  This 
is all done to create economic wealth in the state by taking advantage of several national 
laboratories and rich universities in the area. 
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It was clear that successful programs do not operate in a vacuum.  The larger development 
system varied significantly depending on the region and the type of clients served.  The 
Eco System maps developed in the case studies illustrate the various systems operating in 
the case study incubators. 
 
The overall conclusion from the case study data is that the evidence confirms the 
postulate.  
 
Postulation 2: The best incubators fill in the gaps by focusing local, often disconnected 
resources, thereby allowing companies to fail or succeed because of market forces, not 
because of a lack in regional assets.  
 
Previous research by Lewis (2003) concludes that incubators can make up for a lack of 
regional capacity for the times that an incubator company is a client of the incubator.  Prior 
quasi-experimental research has empirically documented that incubator tenants out-
perform a control group of similar firms and that incubator programs have positive 
demonstrable effects on client firms (Shahidi, 1998; Culp, 1996; Allen and Bazan, 1990).  
Culp’s (1996) research showed that incubator clients grow at an accelerated rate during 
their tenure in an incubator, but then fall off to the region’s rate upon graduation.   
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In this study, the question, “Do you believe your incubator fills in gaps in region resources, 
i.e., access to funding, professional service providers?” was asked in each interview.  The 
responses were moderate to strong, depending on how each interviewee initially 
interpreted the question.  
 
Incubators B, C, F, and to slightly less degree incubator I, which are located in small to 
medium sized markets felt strongly that the Incubator did fill in for many of the gaps in the 
local region in terms of access to funding sources, professional services providers, and 
entrepreneurship training, support, and mentoring.  Conversely however, Incubators A, D, 
and G believed the Incubator helped to exploit regional strengths in specific industry 
clusters, (biotech and software).   
 
Incubator I stated that it helps facilitate introductions to outside service providers and 
investors as appropriate but the core mission is not to create jobs for the surrounding 
region.  The program’s main focus is to exploit the strong research programs of the 
university through technology commercialization and resulting spin-out companies.  
Incubator I understands that its small community is not always able to capture the full 
benefits from a successful spin out in terms of jobs, as many of these companies will 
relocate or be acquired should the technology development prove successful. 
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Incubator J acts mainly as a promoter or cheerleader, for companies, but will often 
recommend certain known vendors to clients in need of specialized support.  The Incubator 
does not offer an active training or mentorship program as of this writing but does 
anticipate developing one in the near future.  Table 45 summarizes the results from the 
interviews.   
 




Table 49, Summary of findings: Fill gaps 












A Strong Moderate Strong The gap they fill is facility based 
Incubator 
B Strong Strong   
Works well to identify external 
talent and uses shared service 
approach. VC provides financial 
advice 
Incubator 
C Strong Strong evidence   
They lead much of the statewide 
small business assistance 
programs 
Incubator 
D Moderate Moderate   
Very well connected community 
that is a world leader of resources 
Incubator 
E Moderate Moderate   
Very well connected community 
that is a world leader of resources 
& commerce 
Incubator 
F Strong Strong Strong 
The university and the incubator 





perspective   
Fill need for very specialized 
infrastructure to advance the 
development of the states biotech 
sector.  Also have access to gap 
funds and loans 
Incubator 
I Strong Moderate to strong Very Strong 
Provide directly or indirectly from 
outside resources  
Incubator 




Stated that they introduce clients 
to a selected list of potential 
providers of services 
UCFTI Strong (PR, web) Moderate to Strong Strong 
Provides a large amount of 
resources, some in the community 
and some via outside connections 
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Postulation 3: Areas that take advantage of “Steeples of Excellence” which they are able to 
draw upon contribute significantly to startup companies and hence incubator success. 
 
As Shane (2004) pointed out in his research, university based ventures are 
disproportionately successful.  These ventures go public 257 times more often than non 
university spin outs, have a higher success rate (68%), and obtain institutional investment 
at a rate that is 44 times the national average. 
 
Previous studies by Lewis (2003) and Tornatzki (2003) confirm that university affiliated 
incubators dominate the list of the most successful programs.  In fact, several of the top ten 
programs existed solely to exploit the intellectual capital generated by the research efforts 
of the universities or national laboratories in the region. 
 
Incubators A, D, F, G, and I are exceptional at successfully taking advantage of the 
steeples of excellence in proximity to their location.  Incubators B, C, E, also owe much of 
their success to these steeples, some directly and some indirectly in terms of the support 
provided to clients generated from the community, and were not as often directly the result 
of research at these centers.   
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Incubator J, the non top performing case, is located at a university that is in an area that has 
a strong biotech cluster.  The incubator however does not offer any specialized facilities to 
take advantage of this regional asset.  The incubator’s client base is mixed, with two client 
companies operating in the IT space and another client operating in the electronics (RF) 
industry sector.  While there is some regional talent in these sectors, the area is not known 
as an industry leader and the university conducts limited research in these two topics.  
Table 50 contains a summary of the findings from the case studies. 
 
The overall conclusion that the case study evidence confirms postulate 3. 
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Table 50,  Summary of findings: Steeples of excellence 
     
  From Public Sources 
From Interviews with 
Incubator Managers 
From Interviews with 
Incubator Clients Comments 
Incubator 
A 
Strong (web, press 
releases, client 
speeches) 
Strong (part of medical 
school) Strong   
Incubator 
B Strong Moderate to strong   




Web and PR supports 
moderate to strong 
Strong, 30% of 
companies are based on 
university developed IP, 
intensive connection to 
university   
Good biotech at 
university 
Incubator 
D Very strong 
Very strong.  Region 
known as leader in this 
field   
Software specialized in 
area known for this 
Incubator 
E Strong 
Strong, largest sources 









G Very Strong 
Very strong.  Region 
known as leader in this 
field   
Numerous national labs a 
top ranked universities 
Incubator 
H         
Incubator 
I 






university IP, create 
jobs, show results   
$450 Million in 
Research, NSF ERC, 
Center of Excellence 
Incubator 
J Weak Weak connection 
Weak, client stated 
that there were few 
interactions between 
him and others beside 
manager of incubator 
Program hasn't tapped 
into large university 
research base as of yet.  
UCFTI Very strong Very strong Very strong 
Strong, 80% of 
companies in areas that 
university has strength in 
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Postulate 4:  The selection process for incubator clients significantly bias incubator client 
success measures.   
 
When reviewing the empirical data concerning the rigorousness of the selection process for 
incubator clients, the average score was 3.7 on a 4 point scale.  This would imply that a 
very strict process and criteria is utilized in the application process.  The case study 
information reveals that this is not always the case, even with the top incubators.   
 
Regardless of the survey results, there is pressure in most, if not all, incubation programs,   
to keep buildings occupied.  Sometimes it is a financial issue, sometimes political, and 
sometimes just a desire to reach capacity.  Incubator A, C, D, G, and I all admitted that 
clients undergo a formal application process but that as many as 95% are accepted.  In the 
case of Incubator A, the program competes for tenants with other facilities, and measure 
success by how many deals (leases) are completed.  Incubator B has recently expanded 
their facilities and admitted that the selection criterion will lax until the new facility is 
closer to full.   
 
Incubator J is under serious pressure to reach the level of activity of other peer institutions.  
Incubator J is less that 20 percent occupied and believes it needs to recruit new clients.  
While the acceptance criterion was less restrictive for Incubator J, the rate of clients opting 
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to join the program was low due to some laborious terms and conditions placed on the 
companies to join the program.  These terms were recently abolished and inquires to join 
the program are encouraging.  
 
Incubator C’s selection process is the most rigorous of the cases.  It is one of the more 
established programs and admits that its requirements were not always as strict.  The 
Incubator is planning on reducing the size of the facilities to help maintain a high standard 
of clients in the program by reducing their capacity for clients.   
 
New programs appear especially susceptible to establishing low entry standards and will 
admit just about anyone to the program in the beginning.  Incubator I stated that it would 
not be especially selective until it added a few more companies to fill in the empty space.  
The building was paid for in this instance so it was not driven by financial concerns.  The 
manager stated the desire to be able to show political leaders that the effort was actively 
delivering on the promise of economic development and commercialization of university 
research.     
 
The selection criterion was least rigorous in the non top performing incubator and highest 
in the more established programs.  The trend being that once the buildings are mostly full, 
it was easier to become more selective.  Three incubator managers stated that once they 
reached capacity and started becoming more selective, the improved clientele helped 
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bolster the incubator’s credibility, which helped recruit even better clients, and so on.  This 
indicates that the credibility of the clients and the incubator are dependent on each other.  It 
is therefore incumbent on the incubator to attract and market success early to insure a 
strong base of client companies from which to build. 
 
This would suggest that if the goal is to select the best possible candidates for a program 
the best option would be to start small and then expand to some point where the supply of 
high quality client companies equals the capacity of the incubator to serve them.  Building 
an expansive and costly facility would tend to create pressure on managers to fill the space 
even at the cost of letting in clients that are not ideal candidates.  Table 51 below 
summarizes the evidence collected in the studies.    
 




Table 51,  Summary of findings: Selection process 
      














Weak from incubator 
selection perspective, 
Clients select 
Incubator     
Try to do as many 




facility filled, then 
will be more selective     
Recent expansion has 
eased backlog 
Incubator 
C Rigorous Rigorous   Rigorous   
Incubator 
D Rigorous Rigorous       
Incubator 
E Rigorous Rigorous process 
Rigorous from 
process perspective Rigorous 
Process is difficult but 
95% are admitted 
Incubator 
F Moderate Moderate     
University spinouts 
account for majority of 
companies 
Incubator 








facility filled, then 
will be more selective 
Weak, just need to 
need facilities Rigorous 
Pressure to show 




Weak, need to fill 
building Weak, asked to join Rigorous 
Severe pressure to get 
make the program 
more successful and 
success measured by 
number of clients 
UCFTI Rigorous Rigorous Rigorous Rigorous 
Accepts less than 40%, 





There was no doubt that the top incubator programs added considerable credibility to the 
clients in the program.  This was confirmed by managers and clients alike in the 
interviews.  This credibility helped the client companies secure customers, management 
and staff, and funding.  It also provided them access to top lawyers, accountants, and other 
professional service providers.   
 
The results were mixed with the lower performing programs.  The managers believed 
strongly that the incubator added credibility but the client interviewed stated that 
participating in the program only helped in the very beginning, and the client is now 
actually losing credibility by being associated with the program.  
 
When examining biotech companies the credibility issue is different.  It is the facility and 
physical attributes of the incubator that dominant the incubator client’s credibility with 
customers, investors and employees. Access to state of the art wet labs, specialized and 
expensive equipment are key factors in the success of these companies.  One investor 
commented that the leverage offered by biotech incubators to companies really influences 
his investment decision. This investor believed that more of his investment would be used 
to deliver products to market and not be tied up in expensive equipment with little 
perceived salvage value. 
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There appears to be two distinct types of credibility that emerged in the interviews.  The 
first type centers on the instant credibility a company would receive by being in the 
facility, as opposed to working out of their garage.  The second is related to the reputation 
that the incubator conveys in terms of being a sought after location for successful high tech 
companies. 
 
Credibility issues vary according to the type of industry sector as well.  What provides 
credibility in the biotech industry is different than that of a software firm.  In biotech 
credibility stems from the access to high tech infrastructure and promising technical 
results, whereas with a software firm the credibility would be based more on filling a 
market need and the ability of the team to get the product to market.  These and other 
factors that effect credibility are illustrated in Figure 23.  
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Credibility









Type of industry Effects slope of curve 
Reputation of incubator Effects magnitude of curve 
Location  Effects magnitude and slope  
Age of incubator Incubator dependent 
 




This study confirms the difficulty of discovering and defining the secrets of incubation 
success.  The data collected from the case studies sometimes confirmed and sometimes 
contradicted the empirical results.  In other instances, the cases added substantial insight to 
the underlying issues.    
 
To assist with the derivation of conclusion, the information collected from each source was 
cataloged using the research instruments developed for the study.  Individual answers were 
summarized in table form and then placed in a summary sheet for the different issues of 
concern.  Patterns supporting or contradicting were then easy to identify.    
 
Postulation 1: Successful incubators are a part of a larger local economic development 
system and their success is significantly tied to the larger development system. 
 
Conclusion 1:  It was confirmed that successful incubator programs are well integrated into 
the enterprise development systems operating in their specific areas.  The role that any 
individual incubator plays varies significantly among the programs studied.  The key 
finding is that the role and services provided by the incubator is a function of the larger 
system and the better fit, the better the incubator will be at creating successful companies 
and new jobs for the region.     
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Table 52:  Summary of Evidence for Postulate 1 
Postulate Case study Introspective Empirical 
Incubator part of larger eco system Strong  Strong Strong 
 
Postulation 2: The best incubators fill in the gaps by focusing local, often disconnected 
resources, thereby allowing companies to fail or succeed because of market forces, not 
because of a lack in regional assets.  
 
Conclusion:  The evidence here is unfortunately mixed.  It must be taken in the context of 
Conclusion 1 in that if the specific role of the incubator in a larger system is to fill in gaps, 
then the successful ones do that very well.  The incubator however, does not always 
function in that role.  Three of the top performing incubators, however, were in areas 
where there were arguably no regional gaps to fill and they simply provided specialized 
real estate infrastructure or network connections.  These incubators serve an important role 
in the facilitation of technology development, but did nothing to fill gaps in areas that 
define an incubation or small business development initiative.  These incubators, in 
essence, functioned to exploit strengths, not fill in gaps.   
 
Table 53:  Summary of Evidence for Postulate 2 
Postulate Case study Introspective Empirical 
Incubator fill gaps in regional capacity Mixed  Strong Strong 
 258
Postulation 3: Areas that take advantage of “Steeples of Excellence” which they are able to 
draw upon contribute significantly to startup companies and hence incubator success. 
 
Conclusion 3:  This was confirmed by the study.  All of the top performing incubators took 
advantage of strong connections with research universities or national labs or were in a 
technology rich area.  Half of the top programs studied focused specifically on 
biotechnology developed within research centers and another specifically focused on 
software in a region that specializes in that field.  
Table 54:  Summary of Evidence for Postulate 3 
Postulate Case study Introspective Empirical 
Steeples of Excellence Strong Strong Strong 
 
Postulate 4:  The selection process for incubator clients significantly bias incubator client 
success measures.   
 
Conclusion 4: The evidence did not support this postulation.  While many of the top 
programs were able to attract great companies, the process itself of selecting companies did 
not appear to be the main determinant across the study population.  Some of the top 
programs viewed themselves as competing for clients with other real estate concerns.  
Even the ones that tout rigorous screening admit that as many as 95 percent of applicants 
are accepted and that vacant space often is the main driver of program acceptance criteria.   
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Table 55:  Summary of Evidence for Postulate 4 
Postulate Case study Introspective Empirical 
Rigorous selection process Weak Moderate Strong 
 
Summary 
This research confirms that the search for a check list of best practices for incubation is 
elusive. It is a complicated and daunting task to create successful companies under any 
circumstance.  Each company is different, each region is different, and each entrepreneur is 
not equal in skills or abilities.  Economic development leaders need to do their homework, 
understand the bigger picture and how their incubator should fit into that system, and be 
able to make adjustments as their program and their regions evolve and mature.  
 
The postulates did not contradict the previous research therefore it built on the body of 
knowledge.  It raised additional questions however for future research and can provide 
practical knowledge to practitioners.  
 
Comments and Recommendations 
Future planners and developers of incubation programs must spend the time necessary to 
understand the larger context of the enterprise development system operating in their 
region prior to developing or implementing a program.  The goals and objectives of the 
program should meet the expectation of the community and fit well into the existing 
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system to either fill gaps in regional capacity or exploit existing strengths.  Conversely the 
community must have a well grounded understanding of the incubator’s contribution to the 
local system. 
Regional government, economic development leaders, and financial supporters should also 
understand that the benefits of incubators rarely come directly back to the incubator.  The 
true benefits come from successful graduates of programs remaining in the region, creating 
high value jobs, and economic wealth.   
 
Unoccupied space in an incubator facility creates tremendous pressure to fill it with 
companies.  This may dilute the resources of incubation programs on companies unable to 
help the region meet the intended expectation of the program.  It may be better to start 
small and expand or contract the program to align with the market demand of preferred 
companies.  This strategy, if feasible, will help keep incubator managers from becoming 
real estate agents. 
 
The top performing programs have strong connections to universities.  Universities add 
instant credibility to the incubation program and the companies that reside there.  The most 
successful programs fully leverage the intellectual capital assets (patents, talented faculty 
and students, and facilities) that universities represent.  If a program is not officially part of 
a university, efforts should be made to develop strong connections between the incubator 
and the research and tech transfer operations of the university.   
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Create a shared understanding of what success will mean for the program as soon as 
possible.  Measures such as job creation, revenue generation, graduate companies, the 
successful commercialization of technology, or filling a building are different goals and 
will steer incubator managers in different, possibly unanticipated directions.   
 
It is also important to point out that the top performing incubators in this study have all had 
at least one very successful client.  These clients account for a large majority of the 
employment growth numbers that put these programs at the top of the category.  These 
successes have increased the stature and credibility of the program.  The program is able to 
attract better quality clients, that create better companies and so on and very soon a 
positive feedback loop is created.  The importance of this for economic development 
leaders considering the establishment of new incubation programs is that the age of the 
program was not a factor and young programs can realize tremendous benefits in a 
relatively short time frame.  
 
Future Research 
This search for best practices in incubation revealed the strong need for additional 
research.  Better definitions need to be developed to understand the “what” better so we 
can assist future researchers trying to understand the “how” and the “why.”   
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In general, the incubation industry needs to come together to collect and report meaningful 
data.  This will be difficult given the political, funding, and public relations issues that 
exist.  The reluctance of managers to provide detailed client information is a significant 
hurdle, but one that should be addressed at the national level, possibly by the National 
Business Incubator Association. 
 
The current categorization of incubators does not account for the very different 
characteristics among the groups.  For example, various industry segments require 
different incubation programs to address their needs.  The following subcategories are 
offered for consideration in the technology incubation sector:  (1) Development focus 
(entrepreneur / technology) and (2) Technology focus (mixed, biotech, IT/Software). 
 
The selection bias issue further exploration.  Given the top incubators vary so much on the 
issue, additional research would be insightful for managers.  One item of particular interest 
relates to understanding the root cause of why the data from the empirical study and case 
study interviews differed so significantly.  It could be simply that the survey did not define 
the notion of a rigorous screening process adequately or it could be from reasons more 
political in nature. 
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The issue of credibility surfaced often during the interviews as one of the most important 
contributions an incubator provides to its clients.  While much has been written by 
practitioners and in the popular press, there seems to be little research into the subject of 
incubator client growth increases as a function of the legitimacy provided by being in an 
incubator.  Additional research should also focus on the differences in the legitimacy 
provided to university affiliated incubators verse non affiliated programs.  A search of the 
archives of the NBIA resulted in no research but the term is mentioned in almost every 
issue of their publication, The NBIA Review, in testimonials from clients and managers.  
 
There is a large body of work in the area of legitimacy and the recent study by Stevens et 
al., (2005) confirms that it has a positive effect of client growth.  More research into the 
best practices that positively affect the legitimacy of client firms would prove be very 
useful for economic development leaders planning the next generation of enterprise 
development initiatives.   
 
As pointed out in the literature review, the incubator industry is growing at a fast pace, 
about one incubator per week.  To this point, the industry is still expanding in mostly 
untapped areas with little or no overlap or competition among programs.  As the industry 
grows, future research into the growing competition among programs would provide 
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valuable insights for those contemplating programs that would be in direct competition 
with each other. 
 
Lastly, the research presented here concerning Eco Systems should be extended to a 
national level.  As policy makers determine how federal funding for research dollars is 
spent and in what areas, a better understanding of the systems required to commercialize 
new developments out of the laboratory and into the market place should be developed.  
Technology transfer and incubation should be integral components of new technology 





APPENDIX A:  E-MAIL SENT TO INCUBATOR MANAGERS 
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My name is Tom O’Neal and I am the Director of the UCF Technology Incubator in 
Orlando, Florida.  We were named Incubator of the Year last year by the NBIA and as you 
can guess, have received a lot of inquiries as to what we did to earn this recognition.     
 
I was hoping I could discuss this very subject with you to better understand what practices 
are most important, from your perspective, to the success of an incubator program.  Would 
it be possible for me to call you for an informal interview to discuss the following topics?  
Below are times I have set aside on my Calendar next week.  Please let me know if you 
have a preferred time. 
 
 





What are the top things you feel have contributed most to help your companies become 
successful? 
 
Is your incubator part of a larger incubation system or is it mainly a stand alone entity? 
 
Do you feel your incubator fills in gaps in region resources, i.e., access to funding, 
professional service providers? 
 
Do you feel your incubator adds significantly to the credibility of companies in your 
program? 
 
How rigorous is your screening process? 
 
Have you had a few very successful clients that have driven a lot of your success? 
 
What would you do different if you had it to do over? 






APPENDIX B: GLOSSARY OF INCUBATOR TERMINOLOGY 
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Advisory/Management Board: Individuals who sit on the board of the incubator. Some 
incubator programs have both a management board that directs the “business activities” of 
the program—such as budgeting, personnel matters, etc.—and an advisory board that is 
responsible for providing value-added business services to client firms and assisting the 
manager in her/his duties. In most cases these functions are combined in one board, which 
may have either title. An advisory board usually has representatives from the finance 
community, legal profession, and host institution as well as economic development 
professionals, the manager, members of the entrepreneurial community, and, in the case of 
technology incubators, technology commercialization specialists, among others. When 
constructing the board, it is desirable to ensure that it can assist in providing value-added 
space at an incubator facility but does 
articipate broadly in the incubator program’s entrepreneurial training programs and 
services to client firms and help to embed the incubator program in the local community. 
The networks established by the board should benefit client firms and increase the 
potential of capturing the firms in the local economy after they graduate.  
 
Affiliate Firm: A client firm that does not lease 
p
receives business services from the incubator. 
 
Anchor Tenant: A stable enterprise that does not participate in the entrepreneurial 
training programs. Usually anchor tenants are long-term and lease space at market rates. 
The cash flow provided by an anchor tenant’s rent helps the incubator meet its financial 
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obligation. Anchor tenants may or may not play another role in the incubation process. For 
example, an anchor tenant may be a professional service provider and be available for 
client firms.  
 
 Angel Capital Investor: A private investor who invests in earlier stage companies sums 
typically ranging from $250,000 to $1.5 million. Angel investors tend to be individuals or 
all groups of investors that help entrepreneurs bridge the capital gap between the 
t where 
om stiff market forces with below-market rent, reduced fees for services, and improved 
 
, when they are most vulnerable. Incubators provide hands-
n management assistance, access to financing, and orchestrated exposure to critical 
roof. 
sm
entrepreneurs’ resources and traditional financial markets, including venture capital 
markets.   
 
Business Incubation: A dynamic process of business enterprise development that seeks to 
fill the gaps in entrepreneurial development by providing a supportive environmen
new entrepreneurs receive training in business management skills and marketing, buffered 
fr
access to necessary seed capital (NBIA 2001).   
 
Business Incubators: Facilities designed to nurture young firms, helping them survive and
grow during the start-up period
o
business or technical support services. They also offer entrepreneurial firms shared office 
services, access to equipment, flexible leases, and expandable space—all under one 
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An incubation program’s main goal is to produce successful graduates—businesses th
financially viable and freestanding when they leave the incubator, usually after two to three




Client Firm: Any firm that utilizes the incubator program as either tenant, affiliate, or 
raduate.   
 
Development Team/Community Advisory Team: A group of community members that 
re interested in establishing an incubator program. There should be broad representation 
that increases as the development progresses. Often there is an informal leader(s) who 
champions the cause. The goal of the board is to gauge the level of community interest and 
support, identify potential partners, and determine if a feasibility study should be 
conducted. It is also common that members of this team become advisory board members.   
 
Empowerment Incubator: An incubator focused on fostering the growth of business 
located in areas that face economic challenges, such as high unemployment or distressed 
neighborhoods. They may focus on welfare-to-work clients, women owned businesses, or 
minority-owned enterprises.   
 
Entrance Criteria: Depending in part on the sponsor of the incubator, entrance criteria for 




benchmarks such as local ownership, potential for job creation, type of industry, and 
having a written business plan. Other criteria may include an evaluation of entrepreneurs’ 
commitment to the new enterprise as well as an evaluation of their entrepreneurial skills.   
 
Exit Policies see Graduation Policies.   
 
Feasibility Study: An objective, systematic analysis to determine whether an incubator 
program should be established in the host community.   
 
Graduate Firm: A client (tenant or affiliate) firm that has exited an incubator program 
having completed a set of benchmarked goals. Though exit criteria may also apply to 
 an 
 
ies have a rational hierarchy of both real estate 
and business-development criteria. Firms may exit the incubator as a result of not meeting 
 
not 
while preparing it to pay market-rate rent and 
affiliate firms, most often these goals are part of the lease agreement for tenant firms in
incubator.   
Graduation/Exit Policies: Graduation polic
the real estate criteria (such as noncompliance with the lease agreement or having reached
the pre-designed maximum length of tenancy), although in these cases the former client 
probably did not meet the other benchmarked business development criteria and would 
be considered a graduate. One business development criterion is escalating rent over time 
to cushion the firm’s early-stage cash flow 
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inducing relocation as rent approaches or surpasses the market rate. Having a flexible and 
f 
 for technology incubators as a result of the length of time it takes 
to develop and commercialize new technology products and services.   
 
Incubator without Walls: An incubator program that provides some or all of the 
omplementary business services and entrepreneurial training programs but has no 
physical facility to house tenant firms. Often these services are delivered via the Internet.   
 
Internet/E-Commerce Incubator: An incubator that fosters the development of new 
nterprises engaged in establishing e-commerce businesses.   
nt Board see Advisory Board.   
 
Manager: The executive who directs the operation of an incubator program. A manager 
develops and coordinates business assistance programs and usually provides one-on-one 
counseling and referral services to incubator clients. Other tasks include marketing the 
incubator program, fund raising, client screening, collection of rents and fees for service, 
and managing other incubator personnel.   
explicit time limit on the length of tenancy is another best practice. One of the most 
important goals is firm growth. In the case of technology incubation benchmarked criteria 
may include prototyping, scale production, and full-scale production. The explicit length o







Manufacturing Incubator: An incubator designed to assist new enterprises engaged i
the manufacturing sector. Because of the needs of their clients for manufacturing space in 
addition to office space, they tend to require more square footage than other segments of 
the incubator industry.   
n 
 
ervice Incubator: An incubator that fosters the development of entrepreneurial firms in 
the service industry. Firms range from professional services to household services and may 
be targeted at selected segments of the service industry.   
 
Targeted Incubator: Incubators that focus on assisting start-up companies from a specific 
industry.   
 
Technology Generator: An institution—such as a university, national laboratory, or 
private research and development laboratory—that ensures a sufficient concentration of 
human capital and engages in an adequate amount of R&D to produce numerous 
 
Mixed-Use Incubator: An incubator that does not focus on a particular type of firm and
services clients from a variety of different industries.   
 
S
opportunities for new commercialization ventures.   
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Technology Incubator: An incubator that fosters the growth of new technology venture
by helping to close the gaps in the innovation process and correct for market failures. 
Generally, if 50% of the client base are “technology firms,” then an incubator is considered 
a technology incubator. There is no standard definition of a technology firm. See Appendi
C for a review of the literature on defining a technology indu
s 
x 
stry/firm.   
Ten
busine
program.   
 
Value-Added: In the incubator industry, the concept of value-added refers to the manner 
in which incubator programs enhance the ability of their tenants to survive and grow in the 
market place. The value-added components of an incubation program generally include 
business management and marketing training, affordable rent, shared office services, 
networking opportunities, financial assistance, and, in the case of technology incubators, 
access to host institutions’ facilities and experts. For example, a university-hosted 
technology incubator will generally provide access to its library, laboratories, and faculty 
at no or reduced cost.   
 
Venture Capital: Source of funds for earlier stage enterprises that are on the verge of 
product/service introduction and need an infusion of capital to ramp up to full production. 
 
ant Firm: A client firm that is housed at an incubator facility, receives the menu of 
ss services, and participates in the entrepreneurial training provided by the incubator 
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These funds may also be used for research and development, testing, or prototyping. In 
technology ventures, generally the firm has a developed prototype. Typical funding ranges from 
$5 million to $15 million, the average investment growing steadily from $2.3 million in 1987 to 
$5.6 million in 1995 (ACE-Net). These institutional funds often include union pensions as well 
as individual investors’ capital. 
 
Note: Sources of the above definitions include Molnar et al. (1997), Meeder (1993), DiGiovanna 
and Lewis (1998), Allen and McClusky (1990), Wolfe et al. (2000), the NBIA web site at 
<http://www.nbia.org>, Lewis 2003. 
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